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“For one another” is our name for Wound Building
This is a book about some people. I could say that it’s a book 
about poetry, but in the time it has taken me to write it I’ve be-
come less interested in the meaning of the separation between 
the writing and the lives that give rise to it. Its chapters focus 
on one group of poets (almost all of whom are known to one 
another) active in a self-organizing poetry scene in the UK in 
the period from 2010 until today. Most of them discuss poems 
with little to no audience outside of the scene of their producers, 
the little magazines that they publish, and the reading series that 
they put on. In the early parts of the book I am still ostentatious-
ly engaged in presenting “literary criticism” of these writings. In 
the later ones, not so much.
The poetry is generally violent. When I wrote the first draft 
of this introduction I claimed that it becomes more conscious of 
this fact as time passes, but now that I’ve gone back and read the 
essays through I’m not sure that the opposite isn’t the case. What 
begins as an overtly self-aware poetry of crassness and brutal-
ity over time becomes crass and violent by habit and educated 
instinct. Violence gets turned more frequently back against the 




I think now that violence and crassness have been our Ro-
manticism, our sexual liberation, our freedom movement, in 
the sense of the one thing that it feels most possible to real-
ize and make beautiful and intellectually persuasive. The po-
ets I discuss here write violent love poems and violent elegies 
as well as violent fantasies composed in stabs of violent verse 
and violent prose. They write crass poems for one another full 
of violent images, and they are unable to explain why they do 
this except that they feel at some level as if the violence were 
solidarity and the crassness mutual aid, and their violent little 
magazines and journals carry essays on this feeling of which 
the crassest passages and equivocations make us think it’s true.
It’s not a mystery. We’ve wanted to write about things that 
are unarguable, that are basic to our experience. We’ve wanted 
to give one another new ways of expressing just how unarguable 
and how basic they are. If we teach one another to be impatient, 
breathless, and illogical in language, it’s because there are more 
important things in life than the length of our attention spans 
and the conceptual niceness of our reasoning. If we’ve made art 
that is crass, stupid, and unthinking, it’s because we’ve wanted 
solidarity and mutual aid to be audible in language as shitty, 
impulsive, and emotionally immature as ourselves (and because 
nothing in the world makes us happier than when it is). We have 
been violent for one another and idiotic for one another, and 
sometimes even murderous for one another; but throughout all 
of it we’ve retained the common decency not to be beautiful.
The individual chapters were written between April 2015 and 
February 2020. The poems they talk about are fantasies of the 
murder of David Cameron, dreams of being split open along a 
seam, basement songs, hundreds of pages of notes on working 
life in a privatized care home in Hove, East Sussex, a four-line 
slogan about the Cologne groping scandal of New Year 2016, 
variations on the Refugees Medical Phrasebook, a life wasted in 
a factory in Guangzhou, of permanence, an autobiographical 
sci-fi internet fever dream, an anarchist elegy, and a refusal to 
argue. And I was going to try to say something sensible here 
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about the historical “context” of this writing, and about what 
we’ve been responding to, but one of the lessons the poems have 
taught me is never to write worthy narrative when it seems like 
a fucked up collage will do.
I used to think that this might be a book about Marxism and 
poetry. Insofar as the early chapters have an argument, it has to 
do with this question. I wanted to make a claim about what a 
Marxist poetry might do, or be. Inevitably this entailed an argu-
ment about what it should reject, or despise. It might be worth 
just presenting a sketch of that, if only for safekeeping.
Anyone who is familiar with contemporary art or poetry will 
be familiar with work that recasts itself as a kind of commentary 
on the outputs of the culture industry. Poetry that is about re-
cent pop music, or that becomes a kind of never-ending gloss on 
pop lyrics that stand in for the total affective accomplishment of 
the work with which they are associated, is now a familiar ten-
dency within admired and institutionally recognized literature 
and is written by authors of very diverse basic political tenden-
cies. Work of this kind is, I think, implicitly hostile to self-ini-
tiated artistic activity on realistic social grounds, whether these 
are consciously recognized and theoretically asserted or tacitly 
presupposed and merely internalized. The claim to which they 
assent is that the division of social labor means that only capi-
tal-initiated art can lay claim to primary transformative social 
affects, and that art that is self-organized or self-initiated is con-
demned to serve either as a kind of inquiry into the historical 
meaning of those affects, or at best as a kind of intelligent model 
of how they might be received, cognized, and diversified into in-
stinct and habitual orientation. For art of this kind, the speciali-
zation of self-initiated artmaking represents a kind of destiny, 
which is just one version of the destiny of educated middle-class 
people in the West to be assimilated into the economy’s tertiary 
or service sectors.
As a way of thinking about poetry, “Marxism” for me has 
meant identifying work whose producers have tried, not to 
measure their writing against a body of poems in a canon or 
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predecessor tradition, but against the prevailing social stand-
ard of capital-initiated culture more generally. For authors of 
this poetic tendency, writing that is content to imagine its sig-
nificance in relation to the history of poetry as an institution 
is dumb shit: the complacent niche-formation undertaken by 
those who are content either diligently to ignore the larger de-
velopment of a capital-dependent culture, or else — what is now 
the more respectable current, even in the catalogues of arch-
conservative UK poetry publishing houses — to shore up their 
position in relation to it by reimagining the form in which they 
are working as a kind of institutionalized space for reflection 
on that which they are incapable of meaningfully replicating. 
Marxism for me has therefore amounted to something like an 
attitude. Its practical class consciousness is defined first and 
foremost by a desire to match up to a capital-dependent cul-
ture and the sensations in which it traffics: it is the desire to 
be moving against the odds. Its materialism is defined first and 
foremost by the effort to be as engaging as work that relies on 
an entirely different division of social labor.1 These definitions 
are clearly polemical, underdeveloped, and suggestive, and the 
1 I think that the following passage of Simone White’s Dear Angel of Death, 
which is not speaking about class but about black life in the United States, 
and therefore about an overwhelmingly proletarianized minority living 
under the specific trauma of slavery and white supremacism, lucidly 
articulates what I can only bowdlerize with reference to a more general 
case: “I’m saying, or rather, asking, isn’t it possible that the complex knit 
of song and people, today, confesses a contraction in the imagination of 
freedom from the status of property, plunging headlong into the terrifying 
convergence of blackness with capital the likes of which we have never 
seen and have not begun to understand? Rap music in the new forma-
tion invites motivated consumers — there is no distinction here between 
artist and consumer, there is no distinction here between the sacred black 
(male) expurgation of the inauthentic R&B-type lame forms of emotion 
and the invitation to simulate/sample/make copies of the raw or real or 
‘true’ experience of the black, or black life, such as Murda Beatz […] — to 
participate in ritual conflation of ‘enjoyment’ with disgust”: Simone White, 
Dear Angel of Death (New York: Ugly Duckling Presse, 2018), 136. I have 
written about this book in “Tradition vs. Grid: Simone White’s Dear Angel 
of Death,” Texte zur Kunst 117 (March 2020): 168–76.
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most valuable poetry could very easily be written by people who 
violently disagree with them.
In any case, the passage to this kind of experience of poetry’s 
tasks is necessarily circuitous. It leads out of the scene of poetry 
as a subculture, in which a small group of people are able to 
experience disruptions in the organization of language as a deep 
insight into social reality, and into the wider world of capital-
initiated culture, in which not only the dominant ideas but also 
the dominant sensations are organized by means of the invest-
ment of an inordinate amount of technical proficiency and ex-
pertise. There is no way back towards a meaningful belief in the 
power of poetry to move people on its own terms that does not 
face into this capital-initiated culture and attempt to come to 
terms with it. The expressive insignificance of the declamatory 
political poetry of, say, the 1930s is at least partly due to the fact 
that, in the 2020s, the affects for which it aims all possess, in 
Marx’s terms, a specific technical composition, which is to say 
a level of development defined by all of the materials and tech-
niques that go into the production of capitalist art. Good poetry 
now being written might usefully be considered in these terms, 
and in some of the earlier chapters of this book, this is how I try 
to consider it.
One final point before I summarize the individual chapters. 
If there is a more specific reason for the emergence of a coun-
tertendency to the ideology of immobilization in poetry, which 
is to say to the idea that there is nothing for poetry to do other 
than reflect on capital-initiated culture, then this has to do with 
the transformations of language as a whole. Popular linguistic 
practice has altered in so many ways in the past decade and a 
half that it is maddening to try to keep up with it. It changes 
faster than experience. Its idioms change, its grammars change, 
its orthographies change, its phonological attack changes. In 
the last five years its structural meta-languages have changed, 
in line with the technical requirements of corporate data plat-
forms. Its rhymes, scale, fonts, colors, and music have changed, 
at the initiative of Facebook and Google (the latter now in-
corporated as Alphabet, Inc., in open acknowledgement of its 
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claims on the total ensemble of the means of human commu-
nication viewed from the ground-level right up to its gyrus in 
the Cloud). Whether we can drag our earlier political certainties 
kicking and screaming through the scene of all of this verbiage 
remains unclear. I want to do that, as I think that critics such as 
the Wealth of Negations group and the poet Simone White have 
already done for the materials of corporate managerial jargon 
and contemporary rap respectively. But in any event poetry re-
mains an obvious candidate to measure up the historical cata-
clysms in its medium.2
I have called the volume Wound Building because this is the 
best phrase that I know of for the dominant aesthetics, which is 
to say the aesthetics under whose shadow any group of coun-
ter-practitioners will have to live and work. It isn’t a name for 
a particular genre or group of artists, for instance for the many 
writers whom I discuss in depth in what follows — in particular 
Frances Kruk, Verity Spott, Lucy Beynon, Lisa Jeschke, Xu Lizhi, 
Nat Raha, Keston Sutherland, Porpentine Charity Heartscape, 
Lotte L.S., and Sean Bonney — nor is it a shorthand for the many 
whom I might have done, from the various groups of authors 
now published by Commune Editions in the US, or by Materials, 
Shit Valley, Barque Press, 87 Press, and Veer in the UK, or by a 
multitude of radical poetry journals such as Tripwire, Materials 
2 The logic of this transformation of the medium is itself disarmingly 
simple. Large capitalist interests subcontract to hundreds of thousands of 
enterprising individuals the tasks of breaking up our syntax, increasing 
the turnover of our idioms, retrenching the extent of our paragraphs, and 
flattening out our rhymes, on pain of disappearance from the structures of 
visibility over which those interests have established a complete and lucra-
tive monopoly. Over time, whole new structures of linguistic expectation 
are sunk into our heads like concrete pilings. And what is so challenging 
about this orgy of competitive reductionism is not the explanation for it, 
which is, when all is said and done, not so very different from the explana-
tion for the restructuring of the taxi trade. Its challenge is rather that it 
is carried on with an energy of such breathtaking and desperate intensity 




(again), Splinter, Lana Turner Journal, Armed Cell, or Datableed.3 
It is, instead, a name for the limits that we all run up against: 
the constraints of a capitalist culture that is itself constrained 
to sublimate the real suffering and disappointment that it pro-
duces and reproduces. In this sense, it is the name for a context, 
in the same way that the Iraq war is a context, or transnational 
austerity is a context, which is to say that it is simply the reality 
to which we are compelled to construct an alternative. Sublime 
woundedness, the impressions of wounds opening up like LED-
lit shopfronts in the night, in a parallel universe in which injury 
is intoxicatingly impersonal and structural, is the environment 
in which the poems that I discuss in this book fight to abso-
lutize the value of every last breath; or face into the reality of 
extravagantly violent wish fulfilment; or dissolve themselves in 
search of new ways of professing love; or transform into a kind 
of expressionism the vomiting up of medical-diagnostic catego-
ries founded in abstract social labor; or pump their verses full 
of the convulsive rhythms of surprise and sudden relief, without 
any guarantee that this is the right thing to do or that anyone 
will even fucking hear. Historicizing criticism shows this kind 
of thing in retrospect, and admires it for its aesthetic strategies. 
Criticism written in the spirit of the work itself tries to get across 
some of the immediate sense of what it makes possible.
As I said earlier, the chapters were written at different times and 
in response to changing conjunctures. Some of the earlier ones 
treat the poems they discuss as a way to speak about a theo-
retical argument about art and technique, to give an account of 
how an individualist mode like poetry could have a relation to 
that. In particular, the first chapter, “Ingrown Expressionism,” 
responds to the re-emergence of cybernetic and post-humanist 
programs for “post”-capitalism in the wake of the Tory re-elec-
tion in 2015. By way of two short readings of the poets Frances 
Kruk and Verity Spott, and their own writing on the technical 
3 Intense collectivized attention is one form of mutual aid, and we absolutely 
don’t care who sneers at that conviction.
22
wound building
management of interior life, it makes the case for the integral 
unity of expressionist art and the most advanced developments 
in capitalist technique, and it denies the separation of conveni-
ence between progressive technology, on the one hand, and re-
gressive will, passion, and instinct, on the other.
How is poetry capable of responding to these developments? 
Anyone who has a sense of the current meanings of that cat-
egory will be skeptical as to the premises of the question. The 
term is incomparably underspecified. It refers to a moribund 
heritage industry dominated by conservative nostalgists, to a 
history of spoken performance, and to any form of language art 
that falls outside of the domain of the equally inert form of the 
commercial novel. As a concept encompassing a sort of boring 
aesthetic provincialism and a negative definition, it groups to-
gether practitioners who in their formal commitments are not 
only widely different, but who are in fact emphatically mutually 
hostile. Definitions of poetry “as such” are a kind of centralized 
arbitration for aesthetics. They are exercises in managing hostil-
ity whether they realize it or not. By contrast, the essays in this 
volume are not a commentary on poetry but on a loose group 
of mostly non-institutionally supported artists trying frantically 
to respond to their own personal and historical circumstances. 
The question in which they are more interested than the gen-
eral one about what poetry is or can do, is how does a mode 
of literary production that continues to be premised mostly on 
individual composition face up to a cultural and social reality in 
which advanced division of labor is the norm? Anyone who has 
been bored at a poetry reading, watching an endless series of 
individual readers trying to compensate for their poems by way 
of violence of address or ostentation of clown shoes, will have an 
idea of the problem. All of the writers who I discuss in this book 
have dealt with it in their own ways.
The second chapter, on the theatrical work of Lucy Beynon 
and Lisa Jeschke, focuses on two writers who have taken the 
simple and unusual step of trying to deal with it by means of 
sustained collaboration. It also presents a recognizably theoreti-
cal argument, in this case in relation to Wilhelm Reich’s account 
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of the enfeeblement of the fascist subject; and it pursues Reich’s 
trail of clues all the way into the establishment theory of the 
virtuous moral neutrality of the literary imagination, on which 
Knights and Dames of the British Empire can be found neutrally 
expatiating in the pages of the London Review of Books. The ear-
liest of the chapters by date of composition, it also deals with 
the text that is most self-consciously and intelligently violent: 
Beynon and Jeschke’s play is among many other things also a 
sort of abstract of the thinking that has been carried on in an 
entire shared culture about the nature of political violence, and 
it remains poised, ambivalently, at the boundary of other forms 
of violence less intelligently cognized and articulated.
At the center of this book, cleaving silently through the mid-
dle of it, is a social fact that is only glancingly discussed in much 
of the poetry it deals with. This is obviously the emergence in 
the dead center of public consciousness of Donald Trump, in 
the four years leading up to his pseudo-insurrection and provi-
sional suppression by Facebook and Twitter. 
In the period beginning with the announcement of Trump’s 
campaign for the US presidency, there was an unstoppable out-
pouring of analyses of his politics, the politics of his supporters, 
their online ecosystems, their aesthetics, their styles of dress, 
their music, and their culture. Every word that proceeded from 
the mouth of a white cis man was squeezed for every last ounce 
of cultural outrage-value. The most unspeakably commonplace 
grad-student name-dropping was treated as if it disclosed the 
deepest secrets of Western culture from its origination in the 
Greek agora to this afternoon in Mar-a-Lago. Almost none of 
the people who took it upon themselves to write about those 
topics tried to think seriously about emancipatory, anti-fascist 
culture or to take seriously the art of those who are working 
consciously to produce it.
Most of the poetry discussed from Chapter 3 onwards works 
within this conjuncture, and the core of the book is taken up 
by studies of poets for whom the re-emergent fascism of the 
post-2015 period went off in their thinking like a bomb. It shows 
them changing. Chapter 3 presents a brief thematic interlude on 
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aesthetics and class politics written during the week of Trump’s 
inauguration. Chapter 4, “Transgression for Anti-Fascists,” on 
Verity Spott’s long poem-cum-worker’s inquiry Click Away Close 
Door Say, preoccupies itself with the most consciously aesthetic 
term to be used in the defense of renascent authoritarianism. 
The chapter presents a reconstruction of Spott’s poem’s singular 
representation of mental breakdown and capitalist restructur-
ing, a derangement of the senses in the age of Ctrl-X + Ctrl-V, 
a collage scattered to the brink of despair. It tries, not only to 
explain some of the things that make the poem worth reading, 
but also to reproduce in high resolution some of its almost inex-
plicable urgency: the unrelenting distinctiveness of its attempt 
to retrieve from the claustrophobic everyday surroundings of a 
destroyed and destructive workplace the intellectual resources 
with which to understand a fascist reality that might at first 
seem, and here and there really is, but finally would only like to 
be, its spectacular counter-pole or opposite.
In my view Spott’s anti-fascist art is not defined simply by 
the reactive attempt to reclaim for “the left” the mantle of a 
transgressive counterculture that “the right” has usurped. It is, 
instead, an attempt to see more deeply into the reality of so-
cial violence than fascist provocateurs can even dream of, and 
to countenance in that process of inquiry a possibility of error, 
or failure, or catastrophic moral misjudgment, that they would 
not be able to bear. Criticism that tries to extract from writing 
like this only the quintessence of its explanation of concepts like 
transgression or fascism panders to an authoritarianism that 
even at its most pantomime-irrationalist remains deeply inca-
pable of risking the sensation of public error or exposure.
And as such her work also marks out a more general transi-
tion. Poets who began to write blisteringly, single-mindedly vio-
lent work about politicians around the time that Sean Bonney 
summed it all up — “But now, surprise attack by a government 
of millionaires”4 — begin to write woundingly, distractingly vio-
4 Sean Bonney, “Letter on Poetics,” in Happiness: Poems after Rimbaud (Lon-
don: Unkant, 2011), 65.
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lent work as the authority of that government enters into de-
cline.5 Violence is turned against the self or shredded into tissues 
of improbable description. Ideas that enter into the world as the 
sun that colors and warms it progressively deteriorate into the 
misshapen punching-bag of a mind that has no other use for 
them. In what sense is this poetry anti-fascist? Is it even mean-
ingfully political?
Answering these questions is the main aim of Chapter 4, 
“World History’s Teenage Diaries,” on Lisa Jeschke’s The An-
thology of Poems by Drunk Women. I argue that Jeschke’s crude, 
diminished, self-cancelling poems are the most brilliant mani-
festation of the principle that crassness can be a form of mutual 
aid. Where Spott’s Click Away Close Door Say presents a vast, 
shifting canvas of rivalrous impulses, the poems in Jeschke’s 
Anthology are more often pared down to their most ridiculous 
extremities and residues. Her work is not a continuation but 
the inversion of Dadaist acting out, because its main purpose 
is not to shock some real or notional bourgeoisie, but to hurt, 
embarrass, and expose the real living person Lisa Jeschke, who 
is the author of her own most vitriolic assaults on middle-class 
5 On the development in Bonney’s own writing, see the remarks by David 
Grundy on his blog Streams of Expression: “But this does not mean that de-
feat is total. Bonney’s recent work charts what it is like to live in conditions 
of defeat, of crisis, of terror, yet it manages to manifest a hope which does 
not refuse pessimism, does not refuse sorrow, does not refuse suffering. As 
he has recently written: ‘It puts me in mind of a poem by Ingeborg Bach-
mann, where she speaks of exile, of feeling like a dead person, of languages 
that you can’t understand passing through you like ghosts. And I guess 
those ghosts exist at the point where “tradition” and “strangeness” meet, 
where all that is defined and foul and murdered and imprisoned becomes 
synonymous with all that is still uncharted and unexplained and wonder-
ful.’ Bonney’s poems are like that. Like ‘marks on a calendar’ or ‘the begin-
nings of a map,’ they are vital indices of where we are.” See David Grundy, 
“David Grundy’s Intro to My Cambridge Reading,” Gods of the Plague, 
March 14, 2018, https://godsoftheplague.tumblr.com/post/171865396568/
david-grundys-intro-to-my-cambridge-reading. See also David’s more 





propriety and gender norms and, like all of us, the frustrated 
bearer of exactly those same values. Her work shocks and hurts 
us only by this indirect route, which is to say through its pas-
sionate identification with a set of blatantly bad options.
The next two chapters adopt a slightly wider angle and try 
to set out some working heuristics. Chapter 5, “Poetry and Self-
Defense,” considers the relationship between the poetry of the 
British poet Nat Raha and the Chinese poet Xu Lizhi, who was 
famous for a day or two in 2014 when he became one of many 
workers at the Taiwanese-Chinese manufacturing firm Foxconn 
to kill himself by jumping off a building. The chapter tries to 
describe the defensiveness of Xu Lizhi’s poetry, and it defines 
self-defense in art as the obstinate, reactive overvaluation of 
whatever it is in your life that the dominant social relation (your 
boss) values at nothing. Nat Raha also writes defensive poetry, 
and Verity Spott sometimes writes it too: the tendency amounts 
to a thick streak of obstinacy in the writing of those who have 
been hurt or have seen those whom they love hurt unnecessar-
ily. It is a class tone susceptible to constant development and 
elaboration, and it remains, in the paved and well-lit environ-
ment of what the great majority of people are now made to think 
that poetry is, almost completely inaudible.
Chapter 7 talks about what is audible in contemporary po-
etry. I argue that its dominant idiom, and the dominant idiom of 
plenty of other art-forms as well, involves a kind of non-specific 
invocation of trauma, and that the idiom is so developed and so 
ubiquitous in the culture that it breaks in upon the work even 
of those writers who are conscious of it and who regard it with 
political disdain. The chapter sketches some stages of the idiom’s 
ascent, from a special mode of upper bourgeois literary disil-
lusionment to the sound that you just heard come out of that 
car that drove by. Via a discussion of Amiri Baraka, Bernadette 
Mayer, Jayne Cortez, and Keston Sutherland, it tries to figure 
out some of the idiom’s uses.
 The material here completes a gradual drift that began in 
the earlier chapters. The move is away from psychoanalysis-talk 
and its conceptual payloads of repression and disinhibition, and 
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towards a discussion of the meaning of aesthetic “immediacy,” 
a word the exact significance of which I don’t pretend to under-
stand. Chapter 8 presents some working notes on that concept, 
in order to make it as confusing as possible. Chapter 9 takes a 
detour into the computer games of the US-based game designer 
and writer Porpentine Charity Heartscape, who in her own de-
scription of her art has developed one way of thinking about 
what “immediacy” in poetry might be:
I don’t really know a lot about abstract concepts. I only know 
about the stuff I’m interested in or the tiny hyper-specific de-
tails that I focus on.6
The final chapter, Chapter 10, is a last, crass attempt at a sum-
mary. It takes the form of a letter to the poet Lotte L.S. written 
after the death of Sean Bonney, the writer whose own crassness 
and violence in language has provided perhaps the single great-
est example of solidarity and mutual aid for the development of 
the poets that this book is about. The letter corrects some earlier 
mistakes, and adds a few more to the bonfire. I try to say more 
accurately what it is that I mean when I say that I am interested 
in poetry that hates its own ideas and wants to see the world di-
minished. At the time of writing I still think that this is a kind of 
love poetry, and that I might finally be able to show in what way.
The aim of this collection is quite limited. It is not to propose 
a fully cohesive account of what the poetry is, to inaugurate a 
“School,” or to contribute to the boring tittle-tattle that for dec-
ades has constituted the great aesthetic debates of British po-
etry as an institution. I don’t care about any of that. I care about 
these poems. I could barely love anything without them; and 
this book is a front-line report on the local detail of their latest 
disasters. Think of it as a travel guide.
6 Alexander Iadarola, “Interview with Game Designer Porpentine Charity 






Ingrown Expressionism:  
On Frances Kruk and Verity Spott
 
In our present phase of the history of aesthetics, which some of 
our most prominently advertised theorists have declared to be 
effectively post-capitalist, many actions cost less to perform 
than ever. Contemporary cultural production both inside and 
out of cultural-industrial contexts is painfully overdetermined 
by the abundance of available means. Text and musical elements 
that once could only be produced by means of laborious train-
ing can now be sampled or cut and pasted without significant 
expenditure of effort. Bodies of work that previously might have 
seemed unapproachably arcane can now be glossed instantly by 
means of search commands. The resources of expressive art 
have never been cheaper, the productivity of the individual ex-
pressive artist has never been higher, the accomplishment of a 
density of surface effects in contemporary artworks has never 
been easier to bring about.1 These and similar visionary procla-
1 Thanks to Christina Chalmers, Larne Abse Gogarty, and Marina Vishmidt 
for comments and criticisms. A number of the abovemtioned truisms can 
be found, for example, here: “The Big Dicdata — Coming Data-regimes: 
Currently a competition is taking place between secret service agencies 
and transnational corporations for the control of the main resource of our 
time: data. New forms of data-driven and automatized governments are 
arising. DISCREET promotes projects to better understand this automated 
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mations cost very little to say and tell us more or less nothing 
about the expressive situation of the individual contemporary 
artist. This omission can be justified on several grounds: firstly 
because, as John Cage wrote in 1992 (the erratic capitalization is 
his own), the “artist’s proper behavior / SElf- / expression” 
should “be Put aside” for a change; or because, as Cage went on 
to say in the same lecture, “we hAve extended / the centRal 
nervous / sysTem/electrOnics   our technology / makes 
the reVolution for us”; or more probably for some combination 
of the two positions, for instance because excessive preoccupa-
tion with “the self ” tends to distract artists from the major “rev-
olutionary” developments of our period, in ICT or Computa-
tional Finance or the microprocessor industry or whatever.2 The 
position is self-evidently a reflex response to the decline of so-
cialist politics and mounts a directly political argument about 
how that decline may be reversed. Its advocates can concede 
that recent “access-driven”3 revolutions in the means of circulat-
ing and reproducing informational goods, which according to 
the theoreticians of post-capitalism are now “corroding the 
market’s ability to form prices correctly,”4 are inseparable from, 
and in some cases are straightforwardly identical with, “access-
driven” revolutions in the categorization and treatment of what 
are deemed to be dysfunctional bodies and inoperative minds. 
future, providing improbable models and algorithmic alternatives in order 
to disrupt this seemingly irreversible development towards increased wel-
fare.” The last word here is either a disgrace or a disgraceful parapraxis. DIS 
Magazine, “DISCREET Call for Participants,” discover: the dis blog, April 11, 
2016, http://dismagazine.com/blog/81659/discreet-call-for-participants/.
2 John Cage, “Overpopulation and Art,” in Composed in America, eds. 
Marjorie Perloff and Charles Junkerman (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), 36.
3 “Around the world, a new wave of peer-to-peer, access-driven businesses is 
shaking up established categories.” PricewaterhouseCoopers, “The Sharing 
Economy,” Consumer Intelligence Series, 2015, https://www.pwc.com/us/
en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-
sharing-economy.pdf.




And they can blandly accept that the people who celebrate these 
developments most overtly are not typically the ones who are 
tracked cheaply by their parole officers or pressed under the 
thumb of a scientific diagnostic category whose definition 
emerges from the International Statistical Classification of Dis-
eases.5 They can agree that all of these facts are obvious and still 
hold that they are nevertheless of very minor political signifi-
cance, or even that excessive concern with them is antithetical 
to radical politics, insofar as it justifies and entrenches a reactive 
aversion to the technical developments that are the true histori-
cal basis for any meaningful new anti-capitalism.New theorists 
of anti-capitalist rationalism might also claim that they have 
progressed beyond the Cagean claim that “our technology / 
makes the reVolution for us.” Their reason for doing so would be 
straightforward. Their work is not avowedly quietist but, on the 
contrary, mounts a concerted attack on the absence of strategic 
political thinking on the revolutionary left. For the writers who 
represent this tendency, the necessity of abandoning endless in-
group subcultural left squabbling so as to take a place at the 
great roundtable of modern managerial scientific discourse has 
been, from its earliest articulation, a central motif. And for the 
cultural improvers looking to warrant their truancy from the 
sub-culture, the motif has proved breathtakingly congenial.6 But 
the cybernetic automatism that Cage was at least candid enough 
5 The argument could also be made in slightly different terms. Since the rise 
in capitalist technical productivity has led to the conversion of the domi-
nant psychology into a quantitative-technical discipline, the conviction 
that subjective expression of lived trauma might be opposed to bourgeois 
forms has also significantly declined in prevalence. Trauma is now itself a 
highly formalized medical category, theoretically integrated in a neurology 
of chemical pathways and socially controlled by means of a number of 
behavioral disciplines of varying complexity and intrusiveness. Aesthetic 
categories that were more or less suitable for an earlier stage of bourgeois 
social relations were true only because of the relative rudimentariness of 
the forces of production to which they corresponded. As the following 
will argue, in much recent expressive poetic writing this fact makes itself 
known intuitively and in practice.
6 See, e.g., Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Inventing the Future: Postcapital-
ism and a World without Work (London: Verso, 2015), 11.
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to avow openly is reproduced in this newer body of work in 
modified form, by means of a kind of studiously over-conceptu-
alized indifference to the actual psychic life of the agents of any 
possible revolutionary political transformation. Theoretical ac-
counts of the hegemonic interpellation of the subject by a radi-
cal modernist program, in which the life of the person who is 
slated to be interpellated is never expressively inhabited,7 or of 
conceptual virality,8 or of the mysterious “hyperstition” of ideas 
strenuously imagineered by left-futurists,9 and obligingly 
retweeted by left-internet users, do not cancel out this indiffer-
ence but merely raise it up to a higher power, so that every ges-
ture towards the realization of a given political strategy only 
fortifies at the level of political theory a pre-existing disinclina-
tion. The disinclination is as rationalist as any other obsessive 
compulsive disorder and as new as middle-class subjectivity it-
self, and phobic personalities as diverse as Sigmund Freud’s Rat-
man and the Parliamentary Labour Party’s Ramsay MacDonald 
have provided it with a long and distinguished cultural history. 
Its manifest aesthetic content is a fundamental theoretical aver-
sion to entering into the joys and the wounds of those whose 
lives are actually fucked up by capital, which is to say, in other 
words, that it is an indifference to the living process of politics 
in intense and confusing human communicative exchange as 
this is mediated by the historical conditions of everyday per-
sonal experience. It is also an indifference to the process by 
which political ideas get absorbed, challenged, misunderstood, 
broken down, and spat back out into new and compromised 
7 Ibid., 170ff.
8 See Cornelia Sollfrank and Rachel Baker, “Revisiting the Future with 
Laboria Cuboniks: A Conversation,” Furtherfield, July 27, 2016, https://
www.furtherfield.org/revisiting-the-future-with-laboria-cuboniks-a-
conversation/.
9 Srnicek and Williams, Inventing the Future, 71–75. A clearer account of 
“hyperstition” is presented by the Laboria Cuboniks group, in the inter-
view cited in the last note. Elsewhere the same group present an accurate 
if cautious criticism of the concept: DIS Magazine, “Laboria Cuboniks in 




environments of living conflict; to practical disagreement, mis-
recognition, wounded pride, escalation in struggle, the collec-
tive need in the breach for violent hyperbole and theoretical 
distortion; and so in short to the whole dynamic of social trans-
formation that turns a gradualist struggle into an overtly revolu-
tionary one.10 In other words, anti-expressive rationalism is the 
flipside of political gradualism. Its superordination of the tech-
nical platform to the subject who makes use of or who is abused 
by it, is the continuation by other means of the traditional social 
democratic privileging of the speaker’s platform to the street ac-
tion or the picket line. Its political theory is in fact the overcon-
ceptualization of an anti-politics in which all processes of trans-
formation through subjective struggle are fastidiously nitpicked 
into oblivion. This is true even to the extent that its perspective 
falls somehow staggeringly behind that of the UK civil service 
bureaucrat who, lately commenting on developments in post-
2010 welfare administration, declares that it is the greatest 
achievement of contemporary state rationality that it has sup-
pressed the “artificial break[s]” between different kinds of mar-
ginal political subjects. And it is specifically overconceptualized, 
rather than simply ideological or mystificatory, because it makes 
subjective life harder to get a hold of to the measure of its degree 
of conceptual complexity. The point here is not that the theory 
should be more plain-talking, but that the plain-talking aver-
sion that the theory transforms is stabilized in that process and 
not counteracted. In the same way, we often use the category of 
overcompensation not in order to suggest a degree of compen-
sation that would be more desirable, but rather to show how the 
energies that are expended in the process of compensation serve 
to cement more fundamentally into subjective life a tic or symp-
10 Its disavowed automatism transforms the traditional vanguardist problem 
of generals without armies into the newer political problem of superegos 
in search of metapsychologies. For the same reason, it is the aesthetic 
and political psychology most appropriate to the topsy-turvy world of a 
revived radical social democracy in which radical demands are always 
delivered in a tone of atypical parental reproachfulness.
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tom that should not be compensated for at all.11 In other words, 
the more intensely and strenuously we defend ourselves, the less 
energy we have left with which to overcome the circumstances 
that first inclined us to self-defense.Anti-expressive political ra-
tionalists fall behind the perspective of the average civil service 
bureaucrat because they accept that divisions between people 
are now unalterable and have to be lived with. In this sense they 
can be contrasted with another category of person who, accord-
ing to the terms of anti-expressive rationalism, is unlikely to 
have any significant influence on their social environment, or, 
indeed, even to exist. This is the class of expressive political ra-
tionalists. By this category I mean to specify, at first in quite 
vague terms, anyone committed to using modern technical ra-
tionality, and in particular the categories and data-forms of 
bourgeois social knowledge, to extend and enhance their own 
capacities of moving or insightful political action. Artists who 
come under this heading are not indifferent to but are obsessed 
with giving shape to the dynamics of decline, tension, and esca-
lation in subjective political life. They do not fall behind but get 
ahead of the perspective of modernizing state oppression, by 
11 The theoretical contribution belongs to Sir Robert Devereux, who in a 
report on the latest developments of welfare-claimant management as-
serts that the main benefit of the new technical transformations in British 
welfare manage is that they “remove that entirely artificial break between 
being in work and being out of work. Those two things together mean 
that the conversations that work coaches can now have are quite different 
from the ones we previously used to have. Previously it was, ‘You’re out 
of work; you need to go to work; goodbye.’ Now they are working with 
them continually.” When Devereux says that the “breaks” between differ-
ent categories of person are “artificial,” he articulates a basic prejudice of 
the state itself, according to which any given population ought naturally 
to present itself as one single continuous and indifferently manageable 
lump. The force of this prejudice prevents him from recognizing the real 
state of affairs, which is that making all types of persons equally accessible 
to state surveillance is itself a work of the highest technological artifice. 
See Work and Pensions Committee, “Oral Evidence: The Department 





expending all of their creative energy in an alternately ranco-
rous and tender effort to give voice to life shut up and reconfig-
ured by advanced clinical and penal procedures. They convert 
into the principal substance of their work the complex, shifting, 
and theoretically refractory processes through which hurt life 
wrenches itself in and out of living immediacy, overleaping the 
breaks that armchair theorists declare to be insuperable and re-
fusing implacably all forms of technical automatism, both of the 
quaint Cagean cybernetic variety and its more sophisticated re-
habilitation as realistic, overconceptualized indifference to all 
processes of political self-activity. Finally, they take confidence 
from the fact that it requires every bit as much draining mental 
effort to persuade oneself against all the available evidence that 
the boundaries that inhibit political movement across lines of 
social division are a priori resistant to any transgression, as it 
does to undertake the act of transgression itself. The rest of this 
essay is dedicated to some writing that can be described in these 
terms. Here is a first approximation to how it might sound:
I fell back down and rolled over and stared hard at the room 
and its window, but over the tall swaying grasses my soft 
mouth, I caressed my long red hair and touched my lips with 
my lips and a seam from the bottom of my foot to the top of 
my head began to gently part, releasing a gentle humming 
silver light, and with a pair of fingers I caught the edge of the 
light and gently tugged, and it came sliding out, and I held it 
there in my fingers, I held her there, and I saw my body ly-
ing in the grass, and I held the silver light in my hands as her 
mouth parted, as she lay there in the grass her mouth parted, 
and with a sigh she breathed in, and the silver light passed 
into her body, and she lay there, perfect and sated. I have 
Gender Dysphoria.12
12 Verity Spott, “Gender Dysphoria,” Two Torn Halves, March 13, 2016, http://
twotornhalves.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/gender-dysphoria.html. The text is 
now reprinted in a slightly altered form in Verity Spott, Trans* Manifestos 
(Cambridge: Shit Valley, 2016).
36
wound building
This is the conclusion of a recent poem by the poet and musi-
cian Verity Spott. It is only the final passage of the text, which up 
until this point has proceeded through the narrative coordina-
tion of much shorter sentences, some of which consist only of 
lists of diagnostic data: “I found myself reciting: Melancholia, 
Asperger’s Syndrome, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disor-
der, Gender Dysphoria, Prader Willi’s Syndrome, Dyspraxia, 
Slovenliness, Hayfever, Autistic Spectrum Disorder, Dyslexia 
& Dyscalculia, Anorexia.” The sudden leap outwards into the 
dizzying paratactic imbrications of this final outcry is prepared 
for by a counteracting discipline of abbreviation. The flood of 
assertoric energy in the text I have quoted does not come from 
nowhere but is stored up through 37 sentences, in each of which 
the writer is cutting herself off, holding herself back, frustrat-
ing the impulse immediately to give voice to the sensations that 
occasioned the speech-process in the first place, pushing down 
the desire to cut loose, and so permitting the pressure of frus-
tration to build up incrementally as the text staggers ceaselessly 
forwards throughout the abstract pathological environment 
that it constructs. The penultimate sentence preserves and con-
tinues this dynamic even as it seems to leave it behind, since its 
individual coordinating clauses almost without exception could 
be shut up into independent sentences: “I caressed my long red 
hair. I touched my lips with my lips.” And the fact that they do 
not do this but instead suddenly open out into one another, 
reach outside and across themselves and flow into a single ex-
pressive current, built up persistently around the single verbal 
pivot of the coordinating conjunction “and,” obeys not a gram-
matical but rather a psychological imperative. This is the endur-
ing psychological need to break out of the confines of individual 
subjecthood. The poem is at last ablaze with this need; each of 
the shorter sentences in the earlier part of the text becomes, in 
the light of this near conclusion, an allegory of social process, 
of the fact that it is possible for the whole to move forwards ac-
cording to a logic that is alien to its constituent parts even when 




But it is only nearly the conclusion. The actual conclusion of 
the poem is “I have Gender Dysphoria.” Expressionism runs in-
evitably into its limit of categorical morbidity. The poem works 
into a new shape Amiri Baraka’s dream of a time when
     I will be relaxed.
When flames and non-specific passion wear themselves
away. And my eyes and hands and mind can turn
and soften, and my songs will be softer
and lightly weight the air.13
For Baraka, hurt and exhausting political life — life in “The Party 
of Insane / Hope” — must hold out the prospect of psychological 
reprieve in the aftermath of victory. Verity Spott’s poem takes 
hold of that prospect and squeezes from it its excess of Roman-
tic longing. What replaces the horizon of softening is a clinical 
dead-end: the door to a room that, as Spott says at the beginning 
of her poem, “I am too afraid to enter.” The cheapness of the 
diagnostic category that might be spoken in that room, which 
is to say, its definitive stupidity and insignificance, is implicitly 
contrasted to the actual pain and ecstasy of the experience that 
it locks down into a medical condition. Everything in Verity’s 
poem leads up to this: each moment in this text is one part of 
an alternative pathway towards the flat and reified commodity 
language whose pressure of authority is grounded in the real 
accumulation of specialized intellectual labor. The real bareness 
and flat legalism of the final sentence of the text is the flipside 
of the unbearably overloaded density of the passage that it shuts 
off. “Gender Dysphoria” is a model lesson in how to relate to 
that unity: not by parodying the concepts that organize it, or by 
politely suggesting alternatives to them, but by counterposing 
13 Amiri Baraka, “Three Modes of History and Culture,” in Transbluesency: 
The Selected Poems of Amiri Baraka/LeRoi Jones (1961–1995), ed. Paul 
Vangelisti (New York: Marsilio Publishers, 1995), 118.
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to them in defiance a whole history of personal and collective 
endurance.14
Whatever this might be said to mean for poetry, one of the 
things that it more crudely accounts for is the way in which so 
many contemporary texts present themselves as architectures 
into which their speaking voices are locked. It accounts for the 
way in which poets are compelled to write their poems as if they 
were inescapable penitentiaries, in which delinquent language 
materials are fenced in by interlocking grates of self-accusation 
and denial.15 At its most abstract level this tendency is really only 
a habit of conception, or a recurrent organizing metaphor; the 
actual technical effects that it induces, its influence on the syn-
tax and rhythmic pressure and diction of the writer, can only be 
determined by the way in which they respond to the constraint 
after they have recognized and structured it by means of a visual 
parallel. In Verity’s case the structure becomes a space whose 
conclusion is a diagnosis locked into place from its beginning, 
from its title down, as dramatic as a screw in a wall bracket. This 
is another explanation for the proliferation in the early part of 
the text of curtailed and confrontationally unpoetic short sen-
tences. “Fell quiet. Saw some figures approaching. Ducked down 
into the long grass.” These are the tentative verbal half-measures 
of someone who knows that the resolution they’ve been offered 
is a trap and who edges towards it as they would towards a preci-
pice, and so the gulps and stutters at the beginning of the text 
contain in themselves negatively the knowledge that is shouted 
out in the poem’s penultimate sentence. The conclusion that 
cannot be overcome can only be leapt into with enough vio-
14 I am underestimating the complicated gentleness of this poem. But the 
tender, risible exasperation in which it terminates seems to me as if it can 
only be achieved by the exaggerated dramatization of the author’s impossi-
ble effort to outmatch the need for it. Without the maximum polarization 
of penultimate and final sentence, the defeat temporarily made bearable at 
the poem’s end would not seem tender but only mockingly parodic.
15 “I tried to move but fell right through the eggshells, dropped a floor, lost 
time, lost weight,” Frances Kruk, “lo-fi frags,” in Lo-Fi Frags In-Progress 
(London: Veer Books, 2015), 18.
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lent impulsiveness that it becomes the cushion of air that we feel 
beneath us, in free-fall through a syntax disintegrating into its 
component elements of shock and nervous disorientation. This 
is where poetry happens, in the maximum polarization of objec-
tive conclusion and subjective movement towards it.
One of the things it might be possible to conclude from po-
etry like Verity Spott’s is that the suppression of artificial breaks 
between the valued and devalued subject induces or encourages 
a literal suppression of pauses or rests.16 Could this be the main 
consequence of the declining costs for capital of access to mar-
ginalized personhood, just a new intimacy with the expressive 
gas pedal? What else might get suppressed in it? What about 
the artificial break between inside and out, the division which 
according to anti-expressionist rationalism cannot be revo-
lutionized but only progressively administered? What can be 
done with the “interior” space in a period in which, more than 
ever before, that space is positively surfeited with dead techni-
cal vocabularies; when, for example, the id refers primarily to 
“a disorganized (random) brain trajectory” subject to chemical 
regulation through technical or specialized intervention?17 In 
other words, what does it mean that the outgrowth of techni-
cal concepts, whose basis is the accumulation of specialized and 
alienated intellectual labor, is also their grotesque ingrowing?
out, things
you that is itself
the pox, lesion
fresh piece of motionless
room you is still sending
the going is the ceiling is the bulb
height of annoyance at 1200 watts
remark the blood & hot
16 By this I mean its literal assembly lines: not wage labor altogether.
17 The phrase is from Avi Peled, NeuroAnalysis: Bridging the Gap between 




out out you Tin of you18
Here the scene has changed fundamentally. In these lines by 
the poet Frances Kruk the architecture of the poem is no longer 
made up of categories of the bourgeois state upholstered as fur-
niture for a clinical environment. Instead it looks more like an 
operating theatre, or a skip. Its exit swings open and closed cra-
zily on two- and three-letter hinges. Objects variously broken 
and gangrenous are thrown into it, they get cursed at and picked 
over by a voice whose stuttering remissions don’t now lead in-
exorably towards a shattering collision but instead loop round 
queasily in a circuit, renewing their protest in rhythmic tremors 
and flinches: aggrieved vocables in a strategy of tension. Repeat-
ed sound elements don’t get straightforwardly vocalized but are 
instead dug out like foreign growths. “[O]ut […] lesion […] is 
[…] is […] is […] hot […] out […] out […] you […] Tin […] 
you.” Kruk’s poetry is not visibly very much like Spott’s, it makes 
no attempt to hurl itself against intellectual conclusions whose 
conceptual struts and panels have been fortified by alienated in-
tellectual labor. For the kind of syntactical freefall that you get at 
the end of “Gender Dysphoria,” Kruk’s work is simply too pre-
occupied with its materials, which it picks through with a kind 
of arch and forensic displeasure, “pull[ing] the guts up through 
lungs” (131) of administrative speech never before retrenched 
on by its enabling condition of cakehole. The larger work from 
which the lines quoted above are taken is a sort of violently col-
laged treatise on the afterlife of discarded human and material 
reality. Its “un faced” speaker is confined by genre conventions 
into a cellar or basement, “from mud to undermud” (112) and 
dust to underdust, teaching itself with each successive setback 
and spasm of phonetic arrhythmia new means of multiplying 
the language resources of those who are pinned viciously to the 
spot. From time to time it makes a joke out of the revelation 
of this fact, “back in the basement” (130), “who has heard the 
basement song & not practiced agony thereafter” (131), but the 
18 Kruk, “lo-fi frags,” 32.
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actual language processing of the poetry is deadly serious, or, 
rather, it is alive to how deadly processing can be, which is to say 
that it understands the deep affinity between abstract formal-
ism and socially induced mental dissociation very well. Insofar 
as the poetry takes an interest in anything so tediously general 
as poetic artifice, it constitutes a practical guide to interiority 
as meat. Its words and syllables are lodged in one another like 
bits of food stuck between teeth, dissolved or semi-decomposed 
even to the level of the grapheme, so that, for example, “hot” in 
the penultimate line of the passage quoted is “out” with its sec-
ond letter displaced, turned upside down and distorted. “Out” 
at the beginning of the passage leads to “in” already swallowed 
up in “thing,” while “in” thus digested is then transferred or ex-
creted into the third line in “lesion,” now having itself swallowed 
up the opening letter of its adversary. The poetry’s telescoping 
of interiority and exteriority, its permanent revolution in gro-
tesque intussusception, has its own music, because the constant 
necroscopic intrusions into the phonetic interiors of constitu-
ent words or living language material produces as its corollary 
a kind of irritable stuttering, syncopated by the frequency of 
line breaks and further subdivided by the manic recurrence 
of dental consonants. The final line (“out out you Tin of you”) 
then merely dramatizes what the poetry is doing all of the time, 
rehearsing in the form of an exasperated joke the chronically 
purgative disposition at which the writing has already formally 
arrived, in which expression is not the innocent ventilation of 
our instincts but instead the laborious, desperate expulsion of 
the pre-constituted dead labor that mainstream society, and not 
just mainstream culture, has already assiduously rammed down 
every throat on which it can get a decent grip.19 There is no al-
legory here and no parable. What gets re-done in the final line 
as narrative is only a phantasmatic backdrop against which a 
whole voiced alternative to the already alienated interior can be 
worked out, if not in perfect clarity then in bits and damaged 
19 The poetry reverts habitually to the same set of worn-out or mass-pro-
duced objects: lightbulbs, forks, dust, and used chemicals.
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sections, glinting half-visibly through a warped lattice of nerves 
and gritted teeth.
The music of the most exciting contemporary poetry is de-
fined not by the unprecedented abundance of information that 
the emancipated poet can access, but instead by the dynamics 
of an expressionism exercised against the dead labor that has 
ingrown into the self like a hideous prognosticating nail. In 
both Verity Spott’s and Frances Kruk’s writing, living desires 
and subjective impulses are not separated from a world of alien-
ated labor of which it can only be said that the author is power-
less to influence it, but are brought instead under its organized 
duress from the outset, by means of the established categories 
of modern clinical practice. Each poet responds differently to 
this experience of intrusion. In Verity Spott’s poem the primary 
constraint elicits a physiologically concerted effort of expressive 
outcry, in which the goal is to make a misunion between the 
conceptually ineliminable diagnosis-conclusion and the explo-
sively torn syntax that leads up to it that is so paradigmatically 
unbelievable as to make the fact of their present pharisaical 
unity into a sick and re-energizing joke. In Frances Kruk’s it is 
given the purpose of anatomizing the class content of the idea of 
surface itself, on which, according to the dominant perspective, 
abundance is always spread and where the idea that it might be 
possible to be buried under it is just totally unthinkable.
The two bodies of writing are distinct in their response to 
the altered historical situation of individual expressive art, and 
yet each works up into its own intensely singular music of im-
mediate feeling the same basic paradox of advanced capitalist 
productivity: that where capitalist technique is sufficiently his-
torically advanced, even the most devalued and marginalized 
lives can flee into their innermost cells and most private desires 
only to find that it is just here that alienated labor has thrown up 
its hoarding and is most actively at work. For the anti-expres-
sionist rationalist, this paradox is at root only natural: it is “Our 
technology / mak[ing] the reVolution for us” on the terrain of 
subjective existence itself. Inevitably the anti-expressionist’s ex-
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planation of this state of affairs shades off into a kind of defense. 
If abstract labor is the hoarding that is built around the ego in 
the period of its demolition and redevelopment, then anti-ex-
pressionist rationalism will be the swathe of decorative slogans 
pasted up on its cladding, a colorful and gratuitous tribute to 
the personality forced to queue up outside of itself while objec-
tive historical forces tear down its derelict interior. The defense 
is polemical and it is also conventionally psychoanalytic. Just 
as it is the basic paradox of capitalist productivity that as tech-
nique advances, the official categories used to define marginal 
(or abject) life become more and more primary repositories of 
abstract labor, so too is it the basic paradox of institutional-re-
formist theory that it does not meet intensifications of violent 
social austerity with a corresponding intensification of subjec-
tive resolve, but instead with more and more thoroughgoing at-
tempts preemptively to liquidate personality by means of vari-
ous overconceptualized forms of impulsive repression — e.g., 
theories of interpellation.
This is where we end up: Life is the raw material of concep-
tual paradox and rationalism is the matrix through which it is 
fed. There are now more conceptual paradoxes in the world than 
ever before, available in ever more varieties and at ever greater 
degrees of conceptual sophistication. Whether your preference 
is for fantasies of technical omnipotence or the deep pathos of 
atomized despair, some version of anti-subjective rationalism 
can generate for you the paradoxical sensation you need. To 
revolutionize this state of affairs, the defenders of these devel-
opments counsel a few reformist demands and leave the work 
of devising expressive slogans to the forces whose most stirring 
contribution to date is, “Take two three times a day after meals.” 
It is to the great credit of the social actors to whom this kind of 
slogan is so regularly addressed that they respond by giving a 






Strong Language:  
On Lucy Beynon and Lisa Jeschke
 
Lucy Beynon and Lisa Jeschke’s David Cameron: A Theatre of 
Knife Songs is a half-hour-long play dedicated to the investiga-
tion of the question of whether sexual violence against the UK 
Prime Minister would represent an effective form of political 
action.1 It doesn’t turn this investigation into a joke, or treat it as 
a means of demonstrating the obvious truth that politicians, like 
capitalists, are nothing but character masks for the social rela-
tions in which they are caught up. Nor even does it try to make 
its central premise into a graphic exemplification of a theoreti-
cal presupposition, for instance that sexual fantasies of one or 
1 A video of a performance from June 26, 2014, at the Betsey Trotwood 
theatre in Clerkenwell, is available on YouTube as Pole Vault, “David Cam-
eron: A Theatre of Knife-Songs, Lisa Jeschke & Lucy Beynon, 26 June 2014, 
Turbamento @ The Betsy Trotwood,” YouTube, February 9, 2015, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=1uhG7iOAmoE. A print edition is available as 
David Cameron: A Theatre of Knife Songs (Cambridge: Shit Valley, 2015). 
All subsequent references to the play are cited parenthetically in text. Two 
later plays, The Tragedy of Theresa May (2017) and The Decline and Fall of 
the Home Office (2019), can also be watched online. See Pole Vault, “the 
tragedy of theresa may,” YouTube, June 15, 2016, and MayDay Rooms, 





another kind are possessed of a particular political import or 
tendency. David Cameron is a significant work of art because it 
shreds and discards all three of these common modes of dealing 
with personalized and violent fantasies in radical political cul-
ture. It shows that all three attitudes are not only insipid or un-
inspiring because they assume that the representation of the de-
sire for revenge can only ever stand in for something else — the 
fact of its own ineffectiveness, the real automaticity of capitalist 
social reproduction, the insurrectionary character of desire in 
general, etc. — but also because they repress the kind of psychic 
work needed to take seriously in representation violent impuls-
es or sensations. The play argues that these attitudes not only 
present a bad account of the relationship between desire and 
reality, but that they actively connive in the reproduction of the 
conditions under which no other kind of account could ever be 
artistically or humanly possible. Their play is a deep investiga-
tion into the deadening of the relationship between desire and 
reality in a liberal culture that is increasingly unreal and was 
always undesirable. There is nothing else quite like it.
The play is constructed out of several discrete segments, not 
quite scenes, though any attempt to tell the exact number of 
these is inhibited by the aggressively shifting tempo of their per-
formance. The most obvious local time-markers are the refer-
ences to the Thatcher “death parties” that took place in Brixton, 
Liverpool, and elsewhere in April 2013,2 but while in the main 
the dramas of state violence and its projective normalization are 
shut into a familiarly national idiom, the source materials for 
the play frequently display a rival influence. The second of the 
play’s “scenes” is an edited recapitulation of the opening sec-
tion of Büchner’s Woyzeck, performed in super-sedative slow-
motion as if to compensate for lack of sepia tints, while another 
2 “When Thatcher died, all the people celebrating at the spontaneous street 
parties — the media said they were violent. Which they were, because 
they knew, on a physical, fleshly, cellular level, Margaret Thatcher was, 
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister” (16). E.g., SovietFilms, “MARGARET 
THATCHER DEAD!! Brixton Celebrates Party — Ghost Town,” YouTube, 
April 9, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikhRGrJReJ8.
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deracinates Kleist’s Michael Kohlhaas from its setting in feudal 
Saxony in order to resituate it in an anonymous “border con-
trol point” — a more intensively policed threshold that could 
be in Heathrow or the disputed territories of the Ukraine (4). 
This compounding of English politics and German literary his-
tory is self-evidently a conscious decision, and for this it might 
understandably be accused of being “clever” in the pejorative 
sense appropriate to public school children and tax avoidance 
schemes, if only it weren’t for the fact that the tone of much 
of the work is so monumentally crude as to make Barry Mac-
Sweeney’s disturbing pornographic poems about Margaret 
Thatcher seem like chaste lyrics of compliment by comparison.3 
The roughness or crudeness of the juxtapositions is itself telling. 
The stance that the play adopts towards its component materials 
is both hungry and abrasive. Different types of political or liter-
ary material are not included for the purpose of grand displays 
of erudition but are thrown together hastily by two writers who 
feel themselves compelled, and who have no wish to conceal the 
fact that they are compelled, to lay hold of all of the materials to 
which they have access.
The main contrast in the play is nevertheless not a contrast 
of literary history, but a contrast of psychological attitudes. The 
segments themselves often concern the narrative of a profes-
sional performer and her unskilled short-term contract dancer, 
Pawel. Together the two make up a “pop duo,” “a small outfit” 
that is also “just big in a different size” (6), and therefore a kind 
of diagram of the small-to-medium enterprises that large-to-
monopolistic English proprietors have been talking up ever 
since the UK was still a kind of third-tier absolute monarchy. 
Within this clinical-entrepreneurial setting, we learn that the 
3 In MacSweeney’s poems from the late 1970s and early ’80s the violence 
of state politics tends to be fully occluded, or perfectly sublimed into the 
violence wished against the politician Thatcher, with the result that there 
is left over no reminder of what prompts fantasized violence in the first 
place. The cycle of part-objects becomes everything. See Barry Mac-




unnamed main character, played by Beynon, “sort of love[s]” 
David Cameron, though during much of the play she is also en-
gaged in a reflective discussion of whether it would be possible 
to exact revenge upon him for “his act” by means of “the proper 
war weapon of rape” (8). Her violent sadism and its autotuned 
vicissitude into self-annihilating identification is then provided 
with a counterpoint in Pawel’s passive masochism, performed 
at the play’s close by means of a long and disturbing dance se-
quence that occurs after the singer has quit the stage: a mime 
routine so preternaturally psychotic that not even Eurovision 
would be able to stretch itself to accommodate it. Out of the 
singer’s aim-inhibited sadism and Pawel’s aimless masochism 
are drawn the psychic raw materials for a “minor” act that must 
be made to measure up to the fantasy that David Cameron is 
larger than the damage he inflicts, and therefore to outrace the 
predictable conclusion that “his act” will always be able to as-
sign our actions to the merest subplot in a theatre in which he 
is the impresario.4
This constructive view of psychic irresolution is essential 
to the work. Beynon and Jeschke do not offer to their viewers 
a catalogue of readymade political ideal types with the order-
numbers all ready to be jotted down. Their play forgoes the 
psychoanalytical account of political desire in which the com-
pound of oedipal love and hatred is destined to be adaptively 
split off into authoritarian identification and inarticulate rage 
towards an Other: Führer to the left of me, Jew or communist 
4 For “minor,” see Pawel’s last word: “Oh, I’m so small. So small and minor. 
I loved you the whole time, and you didn’t even see it. Poor Pawel” (23). 
For “his act”, see the first speech introducing the play’s central problem: 
“Because sometimes I wonder about raping David Cameron. Like, he’s 
such a chunk of embodied violence, could I counter, or match, or punish 
that violence with the real war weapon of rape … Rape would be such a 
fully hateful forceful expression of now in the most unresistant, acquies-
cent way, it makes terrible sense, now, it’s reactionary, and even then, even 
if I raped him back, it still would be so small compared to his act. It’s the 
wrong crime for the job” (8). 
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or homosexual to the right (or vice versa).5 And this indecisive-
ness is important, because it would at least have been possible 
to write a play in which the main lesson was that, ultimately, 
the politics of revenge against the contemporary symbol of op-
pression reverses inevitably into a docile love relation. David 
Cameron does in fact contain this conclusion, but since the con-
clusion does not come last or get invested with the character 
of a sensible summing up, it merely ends up seeming like an 
afterthought or offshoot, a byproduct of the work thrown off 
into an incidental punchline: “So to conclude, I don’t think rap-
ing David Cameron would work. Besides, I sort of love him.” 
This thought arrives on page 10 of a text 23 pages in length and 
is of course no conclusion at all. All it does is terminate one 
sequence of the play, which then veers off into a long skit about 
work — itself an unstable compound in which working through 
is forever liable to be frozen into “a job well done,” one of the one 
hundred and eleven things that Beynon declares that she “loves” 
on pages eleven and twelve, in a great list of dubious love objects 
crammed together like inmates shoehorned into an overnight 
cell. Probably the psychological category that would be best 
suited to describe all of this is ambivalence; but what Beynon 
and Jeschke do with this category needs to be specified quite 
carefully. The two characters at the center of David Cameron are 
split-off halves of a single integral unit like the two characters at 
the center of Brecht’s Seven Deadly Sins of the Petty Bourgeoisie, 
and each proves to be ambivalent in turn in the mode of expres-
5 This is the pattern developed in, for example, Wilhelm Reich’s Mass Psy-
chology of Fascism, though Reich’s conception of upstanding genital health 
inclines him to emphasize passive submission to a Führer over active 
hatred for an outsider or other as the principle characteristic of fascist psy-
chology, see Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, trans. Mary 
Boyd Higgins (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970). The opposite emphasis 
is given in Adorno and Horkheimer’s chapter on anti-Semitism in The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (London: Verso, 1979), 
where experiences of subordination are always merely preludes to intense 
desires for revenge: “the hatred of the led […] knows no bounds” (171).
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sion that he or she adopts.6 This judgment would imply a par-
ticular focus of argument. Ambivalence is a state convenient for 
inducing social quiescence, because, as Wilhelm Reich already 
recognized the better part of a century ago, and as has been 
repeated by psychoanalysts of all tendencies ever since, “to be 
non-political [or to be positively undecided] is not, as one might 
suppose, evidence of a passive psychic condition, but of a highly 
active attitude.”7 Beynon and Jeschke’s play might be thought to 
evince a basic solidarity with this idea, that states of apparently 
placid indecision are wasteful or exhausting, but their argument 
is also more complex than this, because it maintains that the 
attempt to deny ambivalence, as well as to maintain oneself in 
it, is itself intensely exhausting and subjectively destructive. The 
play David Cameron recognizes two species of such denial: first, 
the attempt to imagine that we can harness feelings of intense 
hatred in order to achieve our political goals without suffering 
the experience of vicissitude or reversal; and second, and more 
important, the idea that by recognizing the reproduction of am-
bivalence in the effort to fabricate a sensation adequate to the 
situation in which we find ourselves, the way is open to us to 
reconceive radical politics and its relationship to art without our 
needing to consume ourselves in a vain effort of self-fashioning. 
This second idea is also a denial of ambivalence, although it ap-
pears to be based on a more intelligently conscious recognition 
of it. It sees that in the effort to make ourselves entertain a par-
ticular feeling or desire, we do nothing but establish the condi-
tions in which the opposite feeling can come to expression; and 
it repudiates this violent struggle with the self as a reproduction 
of ambivalent psychic attitudes at a higher order of intensity. 
For the sophisticated denier of the wasteful logic of psychologi-
6 The Seven Deadly Sins of the Petty Bourgeoisie is one of a number of Brecht 
plays in which two characters represent two distinct “sides” of, or possibili-
ties for, a single person. Other examples are The Yes-Sayer, The No-Sayer, 
and The Good Person of Szechwan. See Bertold Brecht, “The Seven Deadly 
Sins”, in Collected Plays, Volume 2, eds. John Willett and Ralph Manheim 
(London: Methuen Drama, 1994).  
7 Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, 233. Brackets added by the author.
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cal ambivalence, the first step to the restoration of lost psycho-
logical energies is the recognition of the fact that ambivalence 
cannot be fought against by means of the attempt to identify 
ourselves with some extreme attitude or feeling. Its promoters 
ask, what is to be gained by forcing ourselves into mental situa-
tions where we suffer the feelings we wish to oppose more and 
not less acutely? How could the struggle against one’s basic psy-
chological tendencies ever be more than an elaborate species of 
self-harm?
In answering these questions, Beynon and Jeschke argue that 
the attempt to harness strong desire is vain, self-destructive, and 
formidably counterproductive, and that it is still worth under-
taking — that the conscious recognition of ambivalence does 
not free up psychological energy but only wastes it differently. 
The adoption of this position is one of the play’s great risks. It is 
also its main challenge to a culture of people who it genuinely 
and vibrantly loathes, who find in their own equanimity an exit 
from wasted energies shaped like the utility-maximizing grown-
ups that they believe themselves to have become. These people 
tell themselves that they have been liberated from the belief that 
they need to make themselves feel something, by the reassuring 
analytical precept that says that this labor of self-production or 
self-manipulation is something that is only done by people who 
are trying unsuccessfully to fend off an impulse of an equal and 
opposite tendency. Beynon and Jeschke’s rejection of this think-
ing is a risk because it is perverse and cannot be proven — we 
cannot prove that those who see in the effort to fabricate ad-
equate sensation merely a heightening of ambivalence and an 
intensification of unproductive internal conflict are themselves 
the most damaged and self-wasting subjects of all. Nor can we 
prove that the injunction to desist in forcing subjective attitudes 
is more akin to the psychotic fantasy of violent revenge than 
the performance that strains actually to inhabit that fantasy and 
therefore to impel us to contemplate it as a real possibility, rath-
er than as a joke or provocation. The play exposes this attempt 
to escape from ambivalence as a false inference from the correct 
recognition that all efforts to fight against subjective uncertainty 
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raise ambivalence to a higher level of intensity. It constructs out 
of the vicissitudes to which it exposes itself the rudiments or 
outlines of a consciously transformative political language.8
This language is naturally energetic. Everywhere in the play-
text internal conflict is permitted to run riot in the involutions 
of a basic conversational syntax. From the very first passage 
in which the rape of David Cameron is tabled and then with-
drawn, Beynon’s grammar decomposes into a particle-storm of 
competing time-markers: “Rape would be such a fully hateful 
forceful expression of now in the most unresistant, acquiescent 
way, it makes terrible sense, now, it’s reactionary, and even then, 
even if I raped him back, it would still be so small compared 
to his act” (8). Rape as a fantasy of revenge for inflicted social 
damage is an expression of “now,” a condensation of its salient 
features as expressive as flared jeans for the 1970s. The hypo-
tactic run-on clause that proceeds from this gross metonymy 
inserts the same word but trusses it up in commas, now, as if by 
way of emphasis, refuting preemptively the still unarticulated 
objection that it was just as bad then or else that things aren’t 
going to get better any time soon, only then for the thought to 
wander off in just the direction that it had seemed definitely to 
prohibit, veering into the adverbial phrase “even then” as if in 
flight from its own basic instincts. “[E]ven then” would indicate 
a qualifying circumstance (“even in this situation”) rather than 
a time reference, but no anterior qualifying circumstance has 
been specified, which is why the speaker is forced to clarify by 
adding another phrase, “even if I raped him back,” a gloss that 
does not diminish but instead reinforces the temporal sense (the 
8 The distinctions in the preceding two paragraphs are perhaps hair splitting 
and are certainly inadequate to their object. But the same point could just 
as easily be made by describing the experience of reading good poetry. 
The aesthetics that attempts to deny ambivalence is based on the false as-
sumption that our true desires are desires that we can have sustainably all 
the time; but this is a stupid lie whose intellectual basis is the conflation of 
desires with subjective constants like skills, experiences, certification, and 
other objects that are capable of being anatomized into bullet points on the 
cover letter of a CV.
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presence of the past) precisely because it seems anxiously calcu-
lated to deny it or otherwise ward it off.
None of the untidiness of this apostrophe is incidental to 
what is being said or divisible from the progress of its argument. 
In the first instance this is because disputes about what is po-
litically singular about the present moment are always accom-
panied by the anxiety that our claims to novelty are deluded. 
In the second, it is because what is being proposed by Beynon 
and Jeschke is based on the paradoxical idea that the novelty of 
our current political situation is defined by its potential for vio-
lent psychological regression. Logical argument in the passage 
slides back into temporal description because of the play’s more 
encompassing practical commitment, to the truth that what we 
want for ourselves now cannot in any circumstances be disag-
gregated from who we are. And at the bottom of this reversal is 
a problem to do with the meaning of confidence. If our “act” is 
“so small,” as Beynon’s character admits that it would have to be 
even if it were to outline an intervention of the most “hateful” 
or “forceful” violence, is this because according to some felicific 
calculus it is always eclipsed by the costs of never-ending fiscal 
austerity? Or is it because the confidence that the act is capable 
of artificing, the anger that it brings to expression, and the vio-
lence that it articulates, are all ultimately available only to people 
who have elected to regress into a realm of fantasy — a private 
theater in which the active performer (Beynon) and the passive 
one (Jeschke) are never anything more than stock characters? 
What kind of act could make the performance of confidence 
something more than a conscious display? 
The idea that extreme acts in art are “small” because they are 
imaginative and not real is part of what today passes for cultural 
common sense. It is the main instrument through which forms 
of psychological self-harm are transformed into a model of aes-
thetic experience. In March 2015, the novelist Marina Warner, 
Dame Commander of the Order of the British Empire, restated 
some of these positions in the London Review of Books in an 
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article titled “Learning My Lesson.”9 The text, which is mainly 
given over to detailing measurement practices in UK higher 
education institutions, and which was occasioned by Warner’s 
resignation from the University of Essex, reminds us that fiction 
“gives you permission” to do what you ought not to do, and is 
thus essential to the process through which flexible and tolerant 
citizens are nurtured into poll booths and civil society organiza-
tions. Warner recalls in this connection the improving advice 
she once gave to a “young Emirati Arab” in her creative writing 
class: “[I]t isn’t you speaking but someone whose voice you are 
making up as you write, so you are free — or rather you can be 
more free there, in that space of imagination — to think around 
things, exploring possibilities.” This will seem, and in fact also is, 
a quite standard representation of the autonomy of the imagina-
tion and the different order of moral values to which it ought to 
be held to account. It is the vision of the freedom of the mind, 
or of the artistic imagination, that has been common to liberal 
writers seeking an accommodation with constituted power ever 
since Coleridge disavowed his early calls for regicide, on the ba-
sis that he was “merely” imagining them. Most of us who think 
of this position in Warner’s article as an idle and politically nox-
ious cliché will feel our eyes glazing over before we reach the 
next sentence. But it is worth pausing here, since her patrician 
benevolence is also possessed of its own internal economy of 
psychological energies, and because this is exactly the type of 
attitude that I think that Beynon and Jeschke are working to 
bring into view. The freedom of the imagination, which is based 
on an abjection of personality, or on the disowning of the de-
sires that are imputed to a character, does not open up a space 
of total license, but only makes us, more cautiously, “more free,” 
incrementally less unfree than we might be in the authoritarian 
UAE or its near anagram the University of Essex. Why Warner 
thinks this qualification is significant is not easy to say. It could 
9 Marina Warner, “Learning My Lesson,” London Review of Books 37, no. 6 




be because she is aware that the idea of the total freedom of the 
imagination is a useless romantic fantasy; or because she wants 
to invest the idea with some atmosphere of psychological plau-
sibility; or because she thinks, in the best tradition of liberal 
colonialism, that total freedom is something for which “young 
Emirati Arab” women aren’t yet prepared. Perhaps all of these 
possibilities mount up to the same thing. Nevertheless, the am-
biguity of the diagnosis maintains its own independent value. 
Warner doesn’t say why the freedom of the imagination should 
be qualified or circumscribed, and the ultimate significance of 
this omission is that the circumscription comes to appear as if it 
were, or at least as if it could be, self-evidently justifiable. There 
is no reason to ask why we need to be “more free” and not free 
altogether, because the readership to whom Warner addresses 
her plea for Western liberal values has already performed the 
psychic work necessary to accept that the separation of imagina-
tion and action is inert and anyway not worth fighting against. 
It is the fundamental accomplishment of the culture in whose 
defense articles like “Learning My Lesson” are written that the 
lessening of subjective intensity implicit in the idea that the im-
agination is at once split off and recuperable, “more free” and 
constrained, appears as a description of how things naturally are 
and not as the result of a process of repressive self-enfeeblement. 
The pseudo-drama of the liberation of the “Arab” in our lib-
eral university system is important to this conception, but the 
more fundamental reason why the effort of mental conception 
has no place in this idea of the imagination is that the repres-
sion of effort is the aim that it labors most strenuously to ac-
complish. Anyone who tries to make herself feel something she 
doesn’t want, or to want something she doesn’t feel, is from this 
perspective engaged not in making art but in a sort of perverse 
self-degradation. And this is itself reminiscent of other forms of 
what to a Warnerian eye seem like morally compromising forms 
of labor, like that of the women who allow themselves to be em-
ployed in the coke heaps of South Wales in the 1860s:
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I love female night shift workers. They quote quote are ex-
posed to the deterioration of character, arising from their 
loss of self-respect unquote unquote. Strength of language 
varies directly with deterioration of character in that as one’s 
bodily commitment increases, as you spend more blood on 
keeping someone else’s private pension wet with it, the lan-
guage which is summoned to stem and then counter that 
blood loss must strengthen.10
This quotation of a quotation in Marx belongs to the most in-
tense passage of David Cameron and to the segment in which 
the problems of liberal auto-constraint are addressed with the 
most focused and explicit energy.11 The inverse correlation that 
10 Beynon and Jeschke, David Cameron, 13. The rest of the segment runs: 
“[…] When this organised country rips your heart out of your chest and 
uses it to supplement his own beating campaign for flesh, THEN WHAT 
IS AN OBJECTION TO STRONG LANGUAGE? In the face of that act Fuck the 
man that does that. Fuck him not with the tenderness of parodic loving 
sex play, but fuck him like they say Dworkin thought every fuck fucked. 
Fuck him in the face that soft-powered poverty into itself. Fuck him in 
the hands that write the speeches, fuck him in the fleshless mouth that 
speaks them. Rip him a cunt of his own invention and let him see how that 
compares to a cunt of human flesh, loudly throbbing. Fuck his gash. It’s 
nothing like mine. He has sorely misunderstood. And to call for calm, for 
gentler terms, is cultural Cameron.”
11 The quote is from the Fourth Report of the Children’s Employment Com-
mission, given in a footnote in Capital, Volume I, in Marx and Engels, Col-
lected Works of Marx and Engels, 50 vols. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 
1975–2004), 35:264: “Both in Staffordshire and in South Wales young girls 
and women are employed on the pit banks and on the coke heaps, not only 
by day but also by night. This practice has been often noticed in Reports 
presented to Parliament, as being attended with great and notorious evils. 
These females employed with the men, hardly distinguishable from them 
in their dress, and begrimed with dirt and smoke, are exposed to the 
deterioration of character, arising from the loss of self-respect, which can 
hardly fail to follow from their unfeminine occupations.” This argument 
prompts anger because it affects to speak about “deterioration” in the labor 
process as if it were a purely moral phenomenon, but the reason I think it 
is interesting to Beynon and Jeschke is that its transgression of a common 
sense distinction (“deterioration” is a strictly physical fact) at once mirrors 
and reduces to a kind of joke the same kind of transgression as the one 
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it sets up between “[s]trength of language” and “deterioration of 
character” does not just assert a relationship between language 
or the kinds of fantasies we express with it and anything so grue-
some and abstract an object of academic dissertations as “the 
Body.” Instead, it argues that the effort to expose the imagined 
desires that we are compelled to have, rather than the ones we 
are encouraged to consume, and to live with them, is the first 
step in freeing ourselves from the state of habitualized ambiva-
lence in which we unconsciously waste and discard our energies 
up to the point where it seems as if we are by nature perfectly 
serene. The prefabricated identity of “strong language” and “bad 
language” arises naturally out of this scene of repressive injunc-
tions like methane from manure. It is a form of the moral code 
that is used to tell certain kinds of people that it is bad for them 
to be strong, both in the diagnostic sense that it leads to pa-
thologies and in the theocratic sense that says that they ought to 
remain in their place. To make “bodily commitment” “stem and 
then counter” the loss of blood and desire and life that is prereq-
uisite to and not excluded by the conscious experience of seren-
ity means not only to work but also to acknowledge the effects 
of the work that we have already been made to do. Beynon and 
Jeschke’s point is not the simplistic and common one that actual 
social misery is in the end “worse than” bad language, so that 
those who castigate bad language are cultivators of indifference 
to actual “bodily” or social human suffering; this idea, which 
has been done to death by serene theoreticians who know abso-
lutely nothing about what it means to fight to stay alive, is really 
not so different from the conception of the mind threnodized by 
such liberal imperialists as the novelist Marina Warner. Beynon 
and Jeschke’s point is rather that the fight for sensations that are 
strong and weak at once, compassionate and aggressive, cannot 
occur without a struggle that not only opens us to damage but 
which actively threatens to induce it. “Deterioration” is not only 
they themselves are determined to carry out, against the idea that art must 




historical; the labor that is necessary actually to face the fact of 
it requires of us that we accept its extension in ourselves. Only 
in a concerted effort to make our desires and our actions bend 
towards one another is it possible to imagine a situation where 
the fucking economics textbook with its fixed and predictable 
relationships might blur or flame up into the medical manu-
al in which blood loss can not only be “stem[med]” but also 
“counter[ed],” where blood can also flow back into the body, not 
in inverse correlation to anything but in defiance of all relation-
ships that we have ever been taught to know.
When Beynon and Jeschke write, and when Beynon yells, 
“THEN WHAT IS AN OBJECTION TO STRONG LANGUAGE?” (13), 
the assertion does not mean (although by anyone who is not 
listening it may always be read to mean) that we should resist 
the moral imperative of proportionality that is always asserted 
by those whose own actions exceed any scale of ordinary moral 
language. What it really means, which is to say, what it means 
more intensely and uniquely, is that it is only when language 
itself becomes exhausting, and not merely a reflection on ex-
haustion or a complaint about our orders of priority, that it can 
really begin to articulate just how much human life is wasted in 
a world in which the pathology that forces people to acquiesce 
to their smallness is forever being imposed upon the idea of cul-
ture itself. In March 2015, in the dreary runup to another general 
election, in which state politicians will talk indefatigably about 
how much we need to save for the future, Beynon and Jeschke’s 
play reminds us that our most significant acts do not occur peri-
odically according to a calendar determined at the convenience 
of our ruling classes, but fitfully and beautifully and counter to 
our best habits and educated expectations. They cannot happen 
over and over again forever, because they require of us an ex-
penditure of life and instinct that is frightening and painful and 
sometimes damaging to undergo. The great accomplishment of 
the “small act” David Cameron throughout all of its vicissitudes 
and inevitable reverses is that it makes the real inevitability of 
large collective acts of this kind feel undoubtable in a period 
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Class Separation vs. Separation Anxiety: 
A Brief Psychotic Interlude
 
In the third chapter of his Reflections On Violence, “Prejudices 
Against Violence,” the French revolutionary syndicalist and 
soon-to-be monarchist Georges Sorel explained why it was nec-
essary for the proletariat to retain a strict separation from the 
middle class. “Everything may be saved,” Sorel wrote,
if the proletariat, by their use of violence, manage to rees-
tablish the division into classes, and so restore to the middle 
class something of its former energy; that is the great aim 
towards which the whole thought of men — who are not hyp-
notised by the events of today, but who think of the condition 
of tomorrow — must be directed.1
The condition of salvation that is imagined here exists in the 
grand tradition of modern regenerative brutality stretching 
from Walter Raleigh to his insurgent antipode Frantz Fanon. 
Violence is at first conceived in it as the political equivalent of 
a sudden awakening. In Fanon’s language, it retrieves its agent 
1 Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, ed. Jeremy Jennings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 85.
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from a state of “aboulia,” or absence of willpower,2 transfiguring 
those “who are inert, cannot make plans, who have no resources 
[and] who live from day to day” into the bearers of “a national 
destiny and a collective history.”3 In the language of Sorel, it 
wrenches its agent out of a state of “hypnosis” and fixes his at-
tention upon the great mythical display cabinet of tomorrow, as 
well as its trophy-“condition.”
For anyone who now passes their days isolated “trying to 
defeat or gratify powerful impulses in a world [they] fear,” this 
“condition” may feel unreal even before they begin to consider 
whether or not it may be desirable.4 The politics of regressive 
separation — “taking back control”, “our” borders, “legitimate 
concerns”, etc. — are more alive now than they have been at any 
time in the last fifty years; and the psychological para-politics of 
fear and aversiveness are revived with them simultaneously and 
to a still greater degree. Furthermore, as this revival picks up 
speed across multiple election cycles and throughout the whole 
atmosphere of so-called public opinion, the process throws up 
its own sub-tendency, in the form of a newly urgent, reactive 
politics of compulsory and defensive unity. This is the tedious 
liberal catchall complaint about political “divisiveness.” What 
could radical separateness in Sorel’s sense even mean in these 
circumstances — if indeed there ever was such a thing, and the 
theory of class separation for which he became known was ever 
anything but a kind of elaborate justification for ascetic puritan-
ism, with all of the tendencies towards sexual suffocation and 
displaced misogyny that flourish at its root?
The following chapter tries to answer this question. It is not a 
history of the political-economic changes that have given rise to 
regressive separation, or that have made earlier politics of class 
separation wither away, but it is instead a brief and provisional 
attempt to explain one psychological relationship between fas-
2 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington 
(London: Penguin 1961), 228.
3 Ibid., 73.
4 Richard Wright, Native Son (London: Vintage, 2000), 73.
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cist demands for racial or ethnic segregation and liberal de-
mands for national unity, and to show how in both worldviews 
the fraught and painful fact of separation is harmfully denied 
and precluded from meaningful expression. For the same rea-
son, it is one element of a broader account of the instinct for 
separation in a militant and transformative culture.
●
On June 16, 2016, six days before the referendum on UK EU 
membership, the British neo-Nazi Thomas Mair murdered the 
Labour MP and “Remain” supporter Jo Cox. The killing was a 
testimony to the historical and psychoanalytic significance of 
the need for separation over unity. Mair was reported to be a 
“loner” with strong symptoms of depression and compulsion 
neurosis.5 In the days after Cox’s death, the newspapers that re-
ported pruriently on his habits of obsessive self-cleaning also 
noted his search record on the computers at the library outside 
which he would later shoot and stab Cox. This included queries 
about matricide,6 a desire that was linked in Mair’s mind with 
the relationship his mother had formed with a British Carib-
bean man during his middle adolescence.7 The violence through 
5 BBC News, “Thomas Mair: Extremist loner who targeted Jo Cox,” BBC, 
November 23, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38071894.
6 Hatred of mothers is a consistent preoccupation of personality types that 
incline towards movement fascism (i.e., rabid fascist extremists), as Klaus 
Theweleit and Christina Wieland have shown in their writings on the 
institutions of masculinity. See Klaus Theweleit, “Männliche Geburts-
weisen,” in Das Land das Ausland heist: Essays, Reden, Interviews zu Politik 
und Kunst (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995), and Christina 
Wieland, The Undead Mother: Psychoanalytic Explorations of Masculinity, 
Femininity, and Matricide (London: Karnac, 2000).
7 Richard Spillett, “‘Jekyll and Hyde’ assassin was a loner who scoured 
himself with Brillo pads because of cleanliness obsession and spent his life 
on mental health drugs,” Daily Mail, November 23, 2016, http://www.dai-
lymail.co.uk/news/article-3960988/Jekyll-Hyde-Jo-Cox-assassin-Thomas-
Mair.html. In the Mail article, Mair’s half-brother Duane St Louis is quoted 
as saying that “[h]e has never expressed any views about Britain, or shown 
any racist tendencies. I’m mixed race and I’m his half-brother, we got on 
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which he hoped, in Sorelian terms, “to manage to reestablish 
[…] division” played out in the key of fantasized restitution, re-
calling such other rifts between overt purpose and deed in the 
vocabulary of the US extreme right as conversion therapy and 
corrective rape. Its unconscious attempt to transform a passive, 
infantile fear of abandonment or extreme separation anxiety 
into an active, grown-up desire to enforce a regime of ethnic 
apartheid,8 is only the latest historical expression of the repres-
sive attitude that Sorel would pompously celebrate as the “re-
signed abnegation of men who strive uncomplainingly.”9
well. He never married. The only time I remember him having a girlfriend 
was as a young man, but a mate stole her off him. He said that put him 
off [women] for life.” This is of course just a decontextualized pull quote, 
and in its original usage it was intended primarily to indicate that Mair’s 
act was not ideological but only disturbed, in accordance with the desire 
of the Mail and the majority of the British news media to disassociate 
the murder from the general atmosphere of the campaign for the “Leave” 
vote, for which the Mail and the majority of the British news media was 
of course directly, and perhaps primarily, responsible. But it does seem at 
least to suggest the centrality to Mair’s fantasy life of some primal rage at 
perceived abandonment, that his first experience of desertion by a partner 
should be treated as if it were an irreparable and inexpiable wrong, for 
which all women in general are to be indifferently held responsible. The 
idea that it “put [Mair] off for life” is one indication that he had in fact 
already been put off, and that his first adult experience of relationship 
trouble was seized upon as an opportunity to rationalize, and so to take 
possession of, what would otherwise have remained a merely troubling 
and inexplicable aversion. Likewise, it is conspicuous in Duane St Louis’s 
account that the man who “stole” Mair’s girlfriend brought about no 
lasting transformation in Mair’s general attitude towards “mates.” The 
selective apportionment of blame conforms to a familiar pattern. If the 
child suffers, it must be the fault of the mother, never of the father: always 
the EU, never the member state.
8 The thought process evidences a conventional inversion: Mair believed 
that his mother deserved to die because she was a “race traitor”: white su-
premacism serves to rationalize a preexisting desire and therefore to give 
to it a semblance of meaning. It might be wondered whether this helps to 
explain why Mair’s desire to kill his mother, although conscious, was also 
inactive, so that newspapers could report that he had spent the day before 
the murder re-tuning his mother’s TV. Cox was of course the ultimate 
victim of these displacements.
9 Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 228.
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It is necessary to talk about Cox’s murder like this, in spite 
of the dangers of pathological readings of fascism, and in spite 
of the risks of converting hateful political assassination into a 
portfolio of materials for an amateur case study, because it is im-
portant to keep in view, at the root of racist divisiveness, some 
wildly distorted demand for unity. Murder in the name of fascist 
violence originates in a convulsively distorted protest against the 
conditions that it reproduces. This principle of interpretation is 
valuable, not because it helps us to remember that ultimately 
fascists are hurt and complex human beings, full of inarticulate 
anguish and perhaps also one day subject to rehabilitation,10 but 
because it helps us to see how gestures of premature reconcili-
ation in the name of the divided national community are not 
necessarily the opposite of feverish moralizing about the virtue 
of violent segregation, but are just as frequently the elaborations 
of an identical process of self-therapy, only now uttered in a lan-
guage of more refined purpose and with a greater consistency 
of form and expressive content.11 It is today January 21,  2017. It 
10 Although patently it won’t be Thomas Mair or even the members of a 
fucking Nazi gang like National Action who will benefit most significantly 
from the conversion of the United Kingdom into an outsized tax-free 
headquarters, which in the absence of any other means of commanding a 
share of total global surplus value is what its asset-holding political class 
now intends to make of it.
11 To drag slightly out of context a line of Leo Bersani’s: “[B]rutality is 
identical to […] idealization”: Is the Rectum a Grave? And Other Essays 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 29. Incidentally, if Bersani is 
right in his thesis, and what is stereotypically treated as “passive” sexuality 
(i.e., in male heterosexual assumptions concerning gay sex and female 
sexuality) is identified with, and organically repeats, a pleasure that is 
felt during episodes of infancy in which the child is faced with the loss of 
identity, then it makes sense that a person who experienced special pain 
due to helplessness or abandonment during a later stage in childhood 
might eventually turn against this earlier sense of loss of control with a 
special intensity, and condemn its perceived corollaries in adult sexual life 
with an aggressive aversiveness that seems pathetically overblown even 
when viewed in comparison to the “ordinary” prejudices of the dominant 
(i.e., male heterosexual) social outlook (Is the Rectum a Grave?, 24). The 
relationship between these two perspectives is apologetically summarized 
by the brother of Mair’s inspiration David Copeland, in an episode of the 
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is more than seven months since Cox’s murder. Yesterday Don-
ald Trump was inaugurated as president of the United States, 
talking in the language of a Hollywood scriptwriter about the 
necessity of confronting “American carnage.” The liberal-par-
liamentarian press disgorges an unending series of condemna-
tions of divisiveness, appeals for healing, pious wishes for the 
re-creation of a non-existent unity. It tacitly acknowledges the 
impotence of these declarations by projecting its own internal 
anxiety onto the outgoing President Obama, or else onto “his 
wife,” substituting for active resistance to authoritarian state 
populism a comforting fantasy of paternal invulnerability, the 
tweediness of which is so blazingly and absolutely out of sync 
with reality as to seem actually laughable:
Obama descended the steps shoulder to shoulder with 
Trump, chatting and sharing a joke. At the bottom, Obama 
smiled broadly. His wife could not hide an expression akin to 
melancholy. He lifted her hand to his lips and kissed it, giving 
her a reassuring smile.12
Here, and in passages that are akin it, the liberal and humane 
call for unity and healing — Obama and Trump, shoulder to 
shoulder! — exhibits by virtue of its precipitousness just that 
kind of false resolution that in the psychohistory of a neo-Nazi 
transforms fear and despair at the prospect of separation into a 
catastrophic political need for it. It is a model example of what 
BBC’s Panorama series aired in 1999: “I think he [David Copeland] just had 
a healthy dislike of gays, like most of the male gender have, not a hatred, 
just a dislike.” Copeland was convicted in 1999 for a series of bombings 
aimed at ethnic minorities and what he enviously understood to be the 
London gay “community.” Mair ordered his first consignment of weapon 
assembly manuals ten days after Copeland’s first court appearance. See 
BBC, Panorama: “The Nailbomber,” June 30, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/panorama/transcripts/tran-
script_30_06_00.txt.
12 Joanna Walters, “Obama Departs White House with a Promise: ‘I’ll be 
right there with you,’” The Guardian, January 20, 2017, https://www.the-
guardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/20/barack-obama-departs-white-house.
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Freud called “the splitting of the ego in the process of defence.”13 
Everywhere I look this kind of false resolution seems to repro-
duce itself, in every byway and backroad of political discourse. 
It recurs wherever some true political aspiration is made too 
quickly into the basis for reassuring political generalization.
Of course liberals will not all endorse Trump explicitly, even 
if they continue to defend political measures that in the long 
run will help right-wing nationalism to thrive; and in fact many 
will despise him with the peculiar, heightened intensity of those 
who feel themselves to have been placed under threat for the 
very first time. But the argument that I am making is not that 
liberalism is incapable of endorsing separation or antagonism 
under any circumstances, but that in general it misconceives of 
the way in which the need for separation is originated and re-
solved. It needs to do this. Within the worldview implied by the 
average editorial in the New York Times, aversion to any analysis 
of the psychological need for unity is what permits the repro-
duction of unity as a political demand. It is only by means of 
this mechanism that liberal thinking can free itself from the rec-
ognition that in this class society, the abstract attempt to effect 
reconciliation is just as likely to express itself in acts of reaction-
ary violence as it is in the emergence of new relations of mu-
tual support. Put more directly, liberal thinking is averse to the 
psychological need for unity because that need arises not only 
in the face of threats to those liberal privileges that are embod-
ied in the constitutional bourgeois state, but also in the face of 
deepening poverty, disintegrating family structures, under-em-
ployment or super-exploitation, landlordism, benefit cuts, news 
of distant family uprooted by bombs and foreign-armed militia, 
and above all in the deep personal recognition of exclusion that 
is the main element of class culture in a society no longer prem-
ised on formal segregation. Its desire to limit discussion of unity 
strictly to the domain of politics is therefore paradoxically its 
13 Sigmund Freud, “The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence,” in 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 23, ed. James Stra-
chey et al. (London: Vintage, 2001), 275–79.
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main method for obfuscating the historical expression of class 
experience as such, and thus of disclaiming its own participa-
tion in the reactionary violence against which it believes itself to 
be the single, indispensable bulwark.14
Where does this leave us? The amateur enthusiast of neo-Na-
zism attempts to manage real individual trauma by transplanting 
it into a political fantasy of ethnic-national self-defense, while, 
by contrast, the professional advocate of unity under the aus-
pices of liberal democracy deals with trauma by means of wish 
fulfilment — the dream of us all standing together “shoulder to 
shoulder.” Georges Sorel could not have foreseen the deep in-
tegrity of this state of affairs any more than could Marx or Rosa 
Luxemburg. But what does it mean that in both social outlooks 
the fact of separation or exclusion remains studiously denied or 
suppressed? If the desire to remain abstemiously separate from 
any culture in particular has now become decisively reactionary, 
while the political demand for unity continues under present 
conditions to be lifelessly premature, how can the experience of 
separation be radicalized?
Transformative political art has to recognize, and wherever 
it already exists it does recognize in practice, that the history of 
class separation is in reality the history of capitalist unification. 
It is the gigantic expansion and integration of capitalist exploita-
tion across the world and its implacable forced entry into every 
domain and level of human experience that determines the false 
resolution of Sorel’s mythical vision into the pseudo-world his-
tory of Thomas Mair, abreacting from the comfort of his com-
puter his unconscious rage at abandonment, and transforming 
it into the conscious wish fulfillment of small town NSDAP-
revivalism. And there is now no country and constituency or 
14 It follows from this that the criterion for a progressive politics of unity is 
that a movement should always articulate its response to the immediate, 
defensive demands of the situation in a practical vocabulary that is ad-
equate to the experience of the excluded — who are emphatically not only 
from “the white working class” — in disregard of the interests of those who 
have never previously been excluded from anything and who would now 
gladly place themselves at the head of the “anti-fascist” resistance.
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region where a Sorelian politics of “class separation” can bring 
about any more desirable result, since even the most extravagant 
nationalist pageantry and the wildest impostures about “historic 
movement[s]”15 are incapable of disguising the fact that beneath 
the blizzards of confetti, no more significant qualitative trans-
formation has taken place then the dignified metamorphosis of 
Thomas Mair’s public computer into the voting booth of every 
enfranchised adult citizen.
What Sorel thought of as the “energy” of working-class 
culture is now produced not in abstemious withdrawal from 
bourgeois values and institutions, but in the hungry and con-
frontational seizure of means and instruments and modes of 
expression from which the working class has historically been 
excluded. That is to say, it belongs in the intense and historically 
legitimate need for bourgeois privilege, backed up by a knowl-
edge of the fundamental role of aggression in overcoming the 
forces that prohibit access to it. You can see this in all working-
class youth cultures now available via YouTube and in the ac-
tivity of working-class performers of all ages and genders. The 
wild psychotherapy of their culture does not culminate in fas-
cist identitarianism or its practical endorsement under the inert 
heading of a National Healing Process, but in unity-through-
seizure, movement for the sake of it, property violation, the ex-
perimental crossing of defined boundaries, self-dissipation, the 
rage of passivity, etc., all lived out throughout and against the 
incessant integration of global capital and the speech-acts of its 
many left- and right-wing advocates.
Could there be in our world now any residual significance 
in the idea that the task of anti-capitalist artists is to create a 
separate and independent worldview, sectioned off from bour-
geois reality not by a wall or by a checkpoint, but by an energy 
that is so clearly its own that middle-class consumers would 
15 “Everyone is listening to you now. You came by the tens of millions to 
become part of a historic movement, the likes of which the world has 
never seen before”: Time Staff, “Read Donald Trump’s Full Inauguration 




instinctively flinch from it? The radical theory that answers 
this question by declaring that separation is already over and 
done with, because capital now “surpasses the division between 
employment and unemployment, working and non-working, 
productive and assisted, precarious and non-precarious” — all 
of the “divisions on which the left has based its categories of 
thought and action” — and that concludes that anti-capitalists 
“must rise to [the same] level of abstraction […] if we want to 
avoid being swept away” — this theory is in fact only half right.16 
It’s right, because the raw fact of historical development does in 
truth point towards the overcoming of working-class separation 
both as a reality and as an aspiration. But it’s wrong, too, because 
it is only in the lexicon of banal received ideas that separation is 
always simply beneath consideration and abstraction is some-
thing to which we invariably rise up. The conclusions are just 
too tediously familiar. For a more confrontational class culture, 
in which the threat of exclusion masses in the sky above our 
heads, and abstraction just as frequently advertises its openings 
beneath our feet, they represent a glaring reality deficit. And it 
would be more true to say that in a world whose complete inte-
gration is more liable to abstract assertion than it has ever been, 
what radical culture needs to separate itself from is not the his-
tory of bourgeois values (whatever they are) but the enormous, 
narcissistic complacency of those who profess to believe in their 
universal availability.
It is because even the most progressive middle-class appeals 
for unity totally lack this instinctive recognition, that they share 
at some deep and mostly unconscious level an uncomfortable 
affinity with the murderous demands for segregation of the fas-
cists whom we are supposed to unite against.
16 This quote is from Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man: 
An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition, trans. Joshua David Jordan (Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2012), 161; but others like it could have been found 




Transgression for Anti-Fascists 
On Verity Spott
 
During 2016 and the period of Donald Trump’s first great elec-
toral circus, the racist provocateur and ex-Telegraph intern Milo 
Yiannopoulos traveled around US university campuses giving 
stump speeches under the heading “The Dangerous Faggot.” 
The talks were all structured around a kind of Coué method 
done in reverse. Just as the French self-help pioneer Emile Coué 
thought that his patients could improve their lives by repeat-
ing to themselves the refrain “every day in every way I’m get-
ting better and better,” the Yiannopoulos technique relies on the 
rote behaviorist insistence that the progressive opponents of his 
audience are getting in every way worse and worse. They are 
insane, immunized against facts, have nothing to say for them-
selves, are ugly, mentally ill, hate their lives, and are nobodies. At 
no other point in the whole history of far-right agitating has the 
role of the speaker been so explicitly therapeutic or so openly 
committed to making an audience feel calm with itself in its 
own skin. Every provocation comes packaged with an attempt 
to ensure that its listener “feel[s] […] confident, happy [and] 
reassured,” as if they were babies staring up out of their cradles 
at the enormous benevolent faces of their fascist leaders. Every 
reference to the forces of progressive liberalism is calculated to 
remind the audience that they are nothing to worry about. For 
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Yiannopoulos, there can be no danger in the culture of the far-
right, no risk-taking, and no transgression, before everyone, the 
heterosexual audience member most especially, has made sure 
that they are sitting absolutely comfortably. The open secret of 
the “dangerous faggot” is that he is the manager of a safe space.
This convergence of fascists on the therapeutic idea of self-
acceptance has several interrelated motives. (1) It promotes the 
ongoing effort by media-savvy ethno-nationalists to stuff every 
available gap in the market with outright racist content. Free 
speech, the free-floating affect of background music, and client-
centered theories of unconditional positive regard are all ele-
ments of a larger culture in which contentless feelings of grati-
fication are the very lifeblood of its marketing operations, a fact 
which is exceptionally useful for customer-facing fascists whose 
main aim is to invest the desire to murder people and to laugh 
at their misfortunes with an atmosphere of reassuring famili-
arity. (2) The mock liberalism of psychological self-acceptance 
reproduces in the uplands of the human ego the same mock 
liberalism by means of which contemporary fascists endeavor 
to argue that they are merely rectifying a pattern of anti-white 
discrimination — the theory according to which white liberals 
have failed to accept their own culture, etc. In both cases this 
acceptance-concept is a pseudopacification of violent impulses. 
To tell someone that they should accept something that is funda-
mentally hateful is a convenient way of inflicting trauma under 
the auspices of its overcoming. (3) Just as classical fascism radi-
calizes the forms of violence required to reproduce bourgeois 
class relations, customer-facing fascism radicalizes the forms of 
psychological conformism required to accept life in a service 
depot. In a world in which revolutions are always made above 
your head and at your expense, what better coping mechanism 
can there be than learned hatred of the idea of transformation 
itself? At a low level of intensity this hatred can be named “self-
acceptance” and marketed by client-centered therapists to their 
paying customers. At a high level it can become the working 
vocabulary of client-centered Nazis and serve as the basis for 
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their campaigns against migrants and transgender people. The 
second ideology is only a new permutation of the first.
●
These basic reflections arise for me out of a reading of Verity 
Spott’s poem Click Away Close Door Say, a work that depicts two 
years spent working in a private care institution in the UK while 
watching with mounting apprehension the insurgency of the far 
right across the US and much of Europe. The poem begins like 
this:
I used to love to work; to come inside
here every day, begin to move,,
& what that means (to assume
a false beginning) is walking up
the tiled path, a
metal hand rail, grass
to either side. The sign at the front a defunct
emblem. The company tag is bust.1
The language commences in what seems at first like natural 
speech conducted artlessly in iambic pentameter, “I used to 
love”; and only the construction “to work,” a verb where we 
might ordinarily expect a substantive, disturbs the sensation of 
speech and meter in easy erotic symmetry. But even that inter-
ference feels relatively serendipitous, or like a retrieval of the 
idea of labor from self-subjugating cliché; and it binds it into a 
sequence of infinitives — “to love,” “to work,” “to move” — whose 
total effect is to summon into speech an impression of blissful 
self-direction. The pauses governed by punctuation arrive at 
regular intervals and enjoin a rhythm of gentle alternations, 
three beats and then two, three beats and then two, in which the 
rhapsody dedicated to wakeful activity is unified naturally with 
1 Verity Spott, Click Away Close Door Say (London: Contraband, 2017), 9. 
All subsequent references to Spott’s book are cited parenthetically in text..
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the music of simple restfulness. At the third line, the pattern at 
first seems set to continue: “and what that means” is something 
else that the speaker may have “used to love”; their love for work 
and movement is also love for the meaning of work and move-
ment in combination. But then a parenthesis opens in the line 
and the language enjambs before it has arrived at its accustomed 
metrical limit, “(to assume / a false beginning),” before the sen-
tence continues in such a way as to sever the relationship of 
“and what that means” with what “I used to love.” Instead “what 
that means” is identified with the more prosaic reality of “walk-
ing up / the tiled path, a / metal handrail, grass.” The fantasy of 
the workplace as a closed environment of love, movement, labor 
and meaning has a hole punched into it and its deictic closure 
is compromised. The metrical organization of the language ma-
terials is terminated and the intricate patterning of verb sounds 
is travestied in the ugly half rhyming of “defunct” and “bust,” 
themselves bringing to a close two terminal sentences that seem 
to repeat meaninglessly more or less the same thing, like any 
sequence of days in an ordinary working week: “The sign at the 
front a defunct / emblem. The company tag is bust.”
This particular breakdown becomes a “defunct emblem” of 
what I think the poem is doing as a whole. Click Away Close 
Door Say is the largescale depiction of a breakdown in a work-
place and of the various efforts of corrupt suasion and bullying 
used to make people shut up and fucking accept it. It is, also, a 
wild commentary on the fascist media talking over our heads; 
a more perceptive account of their baleful symmetries than 
can be acquired from the most admired journalistic accounts 
of either; an anti-case study written in furious infidelity to the 
idea, so central to the bumptious marketing-principles of the 
genre, that the lives of vulnerable people must be either larger 
than life or else worth nothing at all; an anti-workers’ inquiry 
on the verge of screaming; and a confession. Where it plays out 
is a “specialist support service” in Hove that “looks after young 
adults with high functioning autism and related diagnoses / 
mixed diagnoses.” The service belongs to a larger group of pri-
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vate care homes that in turn was purchased by the private equity 
firm Advent International in 2011 and re-sold for a £500 million 
profit in 2016 to the US healthcare group Acadia,2 and much of 
the poem deals with the material harm that that £500 million 
profit represents, in terms of understaffing, trauma, workplace 
assaults, resentment and confusion, failures of care, bullying, 
malfunctioning of essential equipment, managerial horseshit, 
hopelessness and depression — in short, the whole gamut of ex-
periences that contemporary service sector workers are obliged 
beamingly to accept.
   you got through
until the reader was fucked
for a week & the lift was broken &
the emergency radios were gone
& we were understaffed for over a
year and you were leaking in the
low drops of paranoia, anger, and loss […] (18)
This is the situation in which client-centered fascists operate: 
where “Your dad, the pervert estate agent / washes his Milo” 
(49). The poem remains in its first parts predominantly an in-
quiry into details like these, which are, or constitute, as Spott 
puts it in the Note she appends to the poem, the “effect that the 
transition [in ownership] had on the individuals that lived in 
the service.” Accordingly, the work spirals outwards from the 
space itself and into the process of its managerial restructuring, 
and then more generally still to the languages in which that re-
structuring was carried out and made to “seem okay” (53). After 
this, the focus shifts incongruously to the minor mid-twentieth-
century US client- or person-centered therapist Carl Rogers, a 
figure who the poet “feel[s]” “that [they] hate” (69).
2 Nicholas Megaw, “Britain’s Priory Group Sold to US Healthcare Com-




During her pilgrimage across this landscape of management 
troubadours and clinical romancers, the poet is surprised by the 
fact that “change” and “movement” are ceaselessly invoked as if 
their value were held to be self-evident, or as if no change could 
ever be for the worse. At about the mid-point of the book, she 
quotes the following gloss by the group Wealth of Negations:
CHANGE — Invoked in a general, unqualified sense to conse-
crate as natural and inevitable a particular shift of power in 
favour of some interests and against others. The naturalistic 
alibi gets more persuasive as one petty interest strings along 
together a series of coups: it’s the way the world is going; you 
can’t turn back time so you’d better adapt. Where particular 
change can be passed off by its partisans as Change in gener-
al, resistance to their next move is made to look like defence 
of an insufferable past.3
Why is it that contemporary fascists, rising like pimples from 
the backside of a specifically revolutionary ultra-nationalism, 
are now so deeply concerned to make sure that you’re sitting 
comfortably? And since when was the value of Progress aggres-
sively taken over by the factotums of companies like Advent 
International, as a technical vocabulary with which to dignify 
a business-model based exclusively on asset stripping? Implicit 
in the argument by Wealth of Negations is another recognition 
about the nature of revolutionary transformation. Four decades 
into a period of relentless bourgeois counter-insurgency against 
all of the institutions of working-class life, very few theories of 
Change have held out against the general current. Readiness 
for revolution implied willingness to die or to be utterly trans-
formed. It was unthinkable except in a moment in which all his-
3 Emphasis in the original. This definition was included alongside many 
dozens of other entries — on topics as diverse as “Cutting Edge” and “Fa-
cilities Management” — in the collective’s volume on management-speak, 
available at Wealth of Negations, “TERMS & CONDITIONS (Complete and 




torical potential seemed as if it must be held in the balance. By 
contrast, readiness for “transition” of the kind that flows into 
the £500 million river of private equity alpha implies something 
else. It does not imply readiness to die or to be transformed, but 
readiness to be attacked, which is the particular state of prepar-
edness that managers everywhere now refer to as “resilience.” 
Change “invoked in a general, unqualified sense” refers to an 
alteration not in the basic order of social reality, and still less in 
the objective possibility for human freedom, but primarily in 
the individual’s psychic powers of endurance. Farcical invulner-
ability is the alpha of this outlook and its omega too, and it is 
so deeply rooted in the daily practice of getting by that it has a 
vocabulary for every occasion.
As the theories of bourgeois therapists mutate insensibly 
into the motivational speeches of fascist service providers, the 
root cause of these changes emerges more and more blatantly 
into view. In economies in which, as we now know, the “over-
whelming share of employment” is “shunted into sectors of the 
economy that are, perhaps by their very nature, technologically 
stagnant,” a great translation gets underway in the culture that 
supplies them with a running commentary.4 Vocabularies de-
signed in historical periods in which more and more time was 
being reclaimed from necessary labor are restructured for a so-
cial milieu in which the possibility of technical revolutions of 
this kind becomes increasingly unthinkable, or where, as Verity 
Spott puts it, “in a generalisation based on feeling,” “[t]he pri-
vate sector […] doesn’t mind being immobile” (14). In this situ-
ation revolution becomes a synonym for sclerosis — a merely 
verbal form of radicalism for a society entering into a period of 
generalized decline. Only a few grazes and flesh wounds in the 
syntax of progress remain to give the game away.
In Click Away Close Door Say the life that is “priced into” this 
“toxic pyramid / of fearful desire” (49) progresses inexorably to 
4 Jason E. Smith, “Nowhere to Go: Automation, Then and Now,” The Brook-




the point of losing it, and the third section of the poem ends 
with a depiction of this breakdown, in a prose stripped of almost 
all of its rhythmic and grammatical assets:
I do not want to walk through this door to stay inside that 
door to remain out here between them I do not want to have 
to move I want to see no one to be alone anyone everyone 
my time taken or given back I hate the cold and the heat the 
scabs and ridges wrists something back something gone no 
returning no extending no doors and every door. Sick of sick 
of what take me away take back my time my agency I want 
it gone // was born in the wrong body the wrong world its 
climates can not drop out of. What is the i-body, wait. (83)
This is the first of the poem’s multiple endings, its most obvious 
blocked-up exit. It presents in shattered monologue a person at 
the brink of despair, exercising their last remaining autonomy 
in convulsive nihilism, by devaluing the life that they know will 
be taken from them anyway: “take back my time my agency I 
want it gone.” It is the statement “I used to love to work” be-
fore it was knowingly concertinaed, the same thought with its 
mask of descriptive imperturbability thrown impatiently aside. 
Where does it play out? At first it might seem to be a thought 
screamed out in the privacy of a bedroom, in a mind pulled 
closed by depressive inertia. But then why are there two doors 
rather than one? Why do “I […] not want to walk through this 
door to stay inside that door to remain out here between them”? 
On second thought we find ourselves back at the poem’s begin-
ning: “out here” in the “airlock” (10) between the outer and inner 
doors of the private care unit, of which we had earlier received 
an “emotionless / diagram” (22). And in a sense the poem as a 
workers’ inquiry, or as “emotionless diagram” of a work process, 
of its control mechanisms and “chokepoints,” ends here, as too 
does the narrative of its development: in the anguished fit of 
“want” in which the desire to work or to remember what it felt 
like to love it is swallowed up and extinguished; while the elegy 
that succeeds it and makes up the poem’s final part is at once 
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a memorial to that desire and a form of literary recidivism, in 
which the impulses to dream-like abstraction that are repressed 
in the emotionless production of commodities for other people’s 
use are at last given free rein.5 But at this point another kind of 
development takes over in this poem, or wells up in it, and this 
development is not only a “hidden exit” from the despair that 
takes over a life that is shut into its place of employment with no 
way out, stuck or trapped in it, because it is also, and in a more 
general sense, the beginnings of another kind of approach to the 
whole question of what development means, in an economy in 
which the activities in which we receive our wages as workers 
appear impossible to revolutionize. It asks us: If it really is the 
case that contemporary client-centered fascism and its predi-
lection for transgression amount only to a variation on client-
centered ego psychology and its benign hatred for all forms of 
expressive negativity, then what would it mean to make trans-
gression into the instrument of an actual, living transformation 
in human potential? The poem’s answer to this question only 
begins at the point near to its end at which its narrative under-
goes a violent breakdown. Wait.
●
In her recent book about Milo Yiannopoulos and related trends 
in online intellectual revanchism, Angela Nagle writes of the 
“cult of suffering, weakness and vulnerability that has become 
central to liberal identity politics.” “[T]he key driving force be-
hind” this tendency, Nagle writes, “is about creating scarcity in 
an environment in which virtue is the currency that can make 
or break the career or social success of an online user in this 
milieu.”6 Nagle does not say very much about the environment 
5 For a history of workers’ inquiry as a form, see Salar Mohandesi and Asad 
Haider, “Workers’ Inquiry: A Genealogy,” Viewpoint Magazine, September 
27, 2013, https://www.viewpointmag.com/2013/09/27/workers-inquiry-a-
genealogy/.
6 Angela Nagle, Kill All Normies: Online Culture Wars from 4Chan and 
Tumblr to Trump and the Alt-Right (Winchester: Zero Books, 2017), 76.
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of this environment, about its “driving force” or about its cur-
rency — no private equity firm having yet announced that it 
has realized a profit of 500 million virtues — but, as the life and 
times of Donald Trump have proven incontrovertibly, a little bit 
of conceptual scarcity can go a long way, and no one should ever 
allow a real economy to get in the way of a fictitious one. Put 
differently, Nagle’s presentation accepts the idea that the bold 
“rebellion” of the far right emerges out of the exaggerated vul-
nerability of those on the left and justifies that response on the 
grounds that “the left” has created scarcity from potential abun-
dance. This is just a roundabout way of accusing it of being both 
profligate and idle. At the same time, her account tacitly denies 
the idea that the racist and misogynist transgression of the far 
right is the form taken by another therapeutic cult, this time of 
comfort, confidence, happiness, and reassurance,7 the object of 
which is to translate an attitude of petulant egoistic defensive-
ness into an idiom of rebellious nonconformism, the better to 
conceal its deep continuity with all of the other kinds of endur-
ance training that in existing capitalist society are passed off as 
business development.
The image of vulnerability in Click Away Close Door Say also 
begins with fluidity, but in a quite different mode. On p. 25 of the 
book the theme comes up for the first time:
Every time you move
     or are still it’s there.
You are leaking. You think to yourself you
are leaking. The containment of lives, this
conservative sensation of motion.
It never becomes clear exactly who this “you” is, and the revi-
sion to which the poem was subjected after its first publication 
in Prelude magazine deliberately serves to hinder this particu-
lar kind of discernment, by routinely translating heterogeneous 
7 I am referring to Yiannopoulos’s therapeutic desire, mentioned in the first 
paragraph, that his listeners should feel “confident, happy [and] reassured.” 
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third- into homogenous second-person pronouns. But news of 
leaks tends to be related in the poem in a voice of patient tender-
ness, accentuated by the smoking chaos of much of the language 
into which the voice intrudes. And the “conservative sensa-
tion of motion” that might be associated with bodies that don’t 
leak and that cannot because they are “contained” also seems 
to characterize the language in which a leaking person or per-
sons are identified. Unlike the persons of managers, therapists, 
and customer-facing demagogues, their rhythm, the rhythm of 
these bodies, is regular and non-violent: “they rage in you & 
teeth / to leak like skin & fire /  from s / side,,,,,,  to side” 
(48); or “We, both & all leak.” If I were to guess I would say that 
the person who leaks is a resident of the service and that the 
“leaking” of their body is a fantasy that structures their sense of 
reality. The very end of the poem seems to suggest this reading 
most candidly, when the language allows itself a lyrical address 
whose acceptance of the division between poet and addressee is 
elsewhere refracted or prohibited: “My skin / never leaked like 
yours does. Your skin / leaks everyday” (95). Identification with 
this particular kind of fluidity then becomes the primary means 
by which the poem organizes its sense of loving dis-integrity, 
against the “Rogerian” transparency of the self who is inured 
to harm, in line with the aggressive imperatives of an economy 
whose progress has been made identical with attacks upon the 
vulnerable. The leak is the transference of a fantasized wound 
to the body of the speaker who cares for the one who bears it, 
and moreover it is the wound of its transference. The reader is 
guided through this poem against and in the wake of its narra-
tive collapse by the tenderness that characterizes it, even as that 
feeling is beset by guilt and the anxiety that it might slide into 
betrayal: “I […] wonder / whether or not I am accumulating the 
pain of the people I / am paid to care for in order to strengthen 
my position against Rogers” (69).
It’s within this system of what authors like Nagle dismiss as 
merely “performed” vulnerability that passages like the follow-
ing begin to make sense:
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.  Scatter graphs to track in daily motions, or scatter
the fingers in the door snapped. Scatter one finger over the
   no
    why not a commencement of sprinkled
skin in the buttons over your tingling digits like leaking 
milk shut
There is something painfully tentative in these rewritings of basic 
figurative preoccupations: the finger “scattered” this time rather 
than emitted or leaked, the skin “sprinkled” and not leaked or 
discharged, the commencement relocated from the “body” to 
the “skin.” Smashed into the passage I have just quoted like glass 
into a sink is an image of self-harm, of fingers snapped or shut 
into a door, so that the constant recomposition of a single im-
age — the fingers entering the code into a door-locking mecha-
nism — becomes the playing out of a fantasy of self-mutilation, 
and at the same time a kind of penance for the inadequacy of 
any individual permutation of the basic image-complex from 
which all individual instances are derived.8 This is not the kind 
of self-relation that is counselled by the psychotherapists who 
appear in Verity Spott’s workplace as authorities, the “human-
istic” promotors of “client-centred” therapy, the “mature, non-
defensive people” and compassionate disavowers of anything 
“which was coercive or pushing in the clinical relationship.”9 
But nor is its violence turned outwards towards a figure of war-
8 The mutilation may originally have not been self-mutilation: the first al-
lusion to it occurs on p. 11, when Spott writes “So your hand gets / caught 
between the handle / and the wood, dull / pain. Your service manager 
wonders wistfully / if your stuck hand is an act of protest / to somehow 
discredit his efforts” (11). In this case what is described is a workplace 
accident, the kind of thing that might then have to be “populated” in the 
scatter graph of a risk assessment, perhaps by the same person who has 
already suffered the accident the “risk” of which she is expected to assess. 
But the constant, compulsive reproduction of variants of the image still 
seems to me like a more deliberate act of self-harm. Pain becomes super-
erogatory in relation to the demands of description.
9 The quote is from Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s 
View of Psychotherapy (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1961), x.
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ranted hatred, like George Osborne in Verity Spott’s earlier work 
Gideon or David Cameron in Lucy Beynon and Lisa Jeschke’s 
David Cameron: Theatre of Knife Songs.10 I want to slam my hand 
in a fucking door. The wish underlies language’s creative activity 
like concrete beneath linoleum. In Brecht’s The Measures Taken, 
four party agitators sent to China to prepare the Communist 
revolution learn through experience that the excessive moral 
idealism of their young comrade will jeopardize their mission. 
They shoot him and throw him into a lime pit, “so that the lime 
will burn away all traces of you.”11 For Brecht it was the role of 
political art to train the mind to overcome its internalized habits 
of sentimentalization: to see by means of a remorseless dislo-
cation of perspective the historical damage inflicted by the ro-
manticism of nonviolence. Is this realization a stage in my “self 
actualization” as a “person,” a part of my overall “effective per-
sonality change”? Can it be recuperated like this, into the digit of 
a code that we use to make ourselves swing open? I want to leak 
my hand into a fucking door.
The desire to inflict this kind of pain is not in itself uncom-
mon. For example, attempts at self-harm can be a common be-
havioral trait in those diagnosed with high-functioning autism, 
the people for whom Verity Spott was “paid to care” (69) dur-
ing the period of employment that her poem describes. Recent 
historical transformations in the ideology of psychiatric care or 
social work have led, among other things, to a gradual turn away 
from the most brutal procedures for stymieing this kind of self-
harm, including the use of “aversive stimuli” that mimic and ex-
ceed the self-punishment they are designed to “disincentivise.”12 
10 Verity Spott, Gideon (Brighton: Barque Press, 2014).
11 Bertolt Brecht, The Measures Taken and Other Lehrstücke (New York: 
Arcade Publishing, 2001), 33. “Then we shot him and / Cast him down into 
the lime-pit / And when the lime had swallowed him up / We turned back 
to our work.”
12 These “developments” in therapeutic technique are described at some 
length in Steve Silberman’s history of the diagnostic category of autism, 
Neurotribes: The Legacy of Autism and the Future of Neurodiversity (New 
York: Penguin Random House, 2015), 308–15. 
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In Verity Spott’s workplace the poet is instructed to “Ensure the 
erasure of punitive approaches,” or, since it seems unlikely that 
any actual training manual would have used that phrase exactly, 
then she is at least instructed to avoid them; and in place of cu-
rative violence, the idea of progress as incentive is introduced, 
variously embellished into a jabber of pep talk along the lines 
of “we make things possible” (23), that we need to be “going 
forward” (29), to be realizing the idea of “Change in general” 
(38), improving through “forward motion and training” (43), 
practicing “self-actualization” (67), and in general committing 
ourselves to the “anomalous flow” of one or another kind of vir-
tuous cycle (92).
This is the managerial language-screen through which life 
clinging to its need for transformation is forced to look out. The 
life that wakes up broken and stupid, for which “fags condense 
the neglected breakfast” (34) before a shift starts at “7:26am” 
(11), that blurts out “Fuck life” (22) and thinks of itself as “a hole 
to the broken / slot” (56); a self that “shout[s] back at [itself] for 
help” (69) and that can’t sleep (81) and whose metaphors can 
never climax as symbols but which instead stir nauseously like 
acid on the stomach — this is the self who is also compelled to 
self-actualize in a meeting with its line manager. The juddering 
repetitions throughout Click Away Close Door Say, the evidence 
of text cut and pasted in a word processor and pushed around 
like food on a plate, the self-plagiarisms and doublings back, 
are the material signs of a years-long attempt to rip the poem’s 
master metaphor out of its frame, the “central fucking door, / 
object of completion” (58), to slam that door shut and to kick 
open some other means of egress, some hidden exit. What all 
of those cuts and reversions mount up towards is the terms of 
an argument the exact internal relations of which remain unde-
cided, but which must remain undecided, not simply because 
ambiguity is in itself fundamentally preferable to clarity, but 
because the conditions in which self-discovery is undertaken 
are the conditions of a contemporary workplace where meaning 
can either be snatched at or fully abjured, and because through 
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the central fucking door and at the top of the staircase of genu-
ine self-actualization that leads away from it, abjuration shines 
and gasps like a neon no-entry sign.
So much of the language of this book is defined by com-
pulsive reworking of materials that could only be produced in 
conditions of fragmentation. The earlier draft of the first of the 
book’s four parts that was published in Prelude is conspicuously 
more personal, more defiantly self-assertive, than the version 
that was finally included in the edition published by Contra-
band. Names of co-workers in the Prelude version are redacted 
in the Contraband version with a black line; the third-person 
pronouns used to refer to residents of the support unit are 
crammed into an overpopulated second-person “you”; while 
brilliant descriptive passages like the following are aggressively 
truncated:
The regional manager overheard me on the phone joking 
that I am “just a support worker,” which, following my failed 
attempts to become an academic, musician, poet, entomolo-
gist, B2B Comms worker and terminally a senior support 
worker, I felt was, although a joke, at least realistically fitting. 
She exclaimed “you’re not just a support worker,” to which 
I replied that I also write poetry and make music when my 
time allows me to. We haven’t got on well; she isn’t often 
there (since the Care and Quality Commission inspection 
in April.13
The parenthesis that intervenes towards the end of this passage 
and which is never shut up is a premonition of the more com-
prehensive cut to come. In a general sense these deletions are 
a mediated expression of the difficulty of returning again and 
again to a language of passionate speech that is distinguished by 
virtue of the fact that it is not allowed to flow, is not allowed that 
luxury, reserved to pensioned and / or independently wealthy 




poets,14 of unbroken, natural song, but which is instead split up 
and interrupted by the suspended sentence of a shift pattern, or 
left like “Glue traces on the elbow | of the wound in our creepy 
head” (49).15 This glue that thought is like, which we first en-
countered on the fingers inserted into every button of the door 
lock “like a gluey mask” (13), begins here to look like the clue it 
rhymes with, a creepy purloined letter “unevaporated” between 
my fingers like anti-bac gel, or blood by any other name: not 
flowing from the wound but gumming it up or joining its edges 
together. And the deeper into the poem you go the more these 
“clues” begin to hemorrhage: “When you’ve been subject to 
abuse / you might probe / it into your speech, taking each eye / 
to gauge whether or not what has happened is of / consequence / 
in the external world” (23); or 27 pages later, “When you’ve been 
a victim of / abuse you might drop hints into conversations / 
to see if the kindness you’re getting from others sticks to you” 
(50). Sticks like glue? The poetry offers no immediate answer to 
this question; it only opens up a path into its “leaking world,” 
descending like a helter-skelter through the fissures in a vocabu-
lary in which the ordinary exposition of a self — which is to say 
of its ascent upwards, “through the echelons to constitute / the 
defunct ‘I’” — terminates invariably in a workplace disciplinary.
But where does transgression come into all this? I wrote the 
first draft of this piece in 2017, at a time when my claim that 
the far-right aesthetic of transgression was essentially therapeu-
tic seemed to me to be relatively speculative and controversial. 
In the period since, Milo Yiannopoulos has been replaced in 
the pantheon of the contemporary far-right by an actual author 
14 Or as the poet Anne Boyer puts it, “There are years, days, hours, minutes, 
weeks, moments, and other measures of time spent in the production of 
‘not writing’. Not writing is working, and when not working at paid work 
working at unpaid work like caring for others, and when not at unpaid 
work like caring, caring also for a human body, and when not caring for a 
human body many hours, weeks, years, and other measures of time spent 
caring for the mind […]”: From Garments against Women (London: Mute, 
2016), 44.
15 Also: “the removal / of life force and body from narration” (27).
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of self-help books. The argument now seems thoroughly obvi-
ous and even banal. But what would an anti-fascist category of 
transgression look like? What does it look like in Click Away 
Close Door Say?
In order to answer that question, it may be worth taking a 
step back. One thing that Verity’s book was meant to do was, 
in her own words, to begin to develop something like a “social 
poetics of work and mental health” (92). In its form as a scuttled 
workers’ inquiry, her poem serves this communal aim, of elabo-
rating a vocabulary in which we might begin to speak together 
about shared forms of damage, and of the shared means by 
which we can begin to face up to them. But the language of the 
poem is also just so fucking disorienting: its complex of sym-
bols, as they grow into one another and become more and more 
closely inosculated — like the image of trees on the cover of Ver-
ity’s earlier Trans* Manifestos16 — begins to thicken and warp 
into something that resembles pain. And another aim slowly 
begins to transgress, or to betray, this primary desire to pro-
duce something coherent enough and generalizable enough to 
be called a “poetics” — a new aim, one that couldn’t be so clearly 
anticipated in the first lines or pages of the poem in which it 
begins to well up. It insinuates itself into the shared language 
that the poem develops, into its key words and fundamental 
concepts, corrupting them and turning them to more individu-
al purposes. The shared language of punctured ego boundaries, 
overcoming of the self, beautiful leaking bodies, dreams, and 
mutual care comes to feel at some level like a betrayal — and 
a new imperative betrays itself. We must disclose inadvertently 
the experience that no one can share with us entirely: must leak 
it out. In Click Away Close Door Say the recession in the speak-
ing subject occurs through a self-betrayal within the work of 
self-overcoming, the leak within the leak. To drown in its hid-
den exit feels like this:
16 Verity Spott, Trans* Manifestos (Cambridge: Shit Valley, 2016).
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[…] on the corner of Albumen Road in Telford, I met a man 
called Scüth. Or was it Halifax. I was walking alone so Scüth 
appeared. He was from Britain with a British accent and the 
first thing I knew about him was that he was suspicious … 
Yiannopoulos Scüth would sit across me from me in his 
clothes the only ones he wore and would read the paper but 
for the two holes prised out his eyes poking through them 
[…] I explained everything to him how my school had been 
where it was but sat on the floor to tell him for he beneath 
his coat fingered a pistol perhaps that’s what I suspected. He’d 
peer at me around corners, so I filed them down. I should 
have filed for a divorce but filed the corners of the house and 
even then noticed one day a tiny rip in his coat where he 
was leaking. Now why did he leak? What was he on that he 
leaked something out of himself while he lived there looking 
suspect. A pause in the brief wind […] (90–91)
It hurts for me to read this passage. It hurts because it reduces 
an image of tenderness to a generic trope. It blocks out the care 
expressed in “Your beautiful body is leaking” and flattens it into 
the idle clichés of a mass-market horror novel in paperback. The 
poem will end a few pages later with another horror sequence, 
when its speaker describes herself murdering an ego psychologist 
called Tom Kitwood by cutting through his brain stem — “The 
hacking / is the last taboo in me” — and then with her explain-
ing how “When I was small […] I had something taken from me 
that I didn’t know that I’d ever know I had” (95), and so there’s a 
sense in which this passage is only the impersonal adumbration 
of a traumatic personal experience. On “Albumen Road” (albu-
men is the protective and nutritive layer of liquid in an egg), in 
the domestic environment, a seedy down-at-heel lodger whose 
name sounds sort of like “cut” or “scuff,” and who is also the 
fascist Milo Yiannopoulos, leaks his concealed essence. But the 
writing in this passage is, or it has become, more hurtful for 
me than the conclusion, not only because it stages the moment 
when an abusive desire reveals itself in the scene of protective 
domesticity, but also and more catastrophically because it does 
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so in exactly the vocabulary that the poem has enjoined us with 
all of its prodigious resources of metrical intelligence and at the 
very limits of its spectrum of anger and solicitude to hold onto 
or to trust. Leaking is beautiful, it is at once the sign of and the 
resolution to harm, we, both & all leak. It is a poetics of work 
and mental health that promises a language more sensitive to 
our estranged, damaged, fantasizing, and incontinent lives than 
any previous form of workers’ inquiry ever has or could — and 
it is also just one more fucking generality that lets us down like 
all the others. Each of these feelings is true and each transgresses 
the boundaries of the other.
What is a real act of transgression? Earlier I said that the po-
etry’s manipulation of its language materials was consistently 
accompanied by an image, or un- or half-conscious fantasy, of 
self-harm, and that that fantasy was sustained and inspissated 
by the need for transformation in excess of the change that any 
particular dislocation in language was capable of attaining. I 
tried to argue that that kind of abdication of self-care was beau-
tiful, because it resumes the need for life contained in linguistic 
transformation on a higher plane and with a greater prospect of 
joy and mutual recognition. But a mark of the difficulty of this 
poem is that it then goes on to raise this dialectic of transforma-
tive need and self-harm to a still higher level of organization, 
replaying it in relation to the category that comes closest to of-
fering us a hidden exit from fascist aggression and from the pat-
ter of psychological self-acceptance on which that bullshit now 
models itself. The “last taboo” in us really does here feel as if it 
might have been violated, rather than merely invoked in order 
to dignify one or another preexisting prejudice (e.g., there are 
only two genders). There can be no meaningful transgression 
in art that does not raise in us spontaneously and irresistibly 
beyond all of our capacities to repress it this sensation of having 
been violated; and at this point I really do begin to wonder, and 
the pain and the anxiety I feel in this passage formulates itself 
into a question, and the question overruns my ability to think 
clearly and works its way into my anxious, trivial dreams: maybe 
this shouldn’t have been done, maybe that taboo ought to have 
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remained intact, in the dream of care for the vulnerable whose 
fantasies of leaking we share. And isn’t that dream enough? Why 
do we need to betray it? What possibility of transformation can 
justify the experience of groundlessness or needlessness that 
that betrayal can give rise to, and how can we know that it won’t 
lead to nothing but pain, to “pain […] without emollients of 
world”?17 Is there any way in this world of not being in love with 
pain? Do I need to take this final step?
Any work that allows us to answer “yes” to this final question 
without anxious reservations must have failed to place its world 
under significant duress. Only in poetry where we feel acutely 
that in this final step we cannot say whether the ground will 
open up beneath the foot that is poised in midair or the foot 
that is planted on the ground can we know in turn that its move-
ment is real and not fake. The vapid pretense of transgression 
has never in my lifetime represented a greater threat than it does 
now: principles that barely exist in the world and for whose real-
ity we need to fight get raised up on stilts of violence as the main 
dogmas of our entire culture, so that the act of tearing them 
down comes to look like daring freedom from illusion. Fuck all 
of the people who think that this is a way to struggle against the 
reality that makes us begin our attempt to talk about our lives in 
the language of what we used to love. I love this poem, I think it 
is unforgettable; no one will ever be comfortable in it; and it is 
because and not in spite of this fact that the love that leaks from 
its entire body betrays itself without any guarantees that it will 
pour out towards its end.
17 The full quotation from the description on the publisher’s page — written 
by the poet Will Rowe — is as follows: “The writer is a carer in an institu-
tion where the normativity function of world, its disposition of space, 
occurs as a containment of death. Human empathy in this environment 
is an irruption of uncontainable disorder. To look at this place produces 
deep disorder inside: how can one live there? How long is it possible to live 
at an extreme edge, this kind of edge? The answer relates to truth, sheer 
insistence on truth, without any resolution by hope. That means pain, 
without emollients of world.” Click Away Close Door Say by Verity Spott, 





World History’s Teenage Diaries:  
On Lisa Jeschke
 
Ever since Margaret Thatcher said her thing about there being 
“no alternatives,” the political situation has been analyzed in 
terms of an absence of good options. We know all about this 
absence, ritualized in another text about that in centered align-
ment, lasting four minutes, written by a different person each 
time similarly disposed of. It is the gap in the market that never 
stops selling, if not quite what it was then so much the better.1
If I want to make an argument about this absence then I 
need to add to it some extra terms. (1) It is easy to feel that there 
are no good options, but it is difficult to feel passionate for bad 
ones. (2) The painstaking metamorphosis of bad options that 
fall below the threshold of good politics goes on slowly and 
only through the cold fronts of isolation and self-loathing. (3) 
It is also the only way in which our total situation can evolve 
to the point at which good options are once again available to 
be fought for. (4) When Marx wrote that “Right can never be 
higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural 
1 I am thinking, in case it isn’t clear, of any piece of left-wing web “content” 
that tells you before you look at it that it’s a “four-minute read.” 
92
wound building
development which this determines,” he was historically and 
not only incidentally wrong.2
This essay, focusing on some recent poetry by Lisa Jeschke, 
will be about the effort to identify with bad options, which is to 
say that it will be about the experience, not of resignation to bad 
options, but of feeling oneself to be attacked and overwhelmed 
by a kind of ludicrous, embarrassing passion for them, against 
all of the strictures and dictates of healthy common sense. In 
this connection it will also develop some thoughts about the 
meaning of the phrase “to each according to their needs, from 
each according to their ability” in relation to work carried out 
on language, and it will set out a brief epitaph for those ortho-
dox observers of determination who think that this connec-
tion is trivializing and illegitimate, on the grounds that it says 
nothing about the transformation of the economic structure. It 
is this part of the text that will seem most clearly to address 
current affairs, since the clearest evidence of the failure of that 
narrow orthodoxy is right now instated in the narrow racism 
of ex-communist opponents of the EU, whose apparently epis-
temological indifference to culture reveals itself over time as 
nothing more than the expression of a repressed resentment for 
those who make it, stripping off the last vestiges of its Marxism 
and nakedly committing itself to “British culture and values,” 
which is a dignified way of saying to British racism and British 
pedophilia scandals.
Aside from this immediate purpose, the essay also has an-
other, broader aim. I want to try to say in a larger sense some-
2 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in Collected Works of Marx 
and Engels (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2010), 24:87: “But these defects 
[of distributional justice] are inevitable in the first phase of communist 
society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birthpangs from 
capitalist society. Right can never be higher than the economic structure 
of society and its cultural development which this determines.” Marx was 
right to ridicule Lassalle’s belief in the independent power of the state in 
relation to working-class self-activity, but he was wrong to interpret this 
activity in strictly “economic” terms. It is the collapsing of the first term 
into the second that leads to the idea that political institutions can disap-
pear “of themselves” (24:92).
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thing about how it feels right now in this part of 2018 to want 
change: to drive that desire deeply into our habits of perception 
and instinct. The difficulty of doing this seems to me to be re-
lated to the kind of relationship to language that the technical 
means of communication now imposes. As the drive to bring 
about, rather than to comment or to report on, change in lan-
guage is withdrawn, the category itself seems to recede and to 
lose its historical dimensions. I cannot do conceptual thinking 
when I am confronted or satiated with language on a screen like 
this — although fatally I can still feel interested in it — and this 
blurring of thought and the interest into which it decays is it-
self a part of the tonality of language, as it tries to communi-
cate the most radical potential of concepts and aspirations that 
have been contorted in their social inheritance. I mean also that 
I love people who wreck and torture language, because in the 
encounter with their own refracted needs the whole history of 
what we can no longer candidly mean seems to burst back into 
the concepts that I otherwise can waste days staring at in a stu-
por of imperceptiveness. I realize that this should be put more 
clearly.
●
To think clearly it is necessary to have examples. As I write this 
it is almost two years since the EU referendum that has deter-
mined the recent direction of British politics. The “No” vote that 
secured a 52 percent majority among those who turned out has 
introduced a very large transformation in immediate political 
realities, and a large change too in institutional structures. Some 
of the immediate aftermath of these changes makes up the sub-
ject of Lisa Jeschke’s poem “Eurotrash,” which begins like this:
On 25 June 2016, walking through a London valley of great 
nature,
Thoughts wandering along with feet: left right and centre




Who she was clearly drunk, definitely from the EU, slurring
I was enchanted, and I stopped, and listened to those sub-
waged i-tunes
Streaming from her mouth light
Right into the low-cost maintenance mouldy tubular interiors 
of my ear3
What kind of change in the historical sense of transformation 
can language like this communicate? In an immediate confron-
tation with this poem the question seems unreal. The lines are, 
or they appear like, a mockery protruding from a mockery. The 
opening lines do not only mock the thoughts of the solitary 
speaker but also the comic practice of mismatched registers as 
such. “On 25 June 2016, walking through a London valley of 
great nature” is not a comic displacement of the experience of 
the urban pedestrian into the mode of the Romantic solitary, 
but the deliberate sabotage of that very mode of satirical dis-
placement. Its opening line is a farcically awkward version of 
what in a more recognisable mode of light pastiche might have 
gone 
On 25 June 2016, as golden noon,
visiting the spring, descended across the city’s
streets and rented houses,
I learned […]
3 Lisa Jeschke, “Eurotrash,” in Look at Hazards, Look at Losses, eds. Group 
for Conceptual Politics, Anthony Iles, and Marina Vishmidt (London: 
Mute Publishing, 2017), 122. Emphasis in original. Further references 
cited parenthetically in the main text. Note that it’s impossible to give the 
title correctly here because it should really be in size 24-point font. This 
also applies to various other poems in the collection. The poems by Lisa 
Jeschke in Look at Hazards, Look at Losses were later republished in an ex-
panded edition as The Anthology of Poems by Drunk Women (Cambridge: 
Materials, 2018).   
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or whatever; and the possibility of that improvement, which in 
fact would be a neutralization, is a part of what the lines mean, 
so that the subjective pressure involved in their statement is not 
annulled or dissipated but is instead sublimed or debased into 
the mere effort of leaving them as they are. The sense of the lines 
is dominated by the possibility of not saying them, or by the 
frenzy of desire for dis-utterance held consciously in abeyance, 
despite the clamor of the mind for a second referendum on their 
legitimacy.
Lisa Jeschke’s texts in The Anthology of Poems by Drunk 
Women are often variations on this kind of ritual of self-humil-
iation. They assert themselves as language whose characteris-
tic crudities and leaps of theatrical self-exposure mean that the 
hardest thing for their author to do is to leave them exactly as 
they are. Many of the poems concern surveillance by the state, 
the superego, medical professionals, or by some combination 
of all three (cf. “Prime / Dentist” (126), of which more later), 
and all of these forms of oversight blur into one another and 
form a continuum. Images of shame or humiliation accumu-
late implacably: the poems say things like “The Alpine rivulets 
blushed,” or they exclaim in agonies of impotent mortification 
that “Frauke Petry / I do not want you to read / Uh, my teen-
age diaries” (124). Throughout their development of these ba-
sic themes the poems carry out numerous crude experiments 
in typographical emphasis, enjamb in the wrong places, fatten 
with filler, excrete emoticons, make preposterous, juvenile dec-
larations of unguarded woundedness, rhyme excruciatingly, 
and suffer under their own embarrassing illocutionary force. 
Furthermore, they do all of this while swimming in a second 
language whose inherent risks of self-exposure are explored by 
the poet to their very depths of alarm and aphasic cataplexy. 
In the perverse radicalism of their refusal to change, and more 
particularly in the radicalism of their adherence to what is ugly, 
sclerotic, ridiculous, or embarrassing, the inner logic of the po-
etry might at first seem hard to fathom. It may not seem to pro-
vide any means of thinking clearly about, or even of feeling deci-
sive in relation to, our present political moment. But then by the 
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same reason it is hard from the outside to fathom the radicalism 
of the desire to maintain unchanged an ugly, sclerotic, ridicu-
lous, and embarrassing institution such as the EU.
●
For anyone not yet entranced by the ugly, sclerotic, and ridic-
ulous institution Nigel Farage, the current state of European 
politics does not inspire any sense of revolutionary optimism. 
Instead, it compels a sense of organizational confusion, a loss of 
aim and uncertainty, or of painful isolation — a feeling of mov-
ing uncomfortably through a reality that has itself snapped into 
a new form, in which the old kinds of action no longer make 
sense. Poetry written in these circumstances is unhappy poetry. 
It carries titles such as Our Death, or The Anthology of Poems 
by Drunk Women.4 And the feeling has objective grounds and 
is not just an effusion of defeatist irrationalism attributable to 
over-sensitive poets. In fact, the lesson of both of the books 
whose titles I just mentioned is that the feeling can be cogni-
tively and expressively worked on — that it can be stretched out 
into abstract diagnoses or compacted into simple questions. It is 
itself a space of possibility even if it is inseparable from despair, 
and its terrain is at the moment vastly more expansive than 
the terrain, almost entirely theoretical and largely nostalgic, in 
which we feel capable of stating with confidence how unneces-
sary deprivation can be brought to an end.
I feel another problem adjacent to this one. The problem is 
about who I am to say any of this. If Marx and Engels’s great 
breakthrough in the manuscripts that would be published a cen-
tury later as The German Ideology was to discover that German 
philosophy had to be abandoned in favor of direct analysis of 
4 Our Death is the title of a recent sequence by Sean Bonney, some of which 
is published in his recent book, Ghosts (London: Materials, 2017). “We 
were talking about prophecy, about defeat and war, about how nobody 
knows what those words really mean, and what they will come to mean.”
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social being,5 our own period compels a comparable transfor-
mation: not this time the translation of the language of political 
economy into the definition of “the subject,” but of the drunk 
and physically damaged life into the world in which political 
economy is the dominant means of coordinating production 
and of reproducing class power. I feel this compulsion as a kind 
of faint urge, to burst into the reality whose description in both 
conservative and radical vocabularies is so drably familiar, and 
is most drably familiar of all where it professes to identify as a 
part of that reality a corresponding form or structure of sub-
jectivity. The merely individualist or petty-minded question 
“where am I in all of this” is in this sense the central problem 
for a living political vocabulary, and the issue of how to pose it 
is the central technical task for any poetry that wishes to make 
use of the enormous resources of our own living experience of 
loss or marginality or speechlessness or poverty or dissolution 
or physical pain. To learn to sweep through all of those experi-
ences and to grasp their proximity to (or their distance from) 
the implacable event of capitalist institutional reality is right 
now the only way in which poetry as a medium can offer any 
kind of concerted resistance to the rise of a sneering and pacify-
ing right-wing vocabulary whose entry into our immediate po-
litical environment is not only the result of a failure by the left 
to take advantage of a global economic crisis, but also of a col-
lapse in our ability to contest in language the travestying of the 
impulses that underlie our political positions. Put differently: I 
think that fascism will continue to flourish for so long as those 
5 See the introductory essay in Marcel van der Linden and Gerald Hub-
mann, Marx’s Capital: An Unfinishable Project? (Leiden: Brill, 2018): 
“previous editions [of The German Ideology] suggested the existence of 
a finished ‘work,’ in which the philosophy of historical materialism is 
supposed to have been elaborated. In contrast, textual reconstruction of 
the unfinished manuscripts in the mega2 reveals that the true concern 
of Marx and Engels was a critique of post-Hegelian philosophy. This did 
not — as previous editions would have it — culminate in the elaboration 
of the philosophy of historical materialism, but rather in the revocation of 
philosophy and the abandonment of philosophical discourse in favour of 
politics and economy” (21).
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of us who oppose the preservation of class society are unable to 
insist that the theoretical positions with which we are identified 
are our positions and not the dreams and fantasies of manikins 
and caricatures. We have to make the fact of that identification 
as visceral and as breathtakingly complex as it is capable of be-
ing made.
Why should this be a problem that we are particularly com-
pelled to confront now? Is it simply because the increasingly 
oblique relationship of our political concepts to mass practice 
demands that we confront our own personal relationships to 
them? Or is it because the current sequence of political events, 
the EU negotiations, rise of anti-migrant movements, the af-
tereffects of economic crisis, feels like a rerun of the politics 
of the 1970s, only with the workers’ movement brutally edited 
out? Provisional answers to those historical uncertainties might 
be derived by way of a more personal sequence of questions: 
Can I defend communism by publicly expressing my inclina-
tion to feel sick of it? Can I re-vindicate a concept that has been 
emptied of social reality by living as graphically as possible the 
pain we feel when we see it travestied? For the very upright left-
wing advocates of British resistance to the single market in the 
1970s, questions like these would have sounded disgracefully 
subjectivist if not simply incomprehensible, just as, in another 
sense, the writings of feminists and gay rights activists sounded 
to them like a ridiculous distraction from the real business of, 
for example, challenging the power of the right wing in Britain’s 
military apparatus.6 The writers of that tendency who are still 
6 Many of the arguments now conducted in British culture about the nature 
of the European Union were had in not dissimilar terms in the mid-1970s. 
And yet the almost perfect reversal of the poles of the exchange, so that 
in 1975 the desire to exit the Common Market was the uniform position 
of the majority of the left, while in 2016 it was the uniform position of the 
majority of the right, seems to encapsulate the historical transformations 
of the past forty years, as well as to add credence to the view, expressed 
with great regularity by contemporary fascists with ties and webcams, that 
the positions of the left have drifted in the direction of the status quo. If 
the EU continues to be a “eurostomach” that, as E.P. Thompson wrote in 
1975, will, “Once replete […] want to euronate” on the working class; and 
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alive today collude with Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson in re-
viving a kind of diluted national socialism in which the vision of 
popular control of the commanding heights is streamlined into 
a single proposal to nationalize the declining British sphincter, 
for commingled reasons of sentiment and state. This is what 
they mean by their slogan about “taking back control.”7 They 
are people like the ex-communist Bob Rowthorn,8 who col-
laborates with the red-brown thinktank Civitas9 in publishing 
if in 1971 “as large a rassemblement of popular forces as one could wish for,” 
including “most of the trade unions, most of the working class, most of 
the Labour Party, the CPGB, the anarchists, the underground, the pacifists, 
the marxist groupuscules, and most of the ‘unorganized’ left-wing intel-
ligentsia” “came together to oppose the Common Market,” as Thompson’s 
adversary Tom Nairn announced — then how to explain the current left-
wing support for an institution that over the last thirty years has acquired, 
in addition to its original eurostomach, a whole troika of institutional 
rumens, reticulums, and funds, and that has spent the entire duration 
of the financial crisis chewing with its mouth open? See E.P. Thompson, 
“Going into Europe,” in Writing by Candlelight (London: Merlin, 1980), 
86, and Tom Nairn, The Left Against Europe? (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1973), 122.
7 That is to say that the phrase is not just a dog-whistle; though of course it 
is that too, and its psychological or therapeutic connotation is in any case 
inseparable from its sotto voce racist camaraderie (“take back control of 
our borders”).
8 In the 1980s Rowthorn was a prominent Gramscian proponent of import-
controls as part of a strategy of socialist economic transformation. His 
article from the January 1981 edition of Marxism Today on “The Politics of 
the Alternative Economic Strategy [AES]” continues to be cited from time 
to time as the best overview of the economic strategy developed by the 
broad far left; http://banmarchive.org.uk/collections/mt/pdf/81_01_04.pdf. 
His incredulous assertion that groupuscules still further to the left consid-
ered the AES to be “authoritarian, reformist, impractical and chauvinistic” 
now seems remarkably prescient (5).
9 Rowthorn’s dreary and alarmist report The Costs and Benefits of Large-
Scale Immigration (London: Civitas, 2015) can be found without difficulty 
by anyone who has a good reason to do so. Its “findings” were widely cited 
in the right-wing British newspapers, which of course is the whole reason 
for the existence of the report in the first place, as well as for the opaquely 
funded think tank that commissioned it. Rowthorn’s derisive conces-
sion that immigration “may [!] also bring benefits such as a more varied 
cuisine” seems to stiffen into a more academic phraseology the outright 
taunts of David Coleman, with whom he has cowritten an academic arti-
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alarmist “economic” prognostications in which Britain becomes 
so full of migrants that it collapses into the sea; or his ex-social 
democrat colleague David Goodhart, who argues that the real 
division in British society is not a division in class but between 
two “large value blocks” of which the larger is primarily defined 
by hostility to “change.”10
I am sick of these people and of their communism which is 
also mine, a sinew twisted into it and impossible to rip out. I 
want to hate more and more graphically the devastation of the 
concepts that now collapse into resentful anxiety about borders 
and the impoverished people who die on the wrong sides of 
them, and I want the sickness to be historical, a lesson learned 
in the nerves from the intricate history in which the desire for 
communism pursued through struggle led to so many accom-
plishments beyond our power of anticipation. I want the sick-
ness to flare up in the communism that sickens me by virtue 
of its exclusion of exactly that sensation, along with so much 
else of what happened in the period that separates the present 
from its decades-old doppelganger. What is there now besides 
bad options? What drift and snap of popular energy, what acts 
of theft, what effrontery, what chiaroscuro, what warping of 
cle, and who in 2003 asserted that the benefits of immigration were “rather 
difficult to specify beyond a wider range of ethnic restaurants for the 
middle classes and new kinds of pop music for youth.” Coleman is, among 
other things, a member of the eugenicist Galton society and was recently 
involved in a fight around a eugenics conference at University College 
London. His variety of respectable British racism opposes the EU and ex-
ists in an ever-closer union with outright neo-Nazism. For more on some 
of this background, see Beth Davies-Kumadiro, “Eugenics Is Not a Fringe 
Issue — It Influences UK Immigration Policy,” Novara Media, January 13, 
2018, https://novaramedia.com/2018/01/13/eugenics-is-not-a-fringe-issue-
it-influences-uk-immigration-policy/. For the Coleman quote, see David 
Pallister, “The Numbers Game,” The Guardian, March 21, 2007, https://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/mar/21/themarsbarhasa.
10 Rowthorn is a particularly interesting case because there exists a very 
lively depiction of him in the 1960s memoirs of Sheila Rowbotham, a 
brilliant socialist-feminist scholar who in no way has shared his trajectory. 
See Rowbotham’s Promise of a Dream: Remembering the Sixties (London: 
Verso, 2002).
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cupidity or sexual withdrawal, what cacophony, what chants, 
what organizational breakthroughs, what damage inflicted on 
the latest corporate-technical whatever, what nihilism and what 
utopianism, what fights in the street, what depression and what 
euphoria, what self-mythologization, what dreams, what com-
promise between communication and screaming, what level 
of intensity, what pattern of self-harm, what conflict between 
individualism and collectivity, what psychological desublima-
tion, what repression, what taste for abstraction or concretion, 
what arc of decline, what unspoken impulses twisted into sar-
casm and what collisions between different cultures, genders, 
ethnicities, styles of being together or of desire, in what shape of 
solidarity or enmity or both, and what love and what coldness, 
and what popular history, what futurism, what bile, what par-
ties, what clothes, what anticipation or memory projected into 
nature, what rain and what heat, what fantasies of murder or 
revenge, what systems for explaining these away, what deaths 
and what recoveries, what developments and what regressions, 
what horizons and what immediacies, and what willingness to 
be hurt, and what cries of pain, in what tenor, at what volume, 
in what form, in the face of what missed opportunities or cul-
minations, and what art and what denial of it, and what direct-
ness, and streets and signs and commerce and collectivism, and 
what equilibrium of pragmatism and despair, what attunement 
to global reality, what intoxicated immediacy, and what con-
tortions in the attempt to realize in each of these things and in 
every moment of their dialectic their highest possibility?
●
The first poem in Lisa Jeschke’s Anthology is “Operation Vanitas 
Eikonal Heimat Horror Poem”:
Winter’s Bad Aibling’s surgery oh travel
From heart felt to heart synth. We pieces of
Shit soon to collide from boredom at work
The entire bodies shivered! At this arse
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Of a world in this bath fixing bad bodies the
Showers were cold. The golf balls of
Industrious mountains dimensions and reach,
Ears of span through tin can, listen!
Gladly you strip ourselves. To each
The condition makes your head a skeletal
Head in your hand hehe. You are in it is dark
in the afternoon. When we die, is it organ
by organ or all at once? Will one cheek
Go first and you, Pinkie, second hoho?
The side is endlessly infra, plus x giants
Of despair, the arterial road leads out ah
FRG planners of towns, the centre
Rehabilitates neon-bright light into the night.
This is a palace of sickening health, it calls
Itself beautiful, it accumulates what? It
Globally draws, that’s its thing, its twist, its
Strength. Distinctly on different planets
Huhu you waved to me and then you were
Gone. Disappeared. Hole search teams
Couldn’t extension. Had a king eaten a
Human? Was it Horst S.? Now, are you
Eating him from within? Can he sleep at
Night? Lost my way. Found it! Lost it. Hum
“Better to cut myself | myself than wait for
Him to do it.” No! Couldn’t bear it: cut off
My tongue. The Alpine rivulets blushed, run
Soaked in blood. The blood pools looked up
In horror. And this was how we lived. And
We got out of the bath, and we returned to
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Munich was now the centre of Europe. And
This was the turn of the year. And there was
A terror warning prediction for the central
Station. And within minutes, Pegida-Lutz
Smug-faced how he now wanted to see the
Welcome-clappers there. But of course
We will be there, Lutz Lutz Lutz Lutz Lutz. (118–19)
The poem’s title refers to “Operation Eikonal,” “the first success-
ful attempt at mass surveillance of European telecoms,” which 
took place in Bad Aibling, Munich;11 to the genre of renaissance 
still life painting that depicts the transience of human wishes; 
and to Nazism and slasher flicks.12 It does so in the crudest way 
possible, by means of a list. The quatrains are all roughly dec-
asyllabic and unmetrical. From time to time the text is inter-
rupted by transcriptions of artificial laughter like you might find 
in a web forum or a mobile phone message (“hehe,” “hoho”), 
or by noises that look like transcriptions of artificial laughter 
but which aren’t (“huhu”) and that on second thoughts may in-
stead be humans with their little men cut off. Complex literary 
allusion and sophisticated acts of morphological displacement 
run up against the most simpleminded kinds of assonance and 
11 The quote is from the Austrian member of parliament Peter Pilz and is 
quoted on the Wikipedia page for Operation Eikonal: https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Operation_Eikonal.
12 The Texas Chainsaw Massacre seems to be a particular favorite. It is an 
appropriate companion-object for Lisa’s poetry, because so much of the 
horror in her writing is associated with the faces of politicians, which in 
our dream lives become freely detachable just as they are infinitely change-
able in social reality. I recall a joke by the comedian Frankie Boyle that 
the Labour politician Andy Burnham had “carved Fireman Sam’s face off 
and laid it carelessly across his own skull.” This observation seems to me 
to be widely applicable. Frankie Boyle, “How Will Labour Top Losing the 
Election? By Losing Its Own Leadership Contest,” The Guardian, August 
27, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/27/how-
will-labour-top-losing-the-election-by-losing-its-own-leadership-contest.   
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syntactical fuck up. “Operation Vanitas Eikonal Heimat Hor-
ror Poem” (henceforth OVEHHP) is not the kind of poem that 
encourages its reader to take the time to find out (for exam-
ple) that “x giants of despair” might be an allusion to John Bu-
nyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress, in which Christian and Hope are 
imprisoned by Giant Despair in Doubting Castle and tortured 
into killing themselves, even if you can find that out by a bit of 
Googling; and by parity of reason the poem does not encour-
age us to join that allusion to the two following poems with the 
titles “Should one commit suicide with a view to NOTHING but 
ARBEIT ahead?” or to the phone call to the Samaritans that is 
described in one of another pair of poems, each with the title 
“The Future.” It does not try to uplift its reader into “find[ing] 
new ways of making language meaningful and memorable,” as 
the boring and conservative poet Rebecca Watts stipulates that 
poetry should,13 and nor does it exhaust itself in the attempt to 
make it “blurry, distressing, and forgettable,” like Watt’s brilliant 
radical antithesis Anne Boyer.14 Insinuated throughout OVEHHP 
is a third term for this old dialectic, which recognizes that at 
least one of the addressees of the poetry is not a reader at all, 
and that it belongs to no determinable class or gender position, 
13 This was the credo with which Watts signed off her indignantly hedge-
trimming review of the poetry of Rupi Kaur, Hollie McNish, and Kate 
Tempest in the PN Review. Highlights include the passage in which Watts 
demands of McNish a better explanation of her way of eating peanuts  
(“[i]t’s not clear what’s stopping McNish from putting her nuts in a bowl”) 
and the outraged anathemas that she pronounces upon the use of brackets 
in book section titles (“the use of parentheses to shield the terms from 
scrutiny is plain insulting”). The text is a useful window onto the burning 
issues that animate mainstream British poetry. Rebecca Watts, “The Cult 
of the Noble Amateur,” PN Review 44, no. 3 (2018), https://www.pnreview.
co.uk/cgi-bin/scribe?item_id=10090. For an excellent response to Watts’s 
text, see Momtaza Mehri, “Letters from a Young (Female) Poet,” The 
Millions, January 31, 2018, https://themillions.com/2018/01/letters-from-a-
young-female-poet.html.
14 Anne Boyer, “Clickbait Thanatos: On the Poetics of Post-Privacy,” in A 
Handbook of Disappointed Fate (New York: Ugly Duckling Presse, 2018), 
113–18. 
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because it is nothing but the internationally coordinated data 
collection agencies of the repressive bourgeois state.
The poem is also full of dubious expressions of love, various-
ly addressed to the state border (“oh travel”), to one’s own dying, 
blushing cheeks, to the Federal Republic of Germany, to the Hit-
lerite hairdresser Lutz Bachmann, and to the vowel sound ʊ. Its 
mode of progression is tacitly exuberant, spiraling uncontrol-
lably downwards from the title on, and the title already symbol-
izes this intoxicated will to free associative self-abandonment, 
“Operation Vanitas Eikonal Heimat Horror Poem” mixing up 
its Greek and Latin, its Hollywood and its Renaissance, its poem 
and its listening exercise. The overall effect is derived from the 
sensation not only that the work is defined by a very free kind 
of intellectual movement, but that it is consciously an attempt to 
face into and obstinately to overcome the feelings of inhibition 
that particular methods of movement tend to induce. Free asso-
ciation, internal rhyme, adventitious homophony, visual puns, 
etc., are all treated as ways of driving forwards a thought process 
that can nevertheless be blocked up by internalized standards 
of propriety, which is to say that the poem sees that an ersatz 
form of intellectual development, deeply subservient to the pro-
cess of class-socialization, can in fact be defined by a systematic 
process of progressive self-denial, in which all of the possibili-
ties for cognitive-expressive advance are ruthlessly sacrificed or 
boarded up, under the auspices of self-cultivation. Smiley face. 
The desire to get fucking wasted is then defined in something 
like these terms: obsessional over-control of language is a recipe 
not for a more radical and technically advanced poetry but for 
uptight class banality or delusional paranoia. Close reading is 
surveillance culture. And the more that I dwell on what lies be-
hind the surface of this language, the more closely the language 
watches me do it. I am “hole search teams,” noticing, for exam-
ple, that in the line “Soaked in blood. The blood pools looked 
up” there is a recurrence of the language of internet searches 
(search teams “looked up” search terms) and a proliferation of 
“oo” vowels that glare back out at me from the lines like a swarm 
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of staring eyes. “In my back and on my back / An eight-eyed 
thing is watching me / At once and in rotation” (121).
In order to understand what is happening here, it is neces-
sary to understand something about embarrassment. In the 
evolution of the contemporary poet, embarrassment has a par-
ticular developmental role. For the majority of trained poets, 
embarrassment at the historical claims that have been made for 
verse is primeval. Shelley’s unselfconscious skylark is the poet’s 
primary evolutionary form, and it is only after many hundreds 
of years spent mutating in a graduate program that this primi-
tive organism acquires its developed characteristics as a kind of 
polychromatic bipedal clown, whose conceptual buffoonery and 
outsized shoes are so fetching. The laughable, arch, ridiculous, 
and always self-conscious poems that emerge from the contem-
porary MFA system represent so many complex expressions of 
this history, and they search out ever new ways of conveying the 
knowledge that they themselves must be laughable and ridicu-
lous simply by virtue of their position in a lineage of historical 
types. At its worst, this knowledge degrades poetry to a series 
of banal pranks on expressive aspiration, the flipside of which 
is an enthusiastic endorsement of the capitalist organization of 
cultural experience. At its best, it turns poetry into a kind of 
dreamwork, the sensitive metamorphoses of which still suggest 
at some level a kind of repressive self-constraint.
But Lisa Jeschke’s embarrassment is not like this. Embarrass-
ment is the aim of the poetry and not the atmosphere in which 
it breathes. The laughter that happens in it is not the knowing 
laughter of the audience brought up to want its own propensity 
for self-effacement to be knowingly and reassuringly confirmed; 
it is a sarcastic, bodily noise like gargling, intended to make 
posh cunts like them feel uncomfortable. Its quotient of redun-
dant distortion echoes in solidarity the meaningless sounds that 
bodies make under the stress of a life over which their subjects 
have too little control to do anything besides try to hold on, and 
which in the end is more accurately expressed anyway when it 
is communicated as a cry than when it is flattened into a dia-
gram, a parallelogram of forces, or even a narrative. Her poetry 
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develops for the twenty-first century the historical intuition of 
Rimbaud, who so desperately wanted in his A Season in Hell 
to be “The drunken gnat in the urinal of an inn, smitten with 
borage, dissolved by a shaft of light,” and it does this by grasp-
ing at whatever breakdown or vicissitude of sensation is forced 
beneath the threshold of history or even of experience itself, and 
which even the faintest glimmer of the day or disturbance of 
the hour is sufficient completely to irradiate.15 Her drunkenness 
is the state in which we pass out in our concepts, in which we 
wake up into the pain that they blot out, the days that they make 
colorless and impossible to speak of, the sickness and banalized 
intrusions of whatever makes up a life on the edge of speechless-
ness, bits of phonetic detritus of the kind that you can rip out 
from the Christian name of some fascist who we would will-
ingly drink to forget, only to wake up again into new false starts 
and new meaningless ecstasies and find ourselves still talking, 
helplessly, in a language that suffocatingly denies them. It is the 
state in which we can continue to need to be able to say “I am 
a / woman / and I / need to / eat” (120) and call that a poem in 
spite of everything that tells you that it is an idiotic and embar-
rassing thing to do, because the world is full of people whose 
own embarrassment-concept is so much more cleverly refined; 
and it is the attempt to find some way to face up to a culture that 
is increasingly governed by populist male politicians whose en-
15 In Wyatt Mason’s translation, the full quote is: “I loved desert, scorched 
orchards, sun-bleached shops, warm drinks. I dragged myself through 
stinking streets and, eyes closed, offered myself to the sun, god of fire.
  ‘General, if upon your ruined ramparts a single cannon yet remains, 
bombard us with clods of earth. Strike shop mirrors! Sitting rooms! Feed 
our cities dust. Coat gargoyles in rust. Fill boudoirs with fiery, ruby ash …’
  Oh! The drunken gnat in the urinal of an inn, smitten with borage, 
dissolved by a shaft of light! [Oh! le moucheron enivré à la pissotière 
de l’auberge, amoureux de la bourrache, et que dissout un rayon!].” See 
Arthur Rimbaud, Rimbaud Complete, trans. Wyatt Mason (New York: 
Modern Library, 2003), 211. Compare also the conclusion to “The Drunken 
Boat”: “If I still long for Europe’s waters, it’s only for / One cold black pud-
dle where a child crouches / Sadly at its brink and releases a boat, / Fragile 
as a May butterfly, into the fragrant dusk” (89).
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dorsement of extrajudicial incarceration and mass drowning is 
winningly justified on the grounds that they are ordinary people 
who like to have a drink or two.
It is in this sense, also, a highly pressurized attempt to con-
front the relationship of anti-migrant anality to a regulated 
kind of orality. When Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage promise 
the workers control over their own sphincters while standing 
around in a pub — “I want to drink with Boris, I want to drink 
with Nigel” (122) — they take aggressive desires right out of our 
mouths. The psychopathological element of this speech-drama 
is made luridly explicit in the Anthology in the treatment of 
Horst Seehofer, leader of the Christian Social Union and my 
“prime / Dentist” (126),16 since a dentist, as Jeschke knows and as 
Donald Winnicott formulated most clearly, is “a dangerous man 
[…] who might take out teeth to punish you for biting,” and 
who can furthermore insist that women who “need / to eat” do 
so in the most restrained and ladylike manner possible.17 This in 
any case was the implication of Nigel Farage’s comments on the 
groping scandal in Cologne on the occasion of the New Year’s 
celebrations of 2016, in which he offered to protect the civil 
rights of any woman who would accept him as her moderately 
intoxicated spokesperson; and as I write this the point is being 
recycled in the mainstream news by the career Islamophobe 
Tommy Robinson, whose female cameraperson was yesterday 
knocked over by anti-fascists as they tried to prevent her from 
filming attendees at an anti-fascist conference. “Rather groped 
in Cologne / Than marry a man / That’s my New Year’s / Resolu-
tion” (125), Jeschke replies. And in The Anthology of Poems by 
16 In an earlier poem, Seehofer eats the poem’s speaker and is then eaten 
by this speaker from the inside. By this point, it is too late for a dental 
checkup.
17 D.W. Winnicott, Holding and Interpretation: Fragment of an Analysis, ed. 
M. Masud R. Khan (London: Hogarth Press, 1986), 64. “But the main 
thing is that our relationship was stopped by a dentist who is imaginatively 
a dangerous man, who might take out teeth to punish you for biting, for 
your cannibalistic impulses and ideas — a form of castration.” Note the 
thoroughly ambiguous “a form.”
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Drunk Women we see the type of this new man rise up, a Levia-
than for our time, with a smartphone for his sword and a CCTV 
camera for his crosier, rifling through our teenage diaries and 
promising to smash our teeth out, bellowing Non est potestas Su-
per Terram quae Comparetur as if it were a smash hit by Sinead 
O’Connor, and taking up into itself our own cannibalistic urges 
so as to concentrate them with monomaniacal exclusivity on the 
poor old fleshless Statue of Liberty.
What are the historical stakes of this poetry, in which orality 
is not only related to its expression as song, but also to the sub-
limation of biting? Is it just a particularly exaggerated form of 
acting out — a tantrum in language, a transgression ultimately 
inseparable from the parental authority that it constructs? And 
if it is, then how do we explain its continued, passionate preoc-
cupation with the interiors of words, with their significant blood 
and guts, and with the botched or painstaking surgery that the 
living mind can carry out on them?
I think that two distinct impulses run together in this work. 
On the one hand, the poetry is obsessively concerned with do-
ing things that it shouldn’t. We are familiar with that kind of 
transgressiveness. Our lives are organized by the petty injunc-
tions that define it. Don’t suck your thumb, don’t answer back, 
don’t start conversations with strangers on trains, don’t write 
poems that conclude with the world “smelt” or use exclamation 
marks for emphasis! The poetry that defeats these prohibitions 
says what it needs to: it searches through the blizzard of its own 
sense of shame and habitual reserve for new prohibitions that it 
can defy. Also, it tries to make use of shame and embarrassment, 
as routes out of the state of rule-abiding civility in which all of 
us slope about most of the time. But where does this commit-
ment take us? The Anthology of Poems by Drunk Women trials 
different answers to this question. At the end of the second of 
Jeschke’s two poems with the title “Should one commit suicide 
with a view to NOTHING but ARBEIT ahead,” she writes of Don-
ald Trump that “we knew now what to do” (127); and what we 
knew “now” that we had to become, in this simulated rhetoric 
of bellicose decisiveness, what we needed to say that we should 
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be, is — “More than him.” More than him means more alive and 
more receptive and more conscious and more unconscious too: 
and more capable of knowing ourselves by the constant test-
ing of the boundaries that define who we are and what we are 
capable of wanting. We become more than him by growing to 
encompass the “Total universe” (129): by being more alert and 
more encompassing than yesterday’s and today’s political mani-
kins could ever be. And then what. The poem asks this as if in-
nocently. “And we? Laugh, prepare. And then? And further?”18 
Jeschke doesn’t answer her own question openly, but in the 
contrariousness of her own literary instincts an answer is nev-
ertheless awkwardly latent. To say what we need in defiance of 
internalized prohibitions is one way of extending our literary 
vocabulary, but the movement in thought that it represents does 
not necessarily carry us towards any particular type of relation-
ship to whatever it is that we say. In other words, it is possible 
to say what we need without saying anything about that need 
itself, and so the expansionary tendency in the subjectivity that 
throws off all prohibitions at the cost of shame or ridiculousness 
does not by this means necessarily say all that it can.
What does it mean to want to do all that I can with my needs, 
to want more from the kinds of deprivation that they express? 
Can I develop an oral fixation on need itself? Does it make a 
difference if I ask this question at 11 a.m. or 5:28 p.m.? I can stare 
for hours at nothing and feel frantic, and my language and the 
life that it has shaped look out blankly at one another: Better to 
be groped in Cologne than to marry a man. Better to be blurry 
and forgettable than to be memorable and meaningful. Better to 
be a drunken gnat in a urinal than to be the speculative identity 
of this whole universe. All of those expressed preferences are 
self-destructive and seem to rely on an abstract repudiation of 
some other person’s idea of what it would be healthier to desire, 
18 In the newer version of this poem included in the Materials edition of 
Jeschke’s poems, these two questions are replaced with a different one, in 
which the note of skepticism (perhaps intended in the first place to be self-
directed) is somewhat diminished.
 111
world history’s teenage diaries
and I love them even for that, for being stupid and rebarbative, 
like people staggering out of a bar at night. They are the remind-
ers I need throughout my own bouts of aphasia and cataplexy of 
the proximity of language to damage: both the true recognition 
of the ease with which solidarity with specific harm can fade out 
into silence or some other kind of hunger and the resurgence of 
historical intuition from within what seems like a total cognitive 
whiteout. It is ridiculous to write like this. I think that the poems 
make every shift and glitch in conscious purpose burn against 
the horizon of boring, infinite need, and that by this means and 
no other they illuminate the paths that a head fucked up by force 
of circumstance is able to take, on its way into a reality defined 
by class struggle, ageing, queues for food, the chain of events, 
conflicts over access to toilets, world wars, the drama of self-
doubt banalized as virtue signaling, and everything else that 
drives us towards empty statements about how reality is com-
plex and infinitely various. Poetry that knows this kind of wa-
vering at the edge of speechlessness says all kinds of stupid shit. 
And it has to say it. And it has to say it because it knows that it is 
only by forcing language so close to need that it can be devoured 
by it that need becomes suddenly and acutely palpable.
These then are the two distinct impulses in The Anthology. 
The poetry says what it needs to in solidarity with what it can. 
It opposes and outgrows the art of plain transgressive impul-
siveness under the pressure of this specific historical exigency, 
and it trains its attention exclusively on the language of what it 
needs and is presently denied. It is poetry that gives according 
to its abilities and that takes according to its needs. There are no 
good alternatives in it. For the faceless anti-eurocrats and chaise 
lounge generals, and for the paranoiacs waiting to see what the 
Stalinist emeritus says and for the Culture and Values humpers, 
and for the hordes of radical ambulance chasers who stalk about 
in the clouds of dust behind them, this won’t be enough. And to 
all of these people the poetry has an answer, though it couldn’t 
give a fuck whether it amounts to any kind of alternative or not; 
and the answer is the same one that we get in all genuine art 
of the rising class, from Rimbaud to Young MA, asserted with 
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the same crude attention-grabbing, confetti-showering bang: 
Rather be groped than marry “a man.” Rather be forgettable than 
memorable. Rather be a gnat drunk on piss than some washed-up 
professor. And rather be coming up forever in a bad option than 
always coming down with a good one.19
19 About 35 people turned out for Lisa’s reading with Sam Solomon at the 
MayDay Rooms on Fleet Street on March 17, 2018. It had been a long 
winter and outside it was snowing heavily, the road more or less empty of 
the city workers who monopolize it on weekdays. Instead: buses, taxis, a 
smattering of drinkers wearing the St. Patrick’s Day hats that you get given 
when you buy a pint Guinness. Glass-fronted office buildings, slush.
  Lisa read her poems with an astonishing intensity. In a small room like 
the screening space in MayDay her projection is quite breathtaking: the 
poems are read loudly, unforgivingly; she gives them no space to recede 
or to breathe. She does not laugh at her own jokes or pause graciously 
to allow the puns to sink in. The effect is at once confrontational and 
generous. It is confrontational because it forces you to listen, squares up to 
you, dares you to keep sniggering. These are funny, weird texts, but their 
listener is given no opportunity to laugh them off. Lots of contemporary 
poetry readings establish a pact between author and reader in which each 
party acknowledges the intelligence of the other over the heads of the 
poems that are being read. Lisa’s don’t. As soon as one poem is finished, 
she slams the paper it was written on face down on the chair next to her 
and moves on to the next, only taking a breath to spit out the title. Her 
style is nervy, like a reader presenting their work for the first time: paper 
shaking, zero introduction, uncontrolled gestures even in front of an 
audience of comrades and friends. The nimbus of implied self-awareness 
that overshadows the poetry reading genre is burnt away by a really defiant 
sincerity, adopted in full awareness of the ridiculousness of some of the 
material that is being read and with a perverse and unyielding commit-
ment to its (self-)defense. In some of the later poems this stance in delivery 
dovetails with a particular rhetoric of assertion: “I know that this sounds 
improbable but I mean it” (I am thinking of the new poem about public 
toilets being the most important form of infrastructure in contemporary 
society). And within this style of performance a narrow spectrum of 
tones, set off from one another very brilliantly by means of a practiced 
phrasing that seems to contradict, but which in fact just runs alongside of, 
the untrained adrenaline visible in wrists and neck and feet: “Eurotrash” 
read with horrific, wide-eyed gusto bordering on mania, the “song” in 
the middle fitted out with a nasty little tune. Intimations of immorality, 
fairground rides, carsickness, and stale beer. “The Future” a little slower 
and more deliberate, but only so as to ramp up the atmosphere of ill-fitting 
menace which had already seemed as if it might be getting out of hand. 
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Nowhere in this sequence a drop in the air pressure long-lasting enough 
for the mind to sink downwards into its second can of Stella. Generosity as 
well as confrontation pulses in this performance style because it identifies 
its performer with her language in all of its flare-ups of intractable candor; 
and it is generous towards its audience as well as towards the poems 
themselves because it doesn’t try to lead it up the garden path of intelligent 
or knowing narcissism. I think everyone in the room could feel this and 
was grateful for it. At the end of Lisa’s reading of her short poem in which 
she declares her love for Caster Semenya (a piece that in another setting 
might have seemed deliberately simplistic and childlike), there went up 
in the room a kind of deep murmur of assent. It was as if we had all seen 
what effort it cost her to stay within her language, and so could believe 
it when she broke out for a moment into one of its happiest and most 
familiar songs.
  A video of the reading can be found here: MayDay Rooms, “Sam Solo-






Poetry and Self-Defense: 




Even the machine is nodding off
Sealed workshops store diseased iron
Wages concealed behind curtains
Like the love that young workers bury at the bottom of their 
hearts
With no time for expression, emotion crumbles into dust
They have stomachs forged of iron
Full of thick acid, sulfuric and nitric
Industry captures their tears before they have the chance to 
fall
Time flows by, their heads lost in fog
Output weighs down their age, pain works overtime day 
and night
In their lives, dizziness before their time is latent
The jig forces the skin to peel
And while it’s at it, plates on a layer of aluminum alloy
Some still endure, while others are taken by illness
I am dozing between them, guarding
The last graveyard of our youth.
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This is a poem by the poet Xu Lizhi, who three years after its 
composition killed himself by jumping from the seventeenth 
floor of a shopping mall in Shenzhen, to become one member 
of a small but historically significant group. The group was im-
portant enough for Steve Jobs to assert that it was statistically 
insignificant and threatening enough to impel Foxconn to raise 
employee wages by about twelve percent over a period of four 
years.1 Like most groups that achieve their aims by some kind 
of collective action, nobody commented on the behavior of this 
one by describing it as “haunting” or “tragic” or as being “capa-
ble of opening a rare window” onto the experience of “the Chi-
nese youth.”2 Nobody would have said this, nobody would have 
even conceived of such a response, because it was immediately 
obvious to anybody with eyes that the significance of the spate 
of Foxconn jumping suicides as a collective action was a total 
peremptory refusal of the conditions in which proletarian lives 
1 Kathrin Hille, “Foxconn to Raise Salaries 20% after Suicides,” The Finan-
cial Times, May 28, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/5e1ee750-6a05-11df-
a978-00144feab49a.html. For some information about how the suicides 
galvanized other workers to participate in less self-destructive forms of 
struggle, see the article by the Bloomberg journalist Dexter Roberts, “The 
Rise of a Chinese Worker’s Movement,” Bloomberg Weekly, June 10, 2010. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-06-10/the-rise-of-a-
chinese-workers-movement
. More general first-person reports on the recent history of Chinese factory 
labor can be found at the Gongchao website; Hao Ren, et al., “Factory Sto-
ries: On the Conditions and Struggles in Chinese Workplaces,” Gongchao.
org, 2012–2015, http://www.gongchao.org/en/factory-stories.
2 In order of appearance: Ishaan Tharoor, “The Haunting Poetry of a 
Chinese Factory Worker Who Committed Suicide,” The Washington Post, 
November 12, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/
wp/2014/11/12/the-haunting-poetry-of-a-chinese-factory-worker-who-
committed-suicide/; Joshua Barrie, “Read the Heartbreaking Poems of a 
Man Who Committed Suicide After [sic] Working in a Foxconn Factory,” 
Business Insider UK, November 6, 2014, http://uk.businessinsider.com/
foxconn-factory-workers-suicide-poems-2014-11; Eva Dou, “After Suicide, 
Foxconn Worker’s Poems Strike a Chord [sic],” Wall Street Journal, 




are bought up for almost nothing and then made to stand for 
whatever their middle-class owners want them to.
None of these things were said about the group to which Xu 
Lizhi now unalterably belongs, but all of them were said about 
the poetry that Xu Lizhi wrote and which was translated and 
circulated in the months after his death. As soon as the first Eng-
lish-language translations of his poems were stolen, uncredited, 
from the communist labor activists who first produced them, to 
be re-posted to the Bloomberg website, a pernicious tendency 
was manifested in the vocabulary of critical description.3 For 
the journalist writing for the Wall Street Journal, Xu Lizhi was 
“a 24-year-old with literary aspirations.” From this viewpoint, 
Xu Lizhi’s poems were not “tragic” because they scream out for 
some responsive insight into a struggle against wretched social 
conditions, but because they are pathetic.4 The assertion that the 
poetry itself never does anything more than “open a window” 
onto or “offer a peek” at the circumstances that it contests in-
sinuates that there isn’t all that much to be seen.5 The poems 
3 The original article and translations were by the group Nao. All of the 
materials can be found on the Libcom website: Nao, “The Poetry and Brief 
Life of a Foxconn Worker: Xu Lizhi (1990–2014),” Libcom.org, October 29, 
2014, https://libcom.org/blog/xulizhi-foxconn-suicide-poetry. Everything 
in this chapter is stated in the spirit of gratitude to Nao for undertak-
ing the work of translating these poems and for presenting them as they 
deserved to be presented.
4 Put from the perspective of its worst readers, the same point can be made 
differently. Poetry must be treated like this, as if it were the raw material 
for its own concept, and the intense and sustained labor of its human reali-
zation must be disregarded, because without this conceit it cannot be im-
agined as the symmetrically satisfying opposite of a concept of industrial 
labor. Working-class poets must be fobbed off with a vague desire for the 
idea of poetry and their actual accomplishments must be ignored, because 
otherwise their fate cannot be treated as if it were inevitable from the out-
set. The confrontation with actual poetry peremptorily disables this whole 
operation of moral response, since almost by definition actual poetry has 
nothing to do with predestination or with the sad acknowledgement of the 
necessary cruelty of whatever happens to be in the interests of the ruling 
classes in major Chinese export markets.
5 For “offer a peek,” see Bendon Hong, “The Eerie Poetry of Chinese Suicide 
Victims [sic],” Vice Online, November 14, 2014, https://www.vice.com/
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are “eerie,” resonant; they symbolize the death of the person 
who wrote them, and make us think wistfully about what might 
have been (“literature”). I know of no more representative dem-
onstration of the continued default association of poetry with 
middle-class values than the assumption that the main tragedy 
of Xu Lizhi’s life was that he never had the chance to write po-
etry of a kind that middle-class authors can recognize, rather 
than the fact that he wrote powerful and accomplished poetry 
about the system from which they benefit and that that system 
ultimately killed him anyway.
Xu Lizhi’s writing is of course traduced by this treatment and 
yet it seems defenseless in the face of it. Can it be defended? In 
the following short chapter, I will argue that it can be, and that, 
in spite of the liberties that business press journalists take with 
it, it can be defended principally because Xu Lizhi’s poetry is 
itself an expressively defensive kind of writing. I also think that 
the character of its defensiveness, and the specific object that it 
chooses to defend, can tell us something useful about the histo-
ry of capitalist violence and its present everyday extremities. Xu 
Lizhi’s poetry may seem “tragic” to those for whom it suffers the 
conventionally tragic fatal flaw of being nothing but a vain striv-
ing towards an idea of poetry that it could never in fact attain, 
but my argument here is that the work belongs to another genre 
that is less recognized by institutional funding bodies and the 
lamenters of whatever might have been but now isn’t. This is the 
genre of collective self-defense. In our present atmosphere of 
generalized disempowerment and habitual self-abnegation, this 
may not seem like a very plausible category for the description 
of poetry, especially since, according to the usual exclusion-
ary logic, the phrase is more accurately used to describe self-
organized food kitchens or rubbish collection or arms training. 
But Xu Lizhi’s writing is itself the most lucid and exhaustingly 
definitive proof of the bankruptcy of that logic and of the self-
attacking guilt that gives rise to it. It is clearly a very fundamen-




the tendencies that threaten to tear it apart, and the tone of the 
poetry is inseparable from its author’s fundamental, desperate 
need for expressive control over the most basic dimensions of 
the situation that he was forced to confront. Defensive poetry 
is primarily defined by this characteristic, of exercising, and of 
working implacably to heighten, our expressive control over ba-
sic or fundamental experiences of capitalist violence, and also 
by the fact that it recognizes that this exercise of expressive con-
trol is a real and urgent collective and psychological need. Other 
bodies of work besides Xu Lizhi’s can be used to show this — Xu 
Lizhi is in this respect only a singular and unforgettable case.
What defensiveness in language does not primarily involve 
is the prevention of misunderstanding. It is, much more impor-
tantly, a volatile and generous intuition of relative value. It be-
gins in a basic recognition that something that is everything to 
you or to the people about whom you care is emphatically and 
unalterably nothing in the eyes of those who have control over 
the conditions in which you live. It is an immediate and bod-
ily recognition of the insane violence of this historical relativity, 
which becomes more intense with every year in which the social 
distribution of produced wealth becomes more and more bla-
tantly polarized. It is what makes a writer like Xu Lizhi say of his 
own expressive convictions that “[f]lowing through my veins, 
finally reaching the tip of my pen / Taking root in the paper / 
These words can be read only by the hearts of migrant workers.” 
Or as someone else put it: “one is never obliged to speak the 
truth except in one’s own language; in the enemy’s language the 
lie must reign.”6 In other words, it is not an attempt to compel 
6 Guy Debord, Panegyric, Volumes 1 & 2, trans. James McHale (London: 
Verso, 2004), 9. It is of course true that Xu Lizhi’s statement that only 
migrant workers can understand his lines is different to Debord’s assertion 
that one should only speak the truth in the language of the oppressed, 
since the second statement relies on the possibility of wilful obfuscation 
while the first does not. But there is still latent in Xu Lizhi’s lines the idea 
that his poetry would be made into a lie once it was “translated” into the 
language of those who have no common feeling with migrant workers, and 
this is in fact demonstrably what did happen in the reporting of his poetry 
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those who rule over you to share your feelings but an attempt to 
induce in yourself a greater love for whatever it is whose value 
is capable of being reduced in their eyes to virtually nothing, so 
as to make of that reduction a still more maddeningly detestable 
and ridiculous emblem of the established and accepted cruelty 
of ordinary social life. It is a perverse and reactive attitude, bris-
tling with pathological obstinacy, strung out in a feedback loop 
of self-harm and misrecognition. It is inseparable from love for 
that which is actually dominated, hurt, or broken, and at one of 
its extremes it can easily tip back into love for brokenness in and 
of itself. For the properly defensive writer, which is to say, for the 
writer who is habitually and attitudinally defensive, it is not only 
the case that what is everything for us is capable of becoming 
in the eyes of our enemy absolutely nothing, but that nothing 
can be anything except that which is liable at any moment to be 
reduced once again to nothing at all.
Defensive poetry has, besides this, two primary attributes 
or tendencies. The first of these has to do with magnification. 
The poetry springs from a recognition of the violence of rela-
tive value, but it does not follow from this fact that it is in any 
sense relativist or even yet, as a journalist for the Wall Street 
Journal might put it, that it has relativist “aspirations.” It is not 
relativist; it is a total rejection of the fact that that which it values 
absolutely is even capable of being relativized. Everything and 
nothing become for the defensive poet like two distinct filters. 
All things are made to appear alternately under their different 
aspects, and the rhythm of the transformation sets the tempo 
for the protest it gives rise to. In Xu Lizhi’s “The Last Graveyard,” 
“The jig forces the skin to peel, / And while it’s at it, plates on a 
layer of aluminum alloy.” In the first line, my suffering is eve-
rything. In the second, it is nothing. Everything I am becomes 
greater under the light in which I appear as nothing at all, as the 
most immediately replaceable among an infinity of more valu-
able production factors, put to work until my skin blisters and 
after his death. Defensiveness is what unites the two passages in spite of 
their different patterns of emphasis.    
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my body becomes unsuitable for the part-operation that it was 
employed to perform. It becomes inexorably greater under this 
light, because under it the possibility that everything I have and 
am and everything that I hope for will be violently taken from 
me is blown up and distorted and magnified until finally all of 
my horizons press in simultaneously on my life and squash it, 
densify it, jam it more and more relentlessly into just this mo-
ment of living expression cut off from the whole life in which 
we would never have to place on the former such demands as it 
could never hope to meet.
The second primary attribute of defensive poetry is that it 
is preemptive. Defensive poetry knows that it cannot have the 
whole life that it nevertheless wishes for. It wishes to empower 
its readers by confronting preemptively the violation that it re-
alistically foresees for itself, by seeing more deeply and compas-
sionately into its own brokenness and limitations and the con-
straints that are placed on its real and positive accomplishments 
than could any representative of the class who profit from these 
limitations and who write obituaries in which they call them a 
tragedy. “Most of us know,” wrote Baraka in his poem “Das Ka-
pital,” that “there’s a maniac loose. Our lives a jumble of frustra-
tions / and unfilled / capacities.”7 And this knowledge is itself an 
excess capacity, however easy it may be to write down as empty 
aspiration or as negativity pure and simple. Middle-class critics 
think unfilled capacities are sad because they are incapable of 
ever being filled; defensive poets anticipate that response and 
are urged on by it, its negation of their lives, however exploited 
and needlessly damaged, is still the annihilation of everything 
that they have and wish to work with. They know instinctively 
and preemptively how to resist that response, and their poetry 
offers to it a humane and simple answer, by bringing forthright-
ly into view everything in the poet’s life that breaks it up and 
steals the time of it — and they do so on the grounds that this 
7 Amiri Baraka, “Das Kapital,” in Transbluesency: The Selected Poems of 
Amiri Baraka/LeRoi Jones (1961–1995), ed. Paul Vangelisti (New York: 
Marsilio Publishers, 1995), 153.
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capacity to know the ways in which our capacities are unfilled is 
itself a real social power.
The excess of unfulfillment is a power. This is the slogan of 
the poetry of collective self-defense against the whimsical mor-
alism of individual self-aggrandizement. Like all slogans, it is 
meant to condense an historical reality into a practical impera-
tive, which is to say that it is meant to aid our thinking about 
how that reality might be exceeded. Capital abandons produc-
tion and moves overseas, it leaves “the garbage cans parked full 
strewn / around our defaulting cities”;8 it then floods back into 
them in the form of private prison operators and other novel 
means of repression. Later it develops the technologies to allow 
whatever wealthy residents remain in de-industrialized zones 
to recruit workers to clear up their garbage but no one else’s; 
it learns to profit from interactions that previously would have 
been too atomized for it to even notice.9 All the while it succeeds 
overseas in liberating into its factories hundreds of millions of 
people who previously had been tied self-sustainingly to the 
land. How can this reality be exceeded? If historically the activ-
ity of self-defense has belonged mainly to those who are aban-
doned by capital — to those who are forced to struggle chiefly 
with its terroristic border guards, at the edges of states and in 
the centers of their largest conurbations — today the stakes have 
changed, and capital can now abandon you and take you up 
again several times even within the limits of an ordinarily cur-
tailed lifetime. What does this mean for the political category 
of self-defense? And what does this mean for the language of 
self-defense, for defensiveness as a property of poetry intran-
sigently committed to achieving a preemptive insight into the 
scale and the complexity of life that has been broken and cast off 
and fenced in and that still is not content to view itself as priva-
tively under-privileged or merely evocatively dead?
8 Ibid.





Some of these questions might be tested against the following 
lines by the poet Nat Raha:
increasingly white bodies dispersed
  early hours, new cross road:
where we’ve held out in the try collective of us
to construct a wedge stable , of permanence we
  so broken out of belonging together
root & rubble piling upon action to bruise, to be
  thrown only back into privacy
      / landlord behest::
  sick w/ increase on values, the
  suffering of our friends
This passage comes from “((a fire)),” the first poem from a 
book titled Of Sirens / Body & Faultlines.10 Raha has said of the 
zine format in which the poem was published that she wished 
the texts to “disappear”; this, I think, is another way of saying 
that she didn’t desire the poems to possess any more perma-
nence than the people who are constantly driven out by capital-
ist development in the city about which she writes. In any case, 
these are lines that die out freely and hotly on a border of neces-
10 Nat Raha, “((A fire)),” in Of Sirens / Body & Faultlines (London: Veer 
Books, 2015), n.p. Raha provides the following primer on her blog: “as 
I said about the first edition — the pamphlet corresponds with ‘radio / 
threat’. it was mostly written between summer 2014 and spring 2015 (with 
a few exceptions). trying to excavate and map sensations, discordances, 
the transformations of police reality and capital / canary wharf lookouts, 
moments of rupture in the locale of New Cross / Deptford in South 
London and beyond, of collectivity and protest, of what we are now calling 
radical transfeminism, of the constellations of violence that pivot around 
a government department known as the Home Office between the future 
and over 200 years before it was founded, of vague histories needing to be 
reclaimed and understood in the sense of understanding as a necessary 
synonym of decolonialization.” See Nat Raha, “[Of Sirens / Body & Fault-
lines] Second Edition / Readings: Small Publishers Fair, Brighton with 





sitousness, which will go nowhere unfixedly, elaborating their 
brokenness as the substitute for abandonment and imposition. 
They are the push-factor for meaning that Baraka once sarcasti-
cally said was “self imposed”: “the only thing worth living for,” 
if being the only person alive is your kind of thing.11 The words 
that get struck out in the fourth line are a joke about visibility: 
deletions highlighted in signal contrast to lives that are more 
silently extinguished, administratively shut out from the poem 
by the white bodies that fill it up in the “early hours” of the com-
muter shift. They are a kind of reading notes, as well as a muted 
commentary on the passive voice in which the first quoted line 
in this passage is constructed: a gloss for the grammar of igno-
rance is bliss.12 More simply, they are an invitation to a closer 
and more sustained attention to what might here be the descrip-
tion of a squat eviction, or the breaking up of a shared home, 
of lives “thrown only back into privacy,” which is the condition 
in which we are “so broken out of belonging together,” each of 
these lines assembled out of the displaced prepositional rubble 
of the other, divided up by a self-commentary:
  so broken back belonging together
root & rubble piling upon action to bruise, to be
  thrown only out of privacy
The yearning they express is for the process to be reversed, for it 
to be possible to go back, to belong together again, to be thrown 
out of the isolation that is irresistibly brought about by a politi-
cal economy based in the inflationary monetization of basic hu-
man needs. The poem cries out for privacy and for association, 
mixes them up in “scenes of pollutant song” (n.p.); it shows us 
needs made contradictory by cramped proximity and also new 
ways to reverse their polarities. The “wedge” we tried to con-
struct is denatured into a “we” and an “edge,” then the “we” is 
11 Baraka, “Gatsby’s Theory of Aesthetics,” Transbluesency, 132.




shunted out to the end of the line and is declassed into the edge 
that it was at first separated from. All the way across the jag-
ged perimeter of this poetry and then out of and back into the 
heart of it, tenuous sense is left on display, scattered sensation-
ally throughout the bits and pieces of descriptive vocabulary, 
tossed away or carelessly made to pile up against the “suffering 
of our friends,” which is the one fact in these lines whose neces-
sary recognition cannot be gotten clear from or broken down or 
made into a commentary on some text element that preceded it.
Defensive poetry sees preemptively into the fullest extent 
of the damage to which it is exposed. It recognizes in its de-
tail a moving and communicative power, the use of which is 
not restricted to poetry but is the tenuous material of politi-
cal connections that are still to be fleshed out in the reality that 
individually we get lost in. Raha’s poetry indicates a historical 
qualification of this argument: the fullest extent of the damage 
to which we are now exposed has become intensely changeable, 
mobile, and dispersive, as capital has itself become changeable, 
mobile, and dispersive within and beyond the cities in which we 
live. Furthermore, as the points of connection and commonal-
ity between exploited and despairing people thousands of miles 
apart have multiplied, ramified, and grown together, they have 
begun to acquire a richer and more exacting language. This is 
the basis for a more substantive form of political mutuality.
How can this new mutuality be defended? It is easy to see 
how it might be destroyed, since the processes that threaten it 
are the same ones that bring it barely and incipiently into being. 
As capital expands into new areas of social life, it simultane-
ously abandons others. The kind of unfulfillment that has his-
torically been created wherever money flees from a population 
is now expressed just as commonly in the political poetry of the 
contemporary Guangdong factory worker as in the work of the 
American poet-scholar. In this connection the description in 
Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital of the way in 
which capital accumulation is “primarily a relationship between 
capital and a non-capitalist environment” has never been more 
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true.13 Her description of the process through which this “rela-
tionship” is established, by means of “[the] most complicated re-
lations, divergences in the speed and direction of accumulation 
[…] material and value relations with non-capitalist modes of 
production,” has never been more exact.14 It becomes more for-
mally exact not only because of its resistance to rigid formulae, 
but because of its expressive tone and style. Now, just as much 
as in 1972, Amiri Baraka’s “jumble of frustrations and unfilled 
capacities” are the closest thing that we have in our internal lives 
to non-capitalist environments. They are blasts of fire in the 
consciousness of this morning, graveyards of a youth that we 
watch over with perverse contrariousness so as to know them 
more completely than our enemies who look over our shoul-
ders. They are the essence of that deprivation that policymakers 
wistfully compassionate and that political poets like Xu Lizhi 
have preemptively defended, as a part of their life and experi-
ence, and they are the possibilities of a broken-down speech that 
in Raha’s poems are pulled apart and put back together again 
at top speed in a blur of intelligent probation. They are all of 
these things and they are also historically changeable. In more 
recent poetry it becomes more and more clear that they are not 
stable fields of expressive dissatisfaction, in relation to which we 
have no obligation except to fortify their borders, since just at 
the point where they are felt most intensely they now split up, 
as Luxemburg predicted for political economy, into “the most 
complicated relations,” and pass through perpetual divergences 
in the speed and direction of their accumulation: through forks 
in their relationship to their capitalist environment; through 
forward leaps and reverses in their potential expressive inten-
sity; and more generally through all of the changes that might be 
expected to arise in a system of production whose growth and 
development has precisely nothing to do with human desire and 
satisfaction.
13 Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, trans. Agnes Schwarzs-
child (London: Routledge, 2003), 398.
14 Ibid. The translation has been slightly adjusted.
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What is most deeply characteristic of this vertiginous trans-
formation is not anything so simplemindedly straightforward as 
an acceleration of existing social tendencies. It is a widening of 
the extremities within which historical struggles are formed and 
between which our jumble of frustrations and unfilled capacities 
are strung out. As more and more human beings are permitted 
to aspire to and also to achieve the kind of poetry that Xu Lizhi 
achieved so movingly, more and more people are faced with the 
threat that everything that they possess will be valued at and 
brutally reduced to nothing, on the basis that investment capital 
has been feeling a little down recently. Luxemburg’s statement 
is important because she anticipated this historical transforma-
tion: because she knew that the defense of the excess of our un-
fulfillment would become for all proletarians more and more 
like a race across the entire surface of social need, and also that 
the surface is perpetually expanding, and that this can be true 
even with respect to the non-capitalist environments of a single 
human life. Luxemburg anticipated this transformation, and to-
day Nat Raha produces poetry that is buffeted at the center of 
it, and until 2014 Xu Lizhi also lived through it, and ran head-
long into it, and chased his own capacities right into the center 
of that propagandistic black hole into which non-capitalist en-
vironments are sucked only to be spat out again as slogans on 
employee wellbeing. They have titles like the Foxconn/Hon Hai 
Social and Environmental Responsibility Report,15 and Bloomberg 
reports on them too.
Each of these writers provides a different point of access 
onto the same social reality. In this reality, which is the real-
ity both of super-exploitation and of urban abandonment and 
penury, it is not only our ability to realize our desires, or clearly 
to express them, but even our ability to feel them that must be 
fought for and defended. With no time for expression, emotion 
15 See, for instance, the Foxconn 2014 Social and Environmental Responsi-
bility Report, covering the year of Xu Lizhi’s death; Foxconn Technology 





crumbles into dust. Each of the writers mentioned above shows 
us this and each of them shows us also that in poetry the fight 
cannot be won, that it can arrest but not halt the total liquida-
tion of whatever vital powers we happen still to possess. Each 
of them shows us this, and yet each of them proves in spite of it 
a contrary position, which is that any new radical politics that 
would permit us to express our desires clearly or to realize them 
in practice will nevertheless be absolutely worthless until it can 
open itself up to the tones of those for whom even the capac-
ity to feel can never be communicated except as a kind of fight 
to the death.16 There will be no meaningful new radical poli-
tics that is incapable of speaking in the same tones as those for 
whom even the next breath is something that has to be defended 
at all costs. Those who now deny this proposition acquiesce to 
the violence of capitalist value and reduce to nothing a struggle 
that for many people has been everything that they could do to 
sustain themselves in the face of conditions that are absolutely 
inimical to any kind of life. Their way of reading is the norma-
tive way of reading. It mistakes proximity to death in desperate 
struggle for death itself, “tragic” and unavoidable.
And at the bottom of all of this there is a simple lesson. Any-
one who chooses to listen to writing like Xu Lizhi’s patiently 
and attentively engages in a fight against the violence of capital-
ist value and its forms of relativity. Those of us who are not Xu 
Lizhi’s friends or comrades must choose to listen to his writing; 
we cannot be compelled to hear what goes on in it, since the 
poetry truly does lack even the most reduced capacity to fight 
back against those who would ignore it in a fit of condescen-
16 As another writer who knew pretty well about this logic put it: “The man 
who has never received a kind message, a gesture, and who has never 
held anything of value, material or otherwise, if he is healthy, or I should 
say remains healthy (my persuasion presupposes original innocence), he 
never becomes so practical as to expect more of the same — nothing. Less 
but never nothing.
  “To be denied or rejected means less to this man but never nothing.” 
See George Jackson, Soledad Brother: The Prison Letters of George Jackson 
(Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1994), 321.
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sion. Nothing that Xu Lizhi has done or that anyone else will 
ever do will ever be able to compel understanding of the writing 
in those who are determined to hear in it nothing but the tragic 
absence of the poetry that they presume workers are incapable 
of writing. And yet, anyone who goes on treating the writing 
as if it were nothing will one day come in for a horribly nasty 
surprise.
Afterword: From a Letter to Some Friends
… I am not very happy with the essay that I sent to you both, I 
have rewritten it several times already. It still lacks to my eyes 
any clear sense of internal purpose. It is neither really an essay 
about Xu Lizhi nor an essay about self-defense. 
What I most wanted to do is to write an essay about a par-
ticular kind of tone. It is obvious to me that tonal particularity 
in poetry — and not just in poetry — is a product of basic psy-
chological disposition. Psychology is the base to poetry’s tonal 
superstructure. The expressive range that is available in any 
kind of writing that cares about things like “expressive range” 
is predetermined to a substantial extent by the attitudinal habits 
of the writer. If the writer mostly thinks about social suffering 
by processing articles on the internet (the psychology of com-
pulsive indigestion), then the tonal contour that they are most 
likely to be able to access is a tone of sublime horror. Their writ-
ing will be irresistibly controlled by this primary experience, 
of watching something unimaginably large and complex drip 
torturously through one uselessly constricting but also unseal-
able aperture, the drive-in window repurposed into a bilge pipe. 
Different writers will be able to express this basic psychological 
habitus with different degrees of ferocity or bland complacency, 
depending on who they are and how much they get paid for 
being it; and some of them will be able to manipulate the tone 
to which it gives rise with great and impressive facility; and 
some of them will be able to drive it towards its further limits 
of intensity; and some of them will be able to learn from it right 
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up to its outermost accession; but the tone is still basically the 
same regardless. I am not putting this very well. I mean, I sup-
pose, that the very best writer in this line is likely to throw all of 
their energies into the task of heightening and of accenting and 
of speeding up the basic psychological experience of digitally 
processing the data of contemporary social misery. If the basic 
experience is inattentive, twitchy, trigger-happy on a trackpad, 
then what poetry will do is work up that basic experience into a 
riot of expressive confusion. Out of the everyday experience of 
getting waylaid on a historical learning curve and dragged off by 
an impulse to the virtual clothes store, it will discount the whole 
universe by 50 percent. Out of the experience of not knowing 
what to click on next, it will user-generate a more totally hyper-
ventilated parataxis. The tone is overwhelming and luxurious 
and seductive, but it is still a translation of the same old famil-
iar mental bad habits, unaltered by being built out into an OCD 
megamall crisscrossed by overused conjunctions.
In the face of this kind of work it is not adequate to say that 
it is necessary to produce better writing. Some of this writing 
may be deliriously good as a translation of the basic psycho-
logical attitude from which it results, but this is like saying that 
the military junta in Egypt is deliriously good as a translation 
of the Mubarak regime of 2009. It is not the deluxe intensifica-
tion of the attitude that needs changing, but the attitude itself. 
It is a precondition for poetry that its authors learn to rip out 
of their heads the affirmative tendency to treat suffering as if 
it were most conspicuously sublimely excessive and horrible. 
The cultivation of this basic attitude involves wasting expressive 
energy not on overcoming a social and political limitation, but 
on making that limitation strange and impetuously seductive. 
With every new accomplishment in the extreme intensification 
of the tone that is associated with this mental habit, which is 
in its everyday form unutterably tedious and banal, poets bring 
about a new reason to believe that the attitude is intrinsically 
worthwhile and defensible. By throwing all of their powers of 
invention and originality into the service of upcycling and ton-
ally dynamizing the basic attitude I am describing, they repro-
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duce in their audiences the conviction that, because their basic 
mental habits can be expressed intensely, there is no reason for 
those habits to be denied or refuted or overcome. The negative 
outcome of this conviction is that poetry can become more and 
more tonally explosive and far-out even as it makes other and 
more humane and fierce and politically desirable attitudes pro-
gressively less and less possible, both for its authors and its read-
ers. The constant tonal dynamizing of attitudes of spectatorial 
horror makes it more and more evidently impossible to imagine 
that any other attitude could ever be brought to expression with 
the same kind of impetuous force. This makes poetry progres-
sively less interesting, even as it becomes more inescapable.
I say all this to set up some background for a quite different 
kind of response. Xu Lizhi’s writing had the effect on me that 
it did because it shocked me into a recognition of the fact that 
there are other attitudes towards which contemporary poets 
might feel instinctively and powerfully drawn. The tone of his 
writing seems to me as if it is in some very direct and straight-
forward sense the opposite of the tone of the work I am describ-
ing above. It is a fiercely defensive tone, because it recognizes on 
the basis of lived necessity the need to hang on to every moment 
of expressive potential, however compromised by exhaustion or 
despair. The tone is expressive of a personality that cannot af-
ford to find suffering sublimely excessive, and that needs to hold 
onto and defend really whatever it can. Often the tone of the 
work cannot be driven to excess and the poems give conscious 
voice to this fact: they just have to happen anyway, and more 
than that they just have to happen, because if they don’t then 
there is nothing else and because any increment of life that can 
be won against that eventuality is everything to the person who 
knows how close they are to finding life absolutely unlivable. It is 
meaningless to talk about whether they are “good” or “bad” po-
ems, they are a lesson in something that from the perspective of 
the writers of the most sublimely blocked-up and spectatorially 
horrified poetry will simply seem unthinkable. The attitude that 
they evince is completely foreign to anyone who has become 
accustomed to the idea that the suffering of an individual can-
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not be expressively conceived otherwise than as a spectacular 
case of injustice that then stands in for a million other cases of 
cruelty that all belong under the same heading. I don’t think that 
we know, in our present situation, what it would sound like if 
anyone or if a large group of English-language writers, a move-
ment or a collective, were to achieve by some effort of sustained 
commitment or will a real and practical insight into the basic 
attitude of Xu Lizhi’s writing. I don’t think that we know what it 
would sound like if that attitude were suddenly to punch its way 
through into the tone of the poetry that the candidate-writers 
are now composing. I don’t think we know how that would feel. 
So I have no idea at all what it would mean for more writers to 
learn not only to adopt the attitude of defensiveness that we can 
find in Xu Lizhi, but also to do with it just what has been done 
for the basic attitude of spectatorial horror and sublime impo-
tence that is now the most tonally elaborated and outspoken 
and dynamized basic attitude in the culture. I have no idea what 
it would be like if there were to surge into the world a poetry 
whose attitude of careful and defensive commitment to the real 
lives of suffering and exploited individuals were also as freely 
elaborated and dynamized as that. But I do think that a writing 
like this might help people to live instead of annually upgrading 





On T.S. Eliot, Amiri Baraka, Bernadette 
Mayer, and Keston Sutherland
 
Yes. Being unemployed and without food can make you very sad.
 — Jayne Cortez1
I feel that perhaps it’s possible to begin to summarize. Many of 
the chapters in this book have been about trying to feel some-
thing. They are about feelings that it is difficult, rather than 
impossible not, to have. The earliest of these pieces talk about 
this problem in the language of psychoanalysis: the theory of 
mental processes that underlie our experiences of numbness, 
speechlessness or, in the technical sense of the word, apathy. I 
now want to talk about it in the language of being unemployed 
and without food, in a council flat in Nottingham in June 2018.
I treat poetry like a magnifying glass. I put my ideas under 
it and they burn up like ants. I understand that this may seem 
sadistic, but it is the largeness of the ideas that is unbearable to 
me. Errol Graham weighed four-and-a-half stone (30kg) when 
his body was found by bailiffs who broke into his Nottingham 
1 “Supersurrealist Vision: Interview with Jayne Cortez,” in Heroism in the 
New Black Poetry: Introductions and Interviews, ed. D.H. Melhem (Lexing-
ton: University of Kentuck, 1990), 201.  
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council flat to evict him. He had become unendurably small. So 
this is how it will be. No arms / exist for me, but those locked 
in doors, and indoors, with and without a space, across all dis-
tance, forever. I cannot separate this from a thought about love 
poetry, and this is fucking disgusting to me; and I still cannot 
do it.
The first draft of this chapter was about immediacy. I felt like I 
had been suffocated by my ideas, and that I needed to learn to 
talk about whatever was right in front of me. I had come to feel, 
obscurely, that my inability to value particulars in poetry was 
related to my inability to talk about my feelings in life, other 
than in the register of florid political despair in which I had 
become native, and I wanted to change that state of affairs, to 
alter the one through the other. Also, I wanted to know in what 
sense the immediacy that I desired was a placebo, a commodity, 
and an illusion, at a time when what you might call idiomatic 
immediacy, the symbolically codified immediacy of damaging 
intoxication — of pain — had become so widely transacted in 
the mainstream culture as to be effectively its dominant mode. 
As a Marxist I still feel a residual desire to explain this. I look 
out my window. The sky is like a magnifying glass.
Two years and many distractions later, and some things have 
begun to feel clearer. I hate big ideas; lyric poetry continues to 
be one of the ways in which we talk about how we’re sick-n-
tired of them. We write lyrics to say “fuck you” to our thoughts, 
to their vagueness and powerlessness and fixity, and to the way 
that we see them repeat themselves unchangingly throughout 
our lives and all of their reverses. I owe this particular formula-
tion of the problem to the poet Jack Frost; the basic disposition 
I owe to almost every contemporary writer who I am able to feel 
passionate about. To damage and reduce the world through the 
medium of our idea of it is one of the ways we learn to love what 
is in front of us without any debilitating sense of proportion. 
This is what I think of my own big ideas:
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I told the archeologist that I would’ve
liked to be able to represent my culture
 — dead or alive — without any suffering,
but if I’m insolent and wonderless
it’s cause I’m fucking sick-n-tired
of the imperative to ruthlessness
that I endure to court your ruthlessness.
and if I choose this ruthlessness
it’s in order to prevail against you,
you, the specialists on whose lips
I live as something I can barely recognize
and to hope that in each act
of meanness against you
that what prevails begins now —
in rattlesnakes and watersnakes
and gardensnakes and graveyards
and water graves.2
The poets I will discuss in what follows are T.S. Eliot, Amiri 
Baraka, Bernadette Mayer, and Keston Sutherland. These po-
ets don’t share any particular relation to immediacy or direct 
speech. Any attempt to construct a history of those things with 
exclusive reference to their work would be ridiculous. I am just 
trying to get some elements of a problem into view.
●
Here is a famous, early instance of what I just called idiomatic 
immediacy:
Let us go, through certain half-deserted streets,
The muttering retreats
Of restless nights in one-night cheap hotels
2 Jackqueline Frost, The Third Event: Part Three (London: Crater, 2019), 15. 




And sawdust restaurants with oyster-shells […]3
These stupid, trivial lines by T.S. Eliot are the sound of a resigna-
tion so rehearsed that it hurts to listen to it. The first words are a 
command only slightly concealed by the expression of mutual-
ity: Let us go — let go — give up. The street that may as well be 
any other is what we give ourselves up into; it is the common 
architecture that is half-full of people or full of half-people, in-
different in the tepid half-light of half-generic, only ever half-
serious anomie, the halved promise of self-harm that might 
help us at least to forget the hurt that it increases by attenuation, 
like the sounds of the word hurt eked out across “half-deserted,” 
etherized into an aesthetic that 107 years later still thrives in 
the fake immediacy of “streets.” The whole music of the verses 
serves the purpose of strengthening this argument by means of 
practiced imprecision. It tells us to let go not only of ourselves 
but of the definition of our objects also, as the rhyme of “certain” 
and “deserted” makes these two quite contrary words collapse 
into the general credo of resignation: Let go of whatever you 
might have known for certain, since knowledge is a desert; let 
go of the specificity of social institutions, since the people who 
make them are stunted and unreal; and let go of mutuality too, 
of us, let us go, by letting go of the idea of a society whose streets 
and homes might be a source of material and not a symbol of 
vacuity.
The interchangeability of those last two terms is so insidious-
ly central to our culture that it can feel difficult to express. It in-
volves more than the degradation of the world into a symbol of 
interior experience, the concealment of narcissistic withdrawal 
as a withdrawal into reality, in the form of the cheap hotels and 
minicab kiosks that proliferate in these settings. And it involves 
more than this because it also models the shrinking of reality: 
the definite, relentless sensation of the narrowing of the world 
3 T.S. Eliot, “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” in Collected Poems, 
1909–1962 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963), 3.
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to the scale of the personal disaster that blots it out, in a court 
proceeding or debt relation or cell.
Eliot could enjoy this transformation of reality into the sym-
bol of its vacuity because of who he was. The idiom of his early 
poetry makes the real, concrete, daily world seem as filmy and 
unreal as a mirror reflecting on itself: an empty geometrical 
cube by any other name. This method of description is made 
more poignant still by the suggestion, really no more than a 
kind of atmosphere, of a parity of hurt between the person who 
“lets go” of himself in this reality, and the person who it has 
taken hold of with the force of an iron vise. Its candidacy as a 
dominant idiom is premised on this atmosphere of equivalence, 
just as the dominance of a capitalist political party is premised 
on its pretense of speaking in the general interest. Anyone can 
become a member of reality shrinking or fading, can smell some 
aspect of their private experience hanging in the stairwells of it. 
Anyone can do anything in it to anyone and through the haze 
of non-specific trauma that it enfolds can feel in themselves the 
sexual license of a responsibility that has become all at once 
beautifully diminished.
What do we gain from staying in this idiom, and what do 
we lose? How many ways are there of being in it, and how has 
it changed across the century in which it first emerged, as the 
expressive innovation of a handful of overeducated Christian 
bankers? If the idiom mystifies class reality by providing a lan-
guage in which all hurt dissolves into an atmosphere of conveni-
ent parity, and yet remains at the same time the dominant form 
in which the daily realities of our concrete historical society and 
its institutions are inventoried and processed, what use is it, or 
can it be?
Smoke seeping from my veins. Loss from
the eyes. Seeing winter throw its wind




This example of the idiom, dating from the mid-twentieth 
century, changes the kind of self-consciousness with which Eliot 
first introduced it. While “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” 
delectates in self-consciousness of the world reduced to a sym-
bol, Amiri Baraka’s poem is full of feelings of hostility towards 
it: a street punctuated with the intestines of financiers and snow, 
drifting home silently, holding the steering wheel of the car 
and staring out into the limits of control, in dumb recognition 
of the fact that the power to manipulate one part of the world 
can only accentuate our feelings of powerlessness in another. 
“[M]ore, than I’ll ever / have.” A prize for this realization.5 But 
the lines are also about carelessness. The season that throws its 
wind around is slapdash, unfocused; it wastes its own resources 
or expends them prodigiously and without circumspection. Per-
haps it expresses also our own carelessness: the ways in which 
we aren’t looking after ourselves, the intuition that our commit-
ment to working, living, writing, etc., takes a toll on us, causing 
our organs to drift around in our bodies listlessly and to slump 
in their cavities, like drunks making their ways towards the back 
of the bar at midmorning, barely remembering to pump or suck. 
Baraka also writes about this at the beginning — he is a master 
of beginnings — of his “Letter to E. Franklin Frazier,” his poem 
addressed to the African American sociologist who was respon-
sible for the first serious historical criticism of the US Black mid-
dle class in the high era of post-war conformism:
4 Amiri Baraka, “The Burning General,” in Transbluesency: The Selected 
Poems of Amiri Baraka/LeRoi Jones (1961–1995), ed. Paul Vangelisti (New 
York: Marsilio Publishers, 1995), 129.
5 I think that Baraka saw this in his writing, which is why descriptions like 
the one that I just quoted become increasingly scarce in his work from the 
mid-1960s onwards, and are replaced more and more frequently with ar-
guments in a different register: “a real world breathing — inhaling exhaling 
concrete & sand” (165); a world whose reality is defined not by the brilliant 
artificiality of our descriptions of it, but by the violence of the emphasis 
with which I am willing to insist that it is there to be lived in, in spite of 
the “capitalist flunky film hacks” (163) who buy it up.
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Those days when it was all right
to be a criminal, or die, a postman’s son,
full of hallways and garbage, behind the hotdog store
or in the parking lots of the beautiful beer factory6
To die full of hallways and garbage. The construction here is 
as negligent as the world that throws us around: a glaring ellip-
sis in grammar held together by precise symmetries in phonol-
ogy, whose promise that it was alright to die behind the hotdog 
store — long vowels creating a virtual refrain, for it was alright 
to die behind the hotdog store — eventually makes everything 
else sound totally irrelevant. It is alright to die behind the hot-
dog store: the effort expended on making it so renders careless-
ness inaudible, even when it fills our corpses with hallways and 
garbage or makes our selves that are not yet corpses into “a jum-
ble of frustrations and unfilled / capacities,” as it must.7Baraka 
had as much reason as anyone to hate Eliot, and his early work, 
from the period in which he was developing his cultural nation-
alism, is everywhere full of registrations of this specific intel-
lectual struggle: “Who is T.S. Eliot? So what? A cross.”8 His later 
turn against the Eliotian idiom remains perhaps the greatest sin-
gle instance of a rejection of everything that that idiom stands 
for or can be made to represent: a new music of the populated 
streets, conceived in explicitly Marxist terms. And yet the idiom 
6 Baraka, “Letter to E. Franklin Frazier,” in Transbluesency, 121.
7 To use the vocabulary that Baraka would adopt slightly later in his writing: 
Baraka, “Das Kapital,” in Transbluesency, 151. The metaphors remain faith-
ful to Baraka’s earlier instincts. “Our lives” are a symbolic vacant space just 
as the winter was when it threw its winds around.
8 Amiri Baraka [Leroi Jones], The System of Dante’s Hell: A Novel (New York: 
Grove Press, 1966), 134. Getting beyond T.S. Eliot was a consistent preoc-
cupation of black writers in the US fighting for a new idiom in the 1960s 
and early ’70s: his name was a synecdoche for the symbolic literary misuse 
of the “half-deserted streets” that many African American poets grew up 
in. See Ishmael Reed, “Badman of the Guest Professor,” in Every Goodbye 
Ain’t Gone: An Anthology of Innovative Poetry by African Americans, eds. 




has continued to develop irresistibly. It has grown wildly and 
profligately beyond the limits of any particular middle-class 
anomie, and now works its way outwards into the rhythms of 
contemporary music and the whole atmosphere of the mass cul-
ture to which it might once have seemed diametrically opposed.
Other, quite different poets have seen another side of the same 
problem. When in her Sonnets Bernadette Mayer wrote that “It 
might be right to write of just the hour / That’s a structure good 
as love’s or any measure,” she transferred the central problem of 
New York school immediacy into an antithetical vocabulary of 
structures and systems:
And young he (there’s always been this dare) sleeps waking
Partly sideways, mollescent yet macho (only joking)
Always retreating back to what the lawned home
Or something irreligious might be, who knows what’s 
known?
Many other absent things done in times like ours of these
Unfulfill love’s presence like it was one of those
Displayed wedding cakes on 14th street with a bed of pink
Beside the hockey players, if you begin young to think
Life is shit you’re better off later when you get
A sort of basketballish hope from your fancier genes yet
I’ve seen how the light looks in each circumstance
And gone out to get oranges, Tide and water all at once
It might be right to write of just the hour
That’s a structure good as love’s or any measure
The gesture is distinctive and historically singular.9 Frank 
O’Hara had also written of “just the hour,” as anyone who has 
ever read any of his poems will know. His whole reputation in 
9 Bernadette Mayer, “Spooky Action from a Distance: Sonnet About How 
Love Is as Teaching as You Breathe Deeply with Disrespect for the Text and 
Become Disjecta Membra from Your Lover,” in Sonnets (New York: Tender 
Buttons Press, 2014), 72.
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post-war American poetry hangs on this particular innova-
tion.10 But he had not recognized the hour as “a structure,” as if 
it were a building or a prison; and in fact Mayer herself seems to 
shrink from the formulation even as she advances it. The aux-
iliary verb muscles in on the proposition at its very beginning, 
in a chain of trivial rhymes (“might,” “right,” “write”), and in 
the second line the assertion trails off into near incoherence: is 
“love” a structure? is it a “measure” like any other? why would 
I even want to try to answer these questions? The uncertainties 
accumulate in the back of the reader’s mind until the statement 
around which they proliferate seems to fold under the weight of 
them, like a tarpaulin under heavy rain, and the lines begin to 
suggest themselves as meaningless or deliberately incoherent or 
self-sabotaging. But the solidity of the couplet just about holds 
the proposition up. And so the question survives: In what sense 
could we think of an hour as a structure? Why might that for-
mulation be appealing, not just as an attempt to open up poetry 
to the fullest possible range of experience, in the same burst of 
metropolitan post-war optimism that made it “all right” to die 
behind a hotdog store, but as a gesture of psychic defensiveness?
Now older than we were before we were forty
And working so much in an owned world for rent money
Where there seems little time for the ancient hilarity11
I think that Mayer’s writing from this period about the way that 
wage labor and landlordism pulverize our imaginative and sex-
ual lives is all about immediacy in the specific sense of world-
diminution; and her thinking is antithetical to Eliot’s because 
she is so brilliantly determined to ensure that if she is compelled 
to live out her experience on a smaller scale than the one that 
she might freely choose, then she will make this compulsion her 
own. The structure of the hour will be a structure possessed of 
its own dynamics and laws and its own political economy, and 
10 Frank O’Hara, Lunch Poems (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2014).
11 Mayer, “Birthday Sonnet for Grace,” in Sonnets, 52.
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its own descents into nihilism and its own resurgence back out 
into the self-assurance that we cannot hold onto, when from 
hour to hour we find ourselves in the grip of a belief that “struc-
ture” is something that always happens elsewhere. This is what 
the poetic structure of the hour might be, why it might be as 
good as love’s structure, the measure of our ability to pull our-
selves together.
It might be possible now to take a step back. When I reduce 
the world, what is it that I want to achieve? Do I want (a) to 
make it malleable, so as the better to intervene in it; (b) to dram-
atize the carelessness with which I treat myself, so that my habits 
of self-harm are externalized into the amputated environments 
that I pretend to describe; (c) to romanticize the movement out 
of ideology and into some stage-set of faked immediacy; or (d) 
to preserve it at the scale at which I can hope to give it struc-
ture? Could this grid, the terms of which might be described, 
crudely, as Brechtian, Barakian, Eliotian, and Mayerian respec-
tively, provide one way of approaching the history of what is 
now the dominant idiom? In my own thinking I feel the pull 
of all of these terms, and in fact they are closer to my instincts 
than almost any other literary effects that I can now think of, 
although some of the terms I despise and want to reject, while 
others seem to me like things to be getting on with. In any case, 
could this grid make the politics of representatively damaged or 
reduced worlds easier to assess? Could it help us to think about 
what it means to write right now, in this present, against the 
enormously elaborated and intoxicating expressive culture of 
individual hurt, woundedness, isolation?
The dominant idiom first emerged into English poetry as a 
mere backdrop to intellectual disillusionment, a burlesque of 
downward mobility serving the higher purpose of an existential 
crisis. The crisis took place always at the level of ideas. In some 
poetry of the mid-twentieth century, the idiom was transformed 
into a way of describing the pain of wanting to get back into a 
concrete social reality, into a popular life that remains unwel-
coming, alienating, hurtful, or unreal. By the 1980s, at the time 
that Mayer was working, its increasing pressure in the larger 
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culture meant that it could feel like a “structure”: finding oneself 
overwhelmed by immediacy, unable to think ahead, fucked up 
at work or in the constant scramble to pay the rent, traumatized 
sexually or by the thickness of despondency, and watching on 
helplessly as the most mundane daily tasks expand into unsur-
passable obstacles, comes to feel not like the opposite of what we 
might call structural thinking, but its very substance. It is our 
only structure — as good as love’s or any other measure — and it 
flows outwards from here into the common sense of the popular 
culture. Finally, it becomes the space in which certain kinds of 
atmospheric pleasure become uniquely available to us, if only 
we are willing to immerse ourselves in it.
The dominant idiom is the idiom of a world reduced to con-
crete immediacy by trauma. It is flexible enough to convey the 
real experiences of class oppression, the richest expressions of 
relief, and the most inert justifications for exploitation, abuse, 
and institutional oppression. Experiencing happiness, love, or 
comradeship, we reach through this idiom as if through an 
empty geometrical space, and the reality that we stretch out 
towards recedes and goes dim like in any generic depiction of 
drowning. How we can come up from this structure, how we 
can kick our way back out of the fishbowls of ourselves, like 
stock characters in a cheap TV drama, sliding naked in a sheen 
of patience back into the reality of disanaesthesia, is a question 
we have barely started to ask. The remaining part of this essay 
is an attempt barely to ask it: to describe what it feels like, now, 
to become immersed in the dominant idiom, in the effort to ar-
rive on the other side of it. It will focus, primarily, on the recent 
poetry of Keston Sutherland, where the structure of this expres-
sive situation is treated more literally than in any other body of 
work that I know.
●




slowly the park is colourless
    it should become that
re-entered way, not and of to begin
    with more to begin with you
should hear say a bent put by, no way were that what just
    inside its own stayed
flare you’ll ask to freeze, high vacuum
    conditioning to a crass jot in
rate-saccharine stop how stop how put
    by does her
the park is flashing does
    her12
These are some lines from near to the beginning of Keston 
Sutherland’s very early poem “Mincemeat Seesaw.” They re-
enter a topos that earlier poets had already explored very thor-
oughly: the functionalized landscape — here “the park,” a once 
aristocratic, now municipal environment, landscaped and con-
trolled by curfew, and made to stand by virtue of a long history 
of state paternalism for the public who are alleged to be its ben-
eficiaries — that is first made to exteriorize a feeling of isolation 
(“slowly the park is colourless”), then made to ridicule exactly 
that (“the park is flashing”). The main formal discovery of the 
work is particular to its monosyllables (“not and of to begin / 
with more to begin with you”) and the pressurized stuttering 
they create: noise of a head buffeted by doubt or self-accusation; 
the sparking and bursting of particles that serve as trailers for an 
utterance that remains forever on the cutting-room floor.
In terms of the grid I set out earlier, the crudeness of this 
language is of type (b), with a little bit of (c) sprinkled in for 
good measure. Type (b), because the language is full of cli-
mactic displays of self-neglect. Its scene is a flare you’ll ask to 
freeze “just / inside”: intimations of a homelessness that is real 
and not metaphysical. Also real is the despair that makes harm 
12 Keston Sutherland, “Mincemeat Seesaw,” in Poetical Works 1999–2015 
(London: Enitharmon Press, 2015), 48.
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something partly invited, even when it is also violently imposed: 
“you’ll ask [the flare] / to freeze.” But the language belongs to 
type (c) because the world it presents is deliberately reduced. It 
is a toy park, as unreal as any “one-night cheap hotel.” It is a so-
cial object very consciously reduced to a symbol, and then made 
slowly to black out and glitter so as to advertise that transforma-
tion, and to shine garishly like a head kicked in before at last it 
pops and vomits meaninglessly. A “crass jot.” Birdsong. Wheth-
er the conversion of the real world into an atmospheric effect 
is best attacked like this is an outstanding question for Keston 
Sutherland’s own poetry, and the black hole of low amplitude 
into which social facts are sucked and condensed into “moods” 
is vandalized differently in his later work, if never with as much 
volatile ambivalence as here, in this early merry-go-round of 
broken anaphora, and beneath the fog of just these relative pro-
nouns. But by the same token I know of no other poetry that is 
so preoccupied with the construction and dissolution of sym-
bols, or that takes the congelation of immediacies in language 
so seriously. What screams for overwhelming immediacy in one 
moment is at the next nothing except cops farting in a clearing. 
This is why when the park flashes and blows its fuse it conveys 
almost in spite of itself the promise, if not the total reality, of 
the first type of crudeness that I am trying to specify, of world-
reduction, type (a): the preoccupation with the transformation 
of complex social reality into something brick-like and manipu-
lable, as memorably reductive as the Communist Manifesto, and 
now focused specifically on the experience of immersion itself, 
conceived as a topos, or idiom.
Why would we abandon that promise? Other contemporary 
poets have written work more recently that has dealt with this 
problem in different ways and from different perspectives. Tim-
othy Thornton and Ian Heames have written poetry in which the 
idiom is thematized with variant obsessiveness; Simone White 
has written about (and also into) its place in recent rap; Diane 
Hamilton and Porpentine Charity Heartscape have featured in 
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or made computer games that simulate it.13 In 2015 Thornton 
published a book of poems with the title Water and Burning 
Effects On/Off, which expresses with the beautiful, surprising 
abruptness of the best of his writing both the desire to be able 
to accomplish this kind of immersiveness and the impetuous, 
frantic urge to snap out of it. All this is just another way of say-
ing that exposure to half-desertedness, how Eliot wanted the 
world to be, is right now anyone’s head’s default setting. And 
what is sometimes called the “transitional” quality of the period 
is just the reflex of that same instinct, forcing us into the exile 
of some unspecified future, to breathe in an atmosphere of sci-fi 
idiolects, in the precincts of its own stayed flare.Perhaps because 
of this, Keston Sutherland’s poetry has for several years con-
ducted a kind of running argument with immersiveness. In his 
Odes to the TL61P he writes, with a self-attacking instinct com-
pletely unaltered by the switch in register, that “poetry evolves 
from a vivid play of nerves and confusions into sedative aporiae 
in mock-heroic marginalese, if you don’t take precautions to 
prevent it,”14 identifying with what to me seems like an almost 
impossibly, woundingly stiff piece of self-conscious notation, 
like in a diary entry, the disappearance from his writing of most 
of the verbal effects that had first characterized it. In the same 
poem, the symbols of a shrunken world that denote simulated 
13 See Timothy Thornton, Water and Burning Effects On/Off (Cambridge: 
Shit Valley, 2015); virtually the entire corpus of Ian Heames, but especially 
his physically inaccessible series of Sonnets, reviewed by David Grundy 
in his “‘As Life is to Other Themes’: Ian Heames’ Sonnets,” Streams of 
Expression, September 9, 2015, http://streamsofexpression.blogspot.
com/2015/09/as-life-is-to-other-themes-ian-heames.html; Simone White’s 
writing on the role of the “grid” of black expression in the music of Vince 
Staples, in her essay “Dear Angel of Death,” published with her poetry in 
Dear Angel of Death (New York: Ugly Duckling Presse, 2018); Alejandro 
Miguel Justino Crawford’s Diana Hamilton’s Dreams (Oakland: Gauss PDF, 
2016), https://gausspdf.itch.io/dhd; and Porpentine Charity Heartscape, 
Everything You Swallow Will One Day Come Up Like a Stone, available via 
Amanda Wallace, “Twine: Everything You Swallow Will One Day Come 
Up Like a Stone,” Storycade, 2014, http://storycade.com/twine-everything-
swallow-will-one-day-come-like-stone/.
14 Sutherland, The Odes to the TL61P, in Poetical Works, 331.
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immediacy (Eliotian immediacy) appear exclusively in scenes 
of sexual memory, in arch, moderately pathetic descriptions of 
“a wire fence threaded at random but distractedly with abstrac-
tions of childish plants and weeds, after school”15 (see also the 
mount “I go on to” where “[i]t is snowing a bit”).16But does that 
adequately answer the question? Does poetry “evolve” out of the 
immersiveness — the reduced world, scene of nervous “confu-
sions” — in which it begins? If it does, most poets writing now 
about their own fucking lives, instead of frantically trying to 
cover them up, are stuck in some kind of perpetual immaturity. 
Are they?
It seems to me that this evolutionary hypothesis in Keston 
Sutherland’s poetry is at least in part self-attacking. It also runs 
up against a counterclaim, a commitment that intrudes more 
deeply into his writing, and which his work shares with other 
poets as various as John Keats, Jayne Cortez, and Lisa Jeschke. 
The counterhypothesis is more or less as follows. The correct 
response to Eliotian fantasies of a deserted world is not to give 
up on immediacy altogether, or to grow out of it and into medi-
tative prosaic expansiveness, but to fill the world up. Poetry 
fills.17 This is its formal and political destiny. It struggles against 
Eliotian immediacy by an equal and opposite effort of literal 
projection: into the dark night, the quiet clearings, the exquisite 
trap, “the hour” that we have left over, the aesthetic forms that it 
is good manners to leave half empty, the blanks and fissures of 
performed depression, all of it, the pauses and pregnant silences 
15 Ibid., 340.
16 Ibid., 353.
17 Sutherland has written about this, at great length and in a number of 
different contexts, and this whole essay is in part an attempt to approach 
his terms from a slightly different angle. Starting points are his lecture 
“Blocks: Form Since the Crash — A Seminar at New York University, 13 
November 2015,” available via Internet Archive, https://archive.org/de-
tails/BlocksSeminarAtNYU13November2015, and his remarks in “Keston 
Sutherland & John Tamplin: Transcription of a Conversation in Princeton, 
U.S.A., 7th December 2015,” (“crushing life down with my forehead into a 




and the “[s]quare snow” that we pencil into them,18 the prudent 
omissions and excisions, constantly, into all of them, it projects 
its life and its substance until they swim with it:
Ritual fart
and navel of rebellious stink
urination and energetic repulsion
poetic orgasm and guttural belch of erotic storm
let your dynamism grunt19
These lines from Cortez’s elegy for Larry Neale are a spoken 
challenge to the idea that poetry is something that we should 
be immersed in and not something that flows back out into the 
world. It has a feeling, but this feeling is not the kind of which 
we could say that it intimates some emergent truth that is as yet 
unavailable to cognition.20 The poem knows what it feels and 
18 “The snow was / even and undisturbed as we fingered  / the tungsten 
evaporation boats and screamed shit. / Square snow blackened by manic 
recitative” (Sutherland, “Hot White Andy,” in Poetical Works, 217).
19 Jayne Cortez, “No Simple Explanations (To the Memory of Larry Neale),” 
in Coagulations: New and Selected Poems (London: Pluto, 1985), 72–783.
20 I am thinking of the doxa of contemporary affect theory, which often 
presents itself as if it were the recovery of feeling in critical writing and 
not — what Cortez would have recognized it as — the endorsement of a 
deficit. See Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2011): “I believe that its [“weak theory’s”] return is in the hope that 
changing the white noise of politics into something focused but polymor-
phous can magnetize people to a project of inducing images of the good 
life that emerge from the sense of loose solidarity in the political that now 
occupies the ordinary amid the exhausting pragmatics of the everyday” 
(262). This means finding “loose solidarity” (?) in work that adopts a 
“politically depressed position, but without seeking repair in an idiom 
recognizable in the dominant terms” (249).
  Compare Cortez: “And like I said, the poems I wrote before going [to 
Mississippi to participate in the Civil Rights Movement] were concerned 
with being sad. In Mississippi I learned that you could get rid of a lot 
of sad feelings, and you didn’t have to be isolated, lonely, and frustrated 
and sitting around without the necessities of life. Because you could do 
something about it.” “Supersurrealist Vision: Interview with Jayne Cortez,” 
in Heroism in the New Black Poetry: Introductions and Interviews, ed. D.H. 
Melham (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1990), 200–201. I think 
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feels what it knows, and the continuity of the two states is es-
sential to its sense of what radical politics is, of its voluntarism 
that begins in the chest and then crawls out along the nerves. 
Atmosphere appears in it as a byproduct of action; not as its 
subtle and/or titillating substitute. It does not manipulate sad-
ness (“This piece is passing up the motif of sorrow / let it pass”). 
It presents itself as a challenge. How full, or how empty, can you 
be? How far can you free yourself of the embarrassment of its 
inhabitation, and how much of your own vital juices can you 
transfer into it? The lines represent a position for which even 
the smallest space that is capable of being filled is more valu-
able than the largest space that is empty by design, and they are 
opposed for this reason to a dominant art in which the smallest 
space that is capable of being emptied (the street, the park) is 
more valuable than the largest that is capable of being occupied, 
filled up, lived in, or contested. In addition to this, it recogniz-
es a secret of our own culture. Feeling is not located way out 
ahead of thinking — thinking doesn’t need to “catch up” with 
our ephemeral sensations of numbness or boredom. This is a 
class prejudice disguised as a diagnosis of the era. In fact, feeling 
trails miserably behind thought. Cortez’s poetry recognizes that 
our ideas do not generally arouse in us the feelings that ought to 
correspond to them, and that can correspond to them if we are 
willing to do the necessary work, and are fortunate enough to be 
in a position to do it collectively, as in my own life I have again 
been recently reminded.
The filling up that has become more centrally significant for 
Sutherland’s recent poetry is of a different kind, but it shares 
some of the same motivating skepticism related to the construc-
tion and dissolution of symbols of emptiness. And the contrast 
between this skepticism and his attraction to, or dalliance with, 
psychoanalytic-evolutionary thinking thrashes its way through 
his recent poetry, from Jenkins, Moore and Bird (2013)21 to the 
that what Berlant is describing is exactly an “idiom recognizable in the 
dominant terms.” No one else has captured it more succinctly.
21 Sutherland, Poetical Works, 371–82. 
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long poem that follows it, “Sinking Feeling” (2016), in which the 
contradictory principles of immersion (“nerves and confusion”) 
and development are unhappily unified in the topical metaphor 
of drowning:
Then to move it through a doorway blocked up with evacu-
ated footholds laid flat for sliding under you get in. Then at 
either side the walls too indistinct to mean anything to be 
symbolic enough except through being made to keep their 
distance, which is ours too, or to have any role in what is the 
meaning of their dissipation except by later being cast as its 
periphery, drowned out in the surging, irritation, bodies in 
the way, transparency and representations of transparency, 
reticence and gravity as though in their reality there were no 
other movement, or any body left, or only one.22
Much of “Sinking Feeling” is about violations of the exclu-
sion principle, in its various forms. The poem deals with ultra-
fullness, the presence of two or more distinct objects in the same 
space, like “a flight deck or the top of a tall building”; or a space 
that is close and distant simultaneously, “where nothing could 
be closed, and yet where nothing was without an end or un-
bound either”; or with moments that represent beginnings and 
ends at the same time; or that are at once perfectly literal and 
completely symbolic. The exhaustiveness of its elaborations is 
likewise both figurative and literal. The language is wearisome 
to read. It is wearisome to hear, too. In performance Sutherland 
overstresses its literal exhaustiveness by sounding out all of the 
metrical passages as if he were shaking his ball and chain. Noth-
ing is left alone to be what it is: and it doesn’t matter whether 
what this is is the totality of objects or nothing at all. The effect 
extends from the spiritual autobiography that is also the actual 
mass movement of millions of people to the head that is both 
losing its hair and already totally bald to the experience of being 




crowded in by signification and also just being fucking crowded. 
A roar of competing signification rises up in the poem until only 
the simplest and most unambiguous language has any hope of 
being really heard. And it is a part of the work’s consummate 
character (including its consummation of the sequence of po-
ems into which it is inserted) that it is also by turns painfully 
and infuriatingly aware of this. It offers an overcomplicated ac-
count of it: “We wanted to be so simple that even people who 
could watch the 2015 GOP debates at the Coors Event Center in 
Colorado could understand us without slitting each other’s jug-
ular veins and carotid arteries with sponges full of caramelized 
phlegm like the butchers of Deir al-Zour.” The statement starts 
out by being just about that simple, and then gets overwhelmed 
again: the modus operandi is  everywhere to be everything in 
contravention of what is possible: “nothing […] most things 
[…] just a few things […] one particular thing”: complex and 
simple, full up and empty, on fire and extinguished, brilliant and 
pitch black, submerged and washed up, revived and dead, etc., 
and therefore doubly full, full beyond the capacity of logic to 
govern what the word means. This applies also to the poem’s 
treatment of symbols. The duplication and splitting of all objects 
that begins with the ocean itself lies “beyond even the limit case 
of the pathetic fallacy” because, according to the poet, its sym-
bolism fades into complete literality. It is “transparent” symbol-
ism, the same as what it symbolizes:
our present reality […] where […] I am now drowning […] 
where the limits […] seemed inescapably symbolic […] in-
escapably transparent […] beyond even a limit case of the 
pathetic fallacy, such as a cloud in the shape of Farmakonisi
My extreme reduction here of a sentence that otherwise is de-
liberately, unreadably long (full) reduces it to a single point: that 
the “limits” (the beginning and end) of the poem are “symbols” 
representing things other than themselves — e.g., the beginning 
and end of a life — but that the symbols are themselves “trans-
parent.” The poem then explains what this means. A cloud in 
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the shape of Farmakonisi would not be a “symbol” of the Greek 
island of that name because it would simply resemble what it 
represented in all points of detail. By the same logic, since the 
beginning of this poem is “transparently” a description of the 
beginning of a life, it cannot also be held to “symbolize” it. This 
filling of symbols with literality and vice versa changes the rela-
tionship of the author to the “symbols” that he uses. Sutherland 
doesn’t need to attack the symbols into which reality is convert-
ed, their congealed immediacy, as he did so vividly in his early 
poetry, because reality and symbolism loop into one another in 
a single plane or geometrical space of language pushed to the 
point of complete immersiveness. Of course, congealed or false 
immediacies — the symbols that his writing earlier made use 
of and fought to dissolve — still exist in this poem. Sutherland 
even says that it doesn’t “hurt to call [them] meaning”; and since 
“meaning” is counterposed in the poem to the “kiss of life,” and 
since throughout this poem all things loop into their opposite in 
a single space of language pushed to the point of complete im-
mersiveness, so that “meaning” must be death; since “meaning” 
must be death, the dissolution of symbols, or congealed imme-
diacy, is still something that it could be argued that the poetry 
wishes to accomplish. But the fullness of this language means 
that it also comes increasingly to feel less like an attack on the 
congelation of immediacy than congelation of a different kind, 
actively the production of a type of viscosity of cognition that 
retards movement, to the point at which all sense of progress, 
of acceleration or linear development — of beginnings, middles, 
and ends, or of anything resembling a “breakthrough” — ceases 
to apply. And this is how the first section of the poem ends: with 
the doubling of “fullness” to mean both the exhaustiveness of 
all objects that are and are not themselves and the experiential 
viscosity of a language within which it has become impossible 
to feel oneself accelerating into any kind of freefall:
Not the way you move, but in, where, past desire, that, before 
the painless, adjacent extinction, first lasts forever, some-
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where is there, who, for now, stranded in your touch, in flight 
across its furthest stretch, to here, cups its hand to intimate, 
bids its ruffling gales subside, too far in to surge wide of, 
as, but I am just thinking, headlong into the lake, storming 
out, for what, without a head, exhaled at will, sunk in sexual 
aqueous film, blows out the interiorities, the lot, the orange 
on the fire stairs, the idiopathic, existing to wish to be picked, 
persevere, to be shined, when, for the hundredth time cut 
loose, once they reappear, everyone, being almost there, so 
that, in sound, not less immaterial than rafts of polystyrene 
or Rohingya rehydrated into stateless entities, because of the 
multitude of spermatic reasons, right this way, anxious to 
tear reality the fuck out, in case its top blisters and is peeled, 
climaxing, falling off, being repossessed, up to the elbow, 
where, laced with you, quarterly projections, attachable into 
the notches’ rear fins, worried that my heart would explode, 
a point is traced, do not go for this you lip-read stitched into 
the air you wish to empty but will take for now obstructed 
as it is […]
“Not the way you move, but in.” The phrase seems at first to 
suggest that it is the “way” that is being negated. A possible con-
tinuation of the sentence in line with this expectation would be 
“Not the way you move, but the speed with which you move.” 
Instead, the “Not” obliterates the whole phrase that follows it: 
instead of “the way you move,” this single, enigmatic preposi-
tion: “in.” Not movement at all, in fact, but the experience of 
being immersed in an underwater environment in which ideas 
dissolve and symbols rise up in their place, and that, following 
the double- or ultra-fullness that was the principle of the poem’s 
first part, is both a general fact about our technically mediated 
linguistic situation — an abstract geometrical space into which 
anything can be introduced — and, impossibly, also, the specific 
sea in which, at the time at which I write, it is possible to say 
that two hundred people drowned on Tuesday and Wednes-
day of last week. And it is at this point that something like the 
grammar of the earlier poetry, of “Mincemeat Seesaw,” returns, 
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its interruptions now slowed down, becoming almost aphasic, 
the movements of a mind scuttling at the bottom of language, 
watching conjunctions bob and drift above its head. Each for-
ward motion covering the smallest possible distance, like in a le-
gal asylum application process overseen by the British state. The 
commas create an ambiguity between parataxis and hypotaxis 
that means that the smallest statements (“but in,” “that,” “where,” 
“who”) can either be read as the beginnings or ends of phrases, 
as adverbs and pronouns pending clarifications or as questions 
interjected in a sudden access of frustration, a snapped demand, 
the need for crude clarity addressed to the system that thrives 
on sophisticated obscurity: tell me what is happening, tell me 
where you mean, tell me what you mean by that, by this, by who, 
by you, tell me how to stop this process that makes the simplest 
need in my life seem so unfathomably complicated that I want 
to rip myself to pieces rather than continue with the labor of its 
fulfilment, and that makes each step forward so insignificant, 
and that multiplies the number of steps that I have to take to 
what seems like infinity. Tell me this simply and with human 
tenderness, give me the opportunity, the power, to say when this 
will end.
In “Sinking Feeling,” Keston Sutherland has written a poem 
that somewhat resembles, in addition to describing, a waiting 
room, in which many different kinds of poems and disposi-
tions toward poetry are crammed together side by side, going 
nowhere, bickering with one another, and from time to time 
holding one another up. Only Keston could have written some-
thing like this. His text puts its reader in the wholly invidious 
position of an aid worker who is unable to respond to every-
thing and is forced to make difficult choices, even as it splinters 
into a compendium of different ways of saying we’ve no choice 
but to respond with everything we’ve got. It is contradictory like 
that. Since once you’ve spent enough time with it, you begin 
to notice that amid the crush of different poems and different 
dispositions towards poetry in “Sinking Feeling,” there are also 
several Keston Sutherlands, also going nowhere, bickering with 
one another, and from time to time holding one another up. I 
 155
wound building
love that none of them ever stop asking one another “Whose 
side are you on?”
P.S.
How does all this relate to the desire to reduce the world through 
the medium of our idea of it? Now, which is to say in March 
2020, I still want to learn to reduce the world to what is in front 
of me. I still want to feel what I know; and I know from my 
own experience that I cannot feel more than I can say. Keston 
Sutherland was the first poet to teach me an idiom in which to 
articulate some of these desires. Before I read his poetry, I barely 
even knew what a symbol was, and I could not have wished to 
diminish a world in which all my horizons seemed constantly 
to be expanding.
And the world is so large and full of possibilities. A build-
ing in your neighborhood going up in flames, a letter that you 
dreaded coming through the letterbox, a government that you 
hate winning an election, a friend that you loved stepping off a 
building, etc.
I want to understand possibility in these terms. In a diary 
of the UK general election of December 2019, a friend wrote of 
the utterly defeated Labour Party campaign that “[E]nthusiasm 
is not, in any simple sense, contagious […] it’s repellent to see 
enthusiasm in others when it is not present in yourself.”23 It took 
me a while to notice the qualification in that statement. “In 
any simple sense.” Why is it then, that enthusiasm should al-
ways suggests such a hollow, “simple” kind of possibility? What 
would enthusiasm look like if it had possibilities of the other 
kind growing inside of it? Would it look sick? “Contagious”? 
And who would flinch from it? In the reduced world in which 
I am currently semi-voluntarily self-isolating, it seems to me 
that there is no alternative to idealism in class politics, but only 
various ways of depressing its immune system. We are said con-




ventionally to suffer from idealism. Is there also an idealism of 
the sick?24
Those are stupid, overblown questions. I am always so des-
perate to reach a conclusion. I have wanted so fucking intensely 
to know what I mean, and the desire has sat in my mouth like 
a gag:
over time nothing comes out —
only the body hardens.
think of it like you’re dragging a tin can
over to a friend’s place, out onto the square, dragging it, like 
someone else
soft militant talking too much
fuck knows what25
And will you look at that dash. To be alive now, to be sick and 
stupid now, to be dragging a tin can now through the square of 
our ideas and the banal lobbies of our healthy, well-fed idealism, 
to listen to the rattle it makes — is this one way of producing 
an idiom? A conclusion. Good singers only need two or three 
voices. Happiness is knowing our limits. Poetry is the ability not 
to give a fuck about our end —
24 “Words! be sick as I am sick!” That’s a line of Frank O’Hara’s, though I only 
know it through Keston Sutherland. Frank O’Hara, “Mayakovsky,” The 
Collected Poems of Frank O’Hara, ed. Donald Allen (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1995), 201. 
25 Galina Rymbu, “Language Wrecker,” trans. Joan Brooks, Two Lines 27 (Fall 





Mood Music for Wound Building 
(Some Working Notes on Immediacy)
 
1
1.1 The desire for immediacy in language is ubiquitous in con-
temporary art and unites its most radical and its most conserva-
tive practitioners.
1.2 We feel our ideas and expressions are universally immediate 
when they can make an instantaneous impression on the widest 
possible audience. Particular immediacies are universal imme-
diacy’s raw material; they produce the same effect for audiences 
of a more restricted size. Ever since large capital came to involve 
itself in the organization of cultural expression, the abolition or 
temporary suspension of this distinction between universal and 
particular immediacy has been a criterion of all genuinely suc-
cessful political art, and its obfuscation has been a criterion of 
all reactionary cultural management.
1.3 For capitalist cultural managers, the main instrument for ob-
fuscating the distinction between universal and particular im-
mediacy is the phraseology of authenticity. Authenticity is the 
medium in which all immediacies seem totally alike.
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1.4 In reality, universally available immediacy effects imply a 
definite level of technical accomplishment. As the amount of 
capital invested in the production of culture increases, the entry 
cost of universal immediacy rises also. The proposition remains 
true notwithstanding the increasingly widespread availability of 
advanced reproduction technologies said to democratize artis-
tic production.
1.5 Art that is content to base itself on a realistic assessment 
of what is possible given the existing entry costs to universal 
immediacy is failed art, and an institutional definition of art-
making that encourages such an assessment is conformist not 
by accident but by design. But this does not alter the objectivity 
of the given technical level one single bit.
2
2.1 Radical political art begins with particular immediacy and 
tries to fight its way to universal immediacy in spite of all the 
objective barriers that have been set up to prevent this move-
ment. Conservative art (including almost everything that is 
called contemporary art) begins with universal immediacy and 
fortifies it with the sandbags of theoretical essentialism. 
2.2 Purgative attacks on ideas, speech-forms, or idioms that fall 
disappointingly short of universal immediacy constitute the 
method through which conservative art engages in what it calls 
world-building. Annulment of particular human capacities is 
what it finds atmospheric. Self-imposition of expressive poverty 
is what it calls class solidarity.
2.3 The fundamental irony of this position is the way that it 
responds to experiences of obsolescence. Conservative artists 
react to their loss of control over the most advanced resources 
of cultural expression by romanticizing expressive impoverish-
ment. Expressive immediacy is lost to a capital-intensive music 
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and image culture in which all successful works are the result of 
a complex division of labor. A surrogate immediacy is regained 
by recourse to an image of social reality that has been purged of 
all particular idiomatic and communicative force. The response 
could hardly be more misdirected. It is, just as much as popular 
hatred for migrants or the unemployed, a testament to the suc-
cess of the ruling class in making itself seem to disappear.
2.4 The aesthetic value-criterion of difficulty first entered the 
language during a period in which alterations in the technical 
reproducibility of art were bringing about enormous transfor-
mations in the production of its fundamental aesthetic effects. In 
the course of this transformation, universal immediacy ceased 
to fall within the reach of individual bourgeois producers.
2.5 In this sense what art history calls Modernism was always a 
boring rationalization of powerlessness and an obfuscation of 
the processes that brought it into being.
2.6 Producers of political art now find themselves in a situation 
radically unlike the one that was confronted by their counter-
parts a century previously. The historical association of radical 
culture with alienation effects or estrangement dates to a period 
in which radical artists were also still to some degree in control 
of immediacy effects. Now that this is no longer the case, the 
idea of desiring alienation seems clearly counterintuitive. Desire 
for immediacy is incomparably more widespread and produces 
a much wider variety of delusions, misprisions, and political er-
rors, as well as, occasionally, works of beautiful and persuasive 
clarity.
3
3.1 The commonest of these delusions has to do with a kind of 
surrogate immediacy. At its most naked, surrogate immediacy 




3.2 The surrogate immediacy of middle-class art develops in 
several stages: (a) first, the loss of attack of institutionalized cat-
egories of political analysis is identified and induces a state of 
alienation from those categories. This alienation continues until 
(b) the categories begin to be hated. (c) This hatred is resolved 
by means of fantasized attacks on all forms of particular imme-
diacy, which is to say on our immediate speech-forms, expres-
sive habits, modes of life, and ideas. One conventional way in 
which these attacks express themselves is in the conjuration of 
vacant or abandoned space (see: “half-deserted streets”). In a 
final move, (d) the space thus produced is patronizingly iden-
tified with the thoughtless simplicity of working-class reality, 
whose actual reality has in fact been violently dissolved.
3.3 The result of this sequence is as follows: Alienation is pro-
cessed into a surrogate immediacy whose appearance is a kind 
of romanticism of expressive poverty and whose essence is mid-
dle-class self-hatred projected into class disdain. Advances in 
home computing mean that all of this can now be carried out 
from the comfort of your living room.
3.4 The final social triumph of aesthetic immediacy over aes-
thetic alienation occurs when even the deepest disillusion with 
the particular expressive beauty of popular idioms can only be 
developed in the form of a surrogate immediacy in which skep-
ticism is allegorized as evocative vacancy.
3.5 It is not a contradiction, but an expression of the irration-
ality of capitalist culture, that the most universal immediacy 
has its origins in a disguised alienation that itself emerges not 
out of this or that particular immediacy, but from the mania of 
middle-class artists to eliminate, purge, and repress it. The class 
origins of this form of immediacy are not altered when its per-
formers are exemplarily working class.
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4
4.1 In the mid-twentieth century, middle-class aesthetics was 
most commonly justified in metaphysical or existentialist terms. 
Today, when the degradation of white-collar employment is a 
preoccupation of the bourgeois mainstream, it is more often jus-
tified by the impression of compulsion.
4.2 In a social world in which almost all individuals feel that 
they need to compete against one another in order to succeed, 
the ability to give off an aesthetic impression of compulsion be-
gins to rise in value.
4.3 Compulsion effects occur in middle-class art, but they origi-
nate in everyday working-class experience. The intrusion of the 
state into working-class life makes the satisfaction of even ordi-
nary, daily needs seem irresistibly complex and engulfing, as an-
yone who has undergone, or who has struggled alongside some-
one going through, a benefits claim or an eviction proceeding 
will know. Pain de-particularized as an atmospheric property of 
an aesthetic world takes its license from this basic social experi-
ence of everyday struggle that has become unendingly complex 
and immersive. It mimics an immediacy that has been made to 
feel overwhelming.
4.4 Compulsion effects make surrogate immediacies seem nec-
essary. They intimate the reasonableness of human displace-
ment and nullification.
4.5 Compulsion effects are in the air. They are aesthetic features 
of surrogate immediacies and not explicit claims about what it 
is or is not possible to do. (A minutely descriptive reproduction 
of what it’s like to go through a claim for disability benefits com-
municates the experience of compulsion. The presentation of an 
empty environment that has been deliberately botched or made 
to look crude or indistinct constitutes a compulsion effect.)
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4.6 Compulsion effects are a kind of aesthetic nationalism with-
out the disgusting inconvenience of nations. By making wound-
edness atmospheric, they aesthetically mimic the ideology of 
national collective trauma in which real social divisions are use-
fully submerged.
4.7 Theorists who talk about new aesthetic trends in terms of 
poor images have taken compulsion effects too seriously. There 
is no such thing as a poor image. There are images by rich art-
ists trying to conceal their wealth, and there are images by poor 
ones trying to become individually or collectively wealthy. The 
transferal of epithets of social class to forms of representation is 
always a sign that we are dealing with surrogate immediacy and 
the various effects that obfuscate its real basis in class bias and 
social resentment. Good artists need to be able to express that 
knowledge in their art.
4.8 Compulsion effects update working-class solidarity of the 
Orwellian, upper-class variety for the era of digital communica-
tion. Their authors are down and out on the internet. Solidarity 
of this kind is always a species of ostentatious self-harm.
4.9 Where in fin-de-siècle decadence, rejection of social respon-
sibility took place in the name of sensuous enjoyment, in the 
twenty-first-century mimicry of sensual displeasure takes place 
in the name of irresponsibility.
4.10 In an artificial world that has been artfully reduced to its 
bare minimum of detail, that appears faded or unreal, or that 
barely coheres in a jumble of grids and geometrical projections, 
middle-class artists come to feel at last as if they have entered 
into a structure of more or less total permissiveness. Immer-
sion in this world that has been artfully disfigured or etiolated 
comes to signal freedom from the obligations of self-care and 
mutual solidarity. By this means it provides an intense sensation 
of individual satisfaction in a cultivated atmosphere of general 
woundedness.
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4.11 At the point at which immersion in this world verges on 
the total, aestheticized self-harm becomes the dominant form 
of hedonism.
5
5.1 Overwhelming immediacy, surrogate immediacy, particular 
immediacy, etc., are modes. A realist art today needs to be able 
to teach itself to switch between them.
5.2 Switching of this type is our Verfremdungseffekt. It differs 
from the alienation effects of the greatest radical art of the twen-
tieth century, because even in its withdrawal from any particu-
lar immediacy, and therefore in its contradiction of the implicit 
claim made by that form of immediacy to constitute a coherent 
world, it continues to be defined by the immediate sensation of 
movement.
5.3 In this sense, radical art acknowledges the relative primacy 
of overwhelming immediacy. There is no particular immedia-
cy that is not a suitable raw material for radical art, but for the 
great majority of working-class individuals whose immediate 
circumstances are made by the state to seem overwhelming, the 
immediate rush of self-determined movement is too vital to be 
dispensed with.
6
6.1 Currently universal immediacy has many of the character-
istics of a surrogate immediacy. Vast quantities of human labor 
are expended on the accomplishment of this outcome. No trick 
is spared in finding new ways to make non-specific pain and im-
plied emptiness seem contemporary, sublime, and overwhelm-
ing.
6.2 To talk about the entire division of labor, structure of owner-
ship, ensemble of technical resources and recording media, ma-
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chinery of distribution, and raw giftedness involved in the mak-
ing of mass art in terms of universal immediacy is an egregious 
simplification undertaken in the name of immediacy itself.
6.3 A materialist expressionism today must find a way to make 
use of the crude assertion that while bourgeois art makes im-





“Language Is for Fucking Idiots”: 
On Porpentine Charity Heartscape
 
Dear Florence,
It is 1:30 on Saturday afternoon, January 12, 2019. You have asked 
me to write something about poetry and anti-fascism. I am try-
ing to work out where to start.
I’ve wanted to try to write down my thoughts about this since 
at least February 2017, when I was drawn into the campaign to 
close down the neo-reactionary art gallery in Hackney that had 
started running talking shops for fascists. It feels surprising to 
me that that was two years ago already, that it’s election year 
in the US next year. 2020 felt like an age away then. That mo-
ment around Trump’s election felt so chaotic to me; it was like a 
hole had been punched into my expectations and suddenly all 
of these things of which I had been dimly aware were slithering 
around inside of them with horrible unignorable clarity. I was so 
frightened by everything that was going on around us. It seems 
important to me now to be able to admit that we were not think-
ing very clearly, to be candid about it.
And now that I have the space to get my thoughts down 
about all of that stuff its significance seems to have diminished 
again: the lights have come back up, the monsters in the closet 
testify that they were only doing business, the libertarian finan-
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ciers creep back into the shadows, and Trump stands alone in 
the White House, lost in thought, his Nuremburg Rally a table 
of hamburgers.
I don’t mean that we can breathe a deep sigh of relief. Obvi-
ously that would be fucking unconscionable. But I do think that 
to start making work that was obsessed exclusively with an im-
minent fascist state-takeover would be a political and aesthetic 
error. Massive racist “movements” are a part of Western liberal 
societies today, not opposed to them. Cultural impulses that ex-
pressed themselves in opposition to the state were injected into 
the bloodstream of liberal commodity culture decades ago, as 
action films and structural adjustment programs and daytime 
TV, and as the War on Drugs and Terror and Welfare Cheats 
and Economic Migrants and then as revenge pornography and 
Twitter mobs and shooter survival and little Maddie and all of 
the other corporate-sponsored hypertensives that have been 
working their way through the body politic for years, to give 
Rupert Murdoch his long drawn-out symbolic erection. This 
stuff just didn’t exist in the same way a century ago. What does it 
mean to want to politicize aesthetics in circumstances like ours? 
Surely the answer can’t be the same as it was in 1936. It can’t be 
“Brecht.”
This just as a brief attempt to set out where I’m coming from. 
I should also add, since a lot of what I’m going to argue might 
seem to be dismissive of the idea of an anti-fascist art as such, 
that I don’t think that the rejection of an explicitly anti-fascist 
poetry means that there’s no need for anti-fascist politics. I am 
just saying that the way in which fascism is configured today 
means that the culture of fascism is not made predominantly by 
fascists. The obvious corollary of that statement is that a power-
ful anti-fascist art won’t have much to say about fascist ideology 
either.
So that will do by way of introduction.
¯\_(ヅ)_/¯
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All of this stuff has become tied up recently in my head with the 
famous Walter Benjamin quotation about fascism aestheticizing 
politics.1 I had thought that I understood what Benjamin meant 
by that statement without needing to re-read what he wrote. I 
had begun to use it as a kind of shorthand for something that it 
seemed to me to be important to describe. But then I went back 
to his essay and realized that he was talking about something 
else, and now I feel like my misunderstanding has to do at least 
in part with the way in which fascist culture has changed in the 
period since his death. I’ll try to explain the misunderstanding 
as clearly as I can.
This is a straightforward way of presenting it: the impulse to 
make politics beautiful is distinct from the belief that beauty is a 
property of political ideas. Benjamin was writing about fascism 
as a tendency that would beautify politics by conflating it with 
heroic, technically advanced warfare. His intention was to revise 
a Marxist argument: fascism was a way for the masses to make 
use of the most advanced potential of the existing forces of pro-
duction (or destruction) “while preserving traditional property 
relations.”2 By contrast, in my own mind Benjamin’s phrase had 
1 “Its [Fascism’s] self-alienation has reached the point where it can experi-
ence its own annihilation as a supreme aesthetic pleasure. Such is the 
aestheticizing of politics, as practiced by fascism. Communism replies by 
politicizing art”; Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Me-
chanical Reproduction,” in The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility: And Other Writings on Media, eds. Michael W. Jennings, 
Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levine (Cambridge: Harvard, 2008), 42.
2 “In technological terms it can be formulated as follows: only war makes it 
possible to mobilize all of today’s technological resources while maintain-
ing property relations”: “The Work of Art,” 41. This was exactly what Marx 
in his famous Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 
had claimed to be impossible. Benjamin’s revision of Marx’s argument 
about the contradiction between the “forces” and “relations” of production 
(which is to say, between the technical potential of society and the ability 
of capitalism to realize it), suggests that the contradiction can be removed 
within capitalism (a possibility that Marx had denied) by the channelling 
of those technical means towards destructive ends. Technical potential is 
therefore realized through a kind of sadism. I’ll say more about this later 
on. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. 
N.I. Stone (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1904). 
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come to refer to people for whom violent ideas were beautiful, 
who took pleasure in the solecisms and crudeness and brutality 
of racist, authoritarian political speech, and who experienced in 
all of those properties a kind of counterfeit aesthetic enjoyment. 
The first case of the “aestheticization of politics” applies most 
straightforwardly to people who experience their lives with the 
greatest fullness and intensity in situations of violent militarized 
conflict, the second to people who experience them with the 
greatest fullness and intensity on Twitter. The account of fascist 
aesthetics in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Repro-
duction” continues to be relevant to the political proceedings of 
certain balkanized strips of Northern Syria and to the suburbs 
of outer Moscow, but the account that I had wrongly attributed 
to it provides a better description of the relationship between 
art and politics for the homeowners of Swindon and Worthing-
ton, Ohio.
I might seem to be tying myself up in a contradiction. On the 
one hand I am arguing that a fascistic culture reproduces itself 
without the intercession of actual fascists. On the other hand 
I am describing a kind of metamorphosis in the aestheticiza-
tion of politics that Benjamin said was fascism’s defining cul-
tural characteristic. Which is it? Does fascism disappear into 
the structure of consumer personhood under the liberal capital-
ist state, or does it revive itself in the face of a violent capitalist 
culture, as the aestheticization of aggressive political language?
For me, the point of overlap between a fascistic culture 
within liberal capitalism and explicit fascist conviction is the in-
creasing technical potential to use language as a means to satisfy 
violent urges. To the extent that the desire for violent collective 
purification can be satisfied within the domain of individual 
consumption under the stewardship of the constitutional state, 
the appeal of outright fascism will tend to decline. To the extent 
that the beauty of this violence is experienced in language, its 
appeal will tend to increase. The same technical advances that 
incorporate into liberal capitalism those tendencies to aestheti-
cized violence that were originally the distinguishing cultural 
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characteristic of fascism, drive people to make their own sa-
distic pleasure in language and at the same time vastly increase 
their ability to use it in order to inflict harm on total strangers. 
Fascist ideology, shorn of its militarist culture, then becomes a 
culture unto itself: fascist language is the preeminent form of 
violent language, even if fascist art, fascist militias, and fascist 
state theory have all long since been superseded. Fascism is in 
this sense neither the inevitable outcome of capitalist develop-
ment, nor something that it can mechanically overcome, but 
instead a dialectical operation of historically constituted tech-
niques on socially constituted urges.
For the rest of this essay, I’ll try to say a little more about a 
body of work whose anti-fascism can be understood in these 
terms.
¯\_(ヅ)_/¯
Here is a comment on the aestheticization of politics circa June 
2018:
The promise of the internet and neoliberalism is that every-
one gets to be a cop. Everyone gets to be the drone pilot of 
something. You can’t control your life and you’re trapped in 
an infinite self-replicating hellscape of concrete with no kin-
ship and no culture and the sky is on fire and the sea is chok-
ing on plastic and everything’s shit but by god you can team 
up on some poor homeless bitch who no one will miss and 
gangbang that butterfly on a wheel. You can molest the girl 
with a dick at your university, you can forcefeed your autistic 
kid bleach, you can do anything but change a thing that mat-
ters.3
3 Porpentine Charity Heartscape, the shape you make when you want your 
bones to be closest to the surface, Slime Daughter, 2018, http://www.slime-
daughter.com/games/twine/closest; emphasis original. Available along 
with all of Porpentine’s other games at www.slimedaughter.com/games. 
A smart summary that makes lots of useful points is Siri Lee, “Game 
Review: the shape you make when you want your bones to be closest to the 
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This is a passage concerned with some of our own techno-
logical possibilities. In some respects its line of argument seems 
quite similar to Benjamin’s. For Benjamin’s “[Fascism] sees its 
salvation in granting expression to the masses — but on no ac-
count granting them rights,” read “Everyone gets to be the drone 
pilot of something.” In both cases the language describes the 
aesthetics of violent acting out. Whereas for Benjamin the price 
of identification with the superhuman is passionate absorption 
in the fantasy of bodily annihilation, for the author of the pas-
sage quoted above, the price of individual emancipation is collu-
sion in the bodily degradation of feminized others. In both cases 
aesthetics amounts to a sensation of activity that doesn’t “change 
a thing that matters,” with the further qualification that the sen-
sation feels best when it is expressed either as liquidation of the 
feeble human body or as aggressive domination of a wounded, 
exposed, disgusting, or defenseless third party. This is the ec-
static fascist intersection of torture and what now goes by the 
name of self-care, the kind of beaming, sado-positive therapy 
for which a figure like Milo Yiannopoulos was briefly famous. It 
is beautiful insofar as we are the person it is for.4The main differ-
ence between the passage I have just quoted and the Benjamin 
text is, of course, that the former nowhere uses the word “fas-
cism.” It says “the internet and neoliberalism,” but it could just as 
well say “the dominant society,” or “social networks,” or “today.” 




4 When I Google “gangbang that butterfly on a wheel,” the first thing that 
comes up is some porn film on Pornhub. When I Google “butterfly on a 
wheel,” I get a high-concept 2007 thriller starring Pierce Brosnan, about a 
man who concocts a fake abduction scenario in order to mentally torture 
the guy who has been having an affair with his wife. Later I get to Alexan-
der Pope’s “Epistle to Arbuthnot,” our final destination, a passage in which 
the poet vindicates his own practice of writing brilliant, elaborate satires 
against pathetic, low, and undeserving targets. It is funny that this most 
elegant metaphor for punching down should have originated in the work 
of the person who was most exquisitely accomplished in the art of doing 
exactly that.
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It is not arguing that “the internet and neoliberalism” are fascist, 
but that those characteristics that almost a century ago would 
have been associated with fascist art are today widespread as-
pects of everyday culture. Could anyone today possibly deny 
this? For Marinetti, and for the Fascists of the 1910s more gener-
ally, war was beautiful “because it enriches a flowering meadow 
with the fiery orchids of machine-guns.” It was beautiful because 
it mixes “gunfire, barrages, cease-fires, scents, and the fragrance 
of putrefaction.”5 For the Reddit Marinettis of 2016, the internet 
was beautiful because it mixed rhetorical cock-waving with the 
literal image of domination in fucking, and the conspiratorial 
satisfactions of a fantasized whole with the abrupt emptiness of 
a loading screen. In circumstances like these, Max Horkheimer’s 
famous remark about fascism and capitalism has become a tru-
ism for the theoretical edification of prudes: the person who 
should remain silent about fascism is not the one who is un-
willing to talk about capitalism, not primarily the Madeleine 
Albrights and Timothy Snyders of this world, but the person 
who fails to talk openly about ego-collapse, sexual violence, or 
themselves. Everyone knows that capitalism invests heavily in 
all three.
¯\_(ヅ)_/¯
The last block quotation is drawn from a text-based computer 
game by the game designer Porpentine Charity Heartscape, the 
shape you make when you want your bones to be closest to the 
surface. It was commissioned by the Museum of Contemporary 
Art Chicago and released sometime in mid-2018. It is impos-
sible to say how far into the game the quote comes, because 
the work itself is built out of a congeries of hypertext links that 
constantly loop back on themselves and deposit the player at 
an earlier stage of its narrative movement. Like many of Por-
pentine’s text-games, the shape you make is preoccupied with 
5 This and the previous quotation cited in Benjamin, “The Work of Art in 
the Age of Its Mechanical Reproduction,” 41.
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world creation, the obliquities of self-narration in fidelity to the 
trauma that prohibits it, and generic cultural form, the satirical 
manipulation of which this author has mastered like perhaps no 
other writer working today. Her games are a new kind of psychic 
pointillism, a constantly decomposing mental breakdown in 
text-format, dispersed like solar dust into the pixelated debris. I 
know of no one who has done more in obsessively re-imagining 
the formal uses of the web browser in levering open the shut-up, 
wounded, online head.
the shape you make reminds me in certain ways of the trajec-
tory of a discussion on poetry and anti-fascism in which I par-
ticipated in November 2018.6 I had wanted to talk, at that event, 
about the role in our psychic lives of stereotyped images of capi-
tal-letter Fascism. My idea was to try to open a discussion about 
how our wider culture has become saturated with those images, 
of crude Teutons and equilateral Klanspeople, and I thought I 
would talk about how this saturation begins, at the first moment 
that we sit down at our desks in our state-run schools to begin 
dutifully to internalize our state-sanctioned syllabi. I had it in 
my head that we would talk about how successful this opera-
tion is, since the same process that establishes the icons of rac-
ism and authoritarianism as foreign icons and as lessons from 
the past is also the one that allows us to become convinced of 
the essential otherness of fascism to our own lives. I wanted to 
say how in my own work I try to manipulate those symbols like 
puppets, to stick my hands into them and make their tongues 
wag in disgusting, lascivious mimicry of the pallid, wagging fin-
gers of their consumer audiences; and I wanted to say that our 
art could burst from their puppet-torsos like blissful alien jack-
in-the-boxes, screaming the news that this was a new genetic 
6 Some questions I wrote down for the discussion can be accessed at “Ques-
tions for an Anti-Fascist Culture (Nov. 2018),” https://bit.ly/2RwDpin. A 
partial transcript of the conversation is available under the title “Some 
communal thoughts on poetry and anti-fascist culture,” Poetry Emergency: 
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mutation in the “aestheticization of politics” itself: a novel strain 
of it, metastasizing in the ego-conduct of liberal people who live 
in liberal capitalist societies in which almost every impulse that 
was associated with fascists circa 1936 can now be satisfied every 
evening by even the most upstanding champion of democracy 
and human rights. (Everyone knows at least two people who 
prove it.)
What we mostly talked about at the event instead was vio-
lence, about violence in left-wing poetry and in fascist culture, 
and about how to discriminate between the two, and we argued 
with one another about whether we needed to make art that was 
less or merely differently violent; and I was too slow-witted at 
the time to realize that this was in fact the conversation that I 
had wanted in slightly modified terms, since we were its pri-
mary subject.
¯\_(ヅ)_/¯
But assume that Benjamin is right, and that fascist aesthetics is 
a kind of travesty of the gap between actual human reality and 
technically determined human potential. How do we relate our-
selves to that potential?
One way would be to try to find some method of saying what 
it is: to rip out from the thin, insulting air of Google and Twitter 
some image of the life that they can never depict. And for many 
years this has been my own answer. I have wanted my poetry 
to be the immediate realization of existing technical potential. 
I have given to that potential the name of communism, and I 
have burned through successive definitions of that term with 
the enthusiasm of Parisian street demonstrators for luxury cars. 
I am now faced with the sensation that this has been a fruitless 
exercise, and a sort of expressive masochism. What other ap-
proaches can be conceived of?
Porpentine’s games provide another answer to the same 
problem. They don’t try to overcome the gap between human 
reality and technically determined potential, but to light a fire 
in it. Unfinished highways of feeling loop through her text seg-
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ments in almost imperceptible outline, standing out in relief 
against the desktop-wallpaper greens and oranges of their in-
browser backdrops — an affective stage scenery retrenched and 
then retrenched again to its drowsy, dogmatic degree zero. The 
non-existent knife that has a central role in the narrative of her 
2014 game With Those We Love Alive is at once the conscious 
emblem of this materialism of the unrealized and the virtuosic 
contraction of its telescopic absences to the dimensions of a 
simple plot point.7 Who is still afraid of the dark?
the shape you make provides this spacious quality of Porpen-
tine’s work with a few more contour lines. Essential to its overall 
structure is a kind of complex of incompletions: incompletion 
of its (apparently) autobiographical narration of early media 
consumption and of its repressive association with shame; in-
completion in the account of the intrusion of those early expe-
riences into later practices of intimate care; and incompletion 
in the game’s biting criticism of internet culture and its barely-
speculative future of fully privatized exclusion mechanisms. The 
prurient desire of the game-player to access more exquisite vi-
gnettes of defenseless childhood suffering is anticipated in the 
game itself: enough click-throughs brings you to a screen that 
reads
art is an obsession that buries you inside the beauty until you 
can’t see it anymore, you disappear, sacrificed so others can 
look at it from the outside and see what you were dreaming 
when you started.
This is who you are, player: the “other who can look […] from 
the outside,” and see into passages of self-description of an al-
most unbearably frank and compromised intimacy. It would be 
very easy for the game, or for the writer of it, having painstak-
ingly established this relation, to feel violated by its asymme-
try, and to formulate its (and her) anticipation of the reader’s 
7 Porpentine Charity Heartscape, With Those We Love Alive, Slime Daughter, 
2014, http://slimedaughter.com/games/twine/wtwla/.
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grasping intrusiveness as a kind of revenge — a comeuppance 
achieved by way of intellectual mastery, through the humiliating 
demonstration to that person, the reader, now a kind of trans-
fixed analysand, of just who they are, and by shoving down their 
throat the evidence of their own violent, insatiable greed. “The 
entire world is connected by an ethereal lifestream of informa-
tion and the best people can think to do with it is participate in 
human sacrifice.” But that doesn’t happen, here, in those words. 
The tone is instead suggestive, Schumannesque. The beauty. 
Ghost variations. A few, skeletal notations of heat death. The 
gameplay is not an intelligence test.
And in this sense, it is the opposite of the most basic meta-
phor of fascist self-understanding. Fascists imagine themselves 
in a very particular way. In Klaus Theweleit’s famous study of the 
writings of German Freikorpsmen, Male Fantasies, the structure 
is laid out again and again:
The fascists were not projecting when they singled out Fried-
rich Ebert from the Left for a certain grudging admiration. 
They sensed that this man (whom Erhard Lucas fittingly de-
scribes as presenting a “brow of iron” to all demands from 
the Left) would not allow a single drop of the stream to seep 
through; he would not rest until he had crushed all attempts 
to form soviets, to socialize particular areas of production, 
or to organize a republican army. Ebert’s first love was his or-
ganization, the Party. The party in power: large, rigid blocks; 
dams […]8
For the Fuehrer’s “wife,” in that fascist ritual, was the un-
conscious of the masses who were pouring into block for-
mations. “And now the screams of ‘Heil!’ erupt, becoming 
overwhelming, like some all-fulfilling wave that rips every-
thing along with it. Fifty thousand voices merge into a single 
cry of ‘Heil Hitler!’ Fifty thousand arms shoot out in salutes. 
8 Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies, Vol. 1 (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1987), 384.
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Fifty thousand hearts beat for this man who is now striding, 
bareheaded, through the narrow passage formed by all those 
thousands.”9
Theweleit’s argument about fascists who imagine themselves as 
blocks without gaps, penetrable orifices, or vacuums is a part 
of his explication of the relationship of male fascists to women. 
His argument that these fascists have yet to be born means to 
suggest a quite different way of thinking about human ego de-
velopment than the one with which we are familiar from Freud-
ian psychoanalysis. Instead of undergoing the incorporation of 
an internal super-ego representing the father as a resolution of 
the Oedipus complex, the fascist personality is formed through 
the constant disciplining of the body in the process of the mili-
tary drill. It emerges through its bending and welding into the 
continuous, unbroken surface of the collective block person: the 
nation or military parade.
The threat of personal dissolution outside of this relationship 
of violent male fraternity is, predictably, warded off through ex-
plosions of frantic violence. In the sight of the quivering, life-
less flesh of battlefield enemies, in their blood and shit turned 
outwards and commingled and externalized, the Freikorps man 
discharges the anxiety he feels at the prospect of his own dis-
persal or fragmentation. He blacks out and is reborn. The first 
screen of the shape you make: “One of my first memories is a 
bowl of blood and flesh in a bedroom.”
Fascists imagine themselves as blocks because the idea that 
their personalities might contain holes or gaps is unbearable 
to them. They need to be impenetrable, complete, positively 
constipated with their own heroism. Squadrists, ex-syndicalist 
theorists of the total state, Nazi stormtroopers, fans of the band 
Skrewdriver, and racist 4Chan users represent the unity-in-dif-
ference of this need not only to be whole, but to be full.10 How 
9 Ibid., 435.
10 In Newcastle in 2015 I walked down a hill behind a right-wing biker with a 
patch on his jacket that said The UK Is Full. And he was.
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does this relate to the argument I made earlier, about language 
being the point of contact between a fascistic culture without 
fascists, on the one hand, and the transformation in the fascist 
aestheticization of politics, on the other? I said there that inso-
far as the aestheticization of politics still occurs, it does so in 
language. I also said that it was here more than anywhere else 
that fascist cultural tendencies realized themselves in fascist 
politics, and that it was a real contradiction of capitalist social 
relationships that the same process that allows capital to interi-
orize fascism, in the same way that a child might grow up to in-
teriorize her adult persecutors, also produces new, consciously 
revolutionary fascists through the new technical affordances of 
language to hurt, brutalize, and cause pain.
But why is this the case? If fascism has been deprived of its 
mastery over the sadistic aesthetics of existing technical poten-
tial (which is to say, over the politics of war), what kind of lan-
guage allows it to sustain its own ideology?
The usefulness of Theweleit’s argument to my mind is this. 
It allows us to see what fascist language tries to achieve. Fas-
cism becomes conscious and theoretically aware in language 
because theoretical language is, or feels, block-like and gapless; 
and because it is block-like and gapless language, more than any 
other kind, that does duty as a bludgeoning instrument for the 
infliction of intellectual injury.11 While in every other domain 
of social life, advanced capitalist relations have interiorized the 
sadistic urges that previously sought expression in fascist oppo-
sition to the state,12 in the scene of communication it has given 
fascist theory an immense new lease on life, as the one solid, 
11 So, to be specific, my argument is that the gaplessness of a widespread 
neo-fascist conspiracy theory like the “Eurabia theory,” or, still better, the 
“Cultural Marxist” theory, is attractive to individuals used to attacking 
other people on the internet not because it explains anything, but because 
it seems like an effective instrument for meting out punishment. The titles 
assigned to Youtube clips of television debates featuring fascists and liber-
als famously bear this out. Fascist theory is attack theory.
12 Which is to say, the new state, the liberal democratic state of constitutional 
conventions and universal enfranchisement, formed either in belated 
emulation of the central capitalist powers or as the direct consequence of 
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impenetrable block that individual men and women are able to 
call their own. This is the latest stage in the dialectic of fascist 
culture, its aestheticization of politics distorted into the tenden-
cy to find the most bestialized and persecutory speech-habits at 
once beautiful and sexually arousing.
We are now faced with the task of imagining what these his-
torical transformations mean for anyone whose ambition is not 
to aestheticize politics, but to politicize aesthetics. Porpentine 
gets the main problem into focus: “Language is for fucking idi-
ots. […] I don’t really know a lot about abstract concepts. I only 
know about the stuff I’m interested in or the tiny hyper-specific 
details that I focus on.” Her games are sustained elaborations on 
that instinct, the formal antithesis to the cutting edge of con-
ceptual language. And that they somehow manage to be this 
literally and not only in some amiable metaphorical sense is 
so astonishing to me, and so moving. Again, the first sentence 
of the shape you make: “One of my first memories is a bowl of 
blood and flesh in a bedroom.” Replaced at the second screen 
with “Me and my siblings weren’t born in hospitals.” How many 
cancelled possibilities are strung out across these two screens 
and twenty-three words? How many times do you have to read 
the second statement before it emerges for you as a comment 
on the first, before “hospitals” and “bowl of blood and flesh” as-
sert their elective affinity? How often do you have to be reborn 
through the game’s click-through HTML loops into the scene of 
the first screen before you realize that this scene of your birth 
as the game’s player is not primarily an enigmatically evocative 
statement about violence and sexual desire — the stress held on 
“bedroom” — but a description of a home birth that connotes 
(at least for anyone unfamiliar with normal homebirths, which 
is probably the majority of the game’s players) stillbirth, or 
abortion? And what does it mean for clarity to be withheld like 
this, and why is it that this birth that is also the cancellation of 
birth, measured out not in abstract space but in the lived time of 
military defeat by them — since it was in these conditions that interwar 
fascism emerged and its specific relationship to violence was elaborated.
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my own fallible head, in the dimensions of my own distraction 
and insensitivity, and of my indifference to tiny details — why 
is it that it cuts so deeply into the heart of the central organ-
izing metaphor both of conscious fascists and of the violent, 
repetitive video games that have usurped so much of the social 
libido that they used to be able to monopolize, into the scene of 
“palingenesis,” rebirth or reawakening, where we come to life 
as gapless blocks, with our health bars replenished, screaming 
insults at the weak?
Language is for fucking idiots.
The fascist who thinks he is a block, a hard, integral object 
without gaps, internal fissures, or breaks — this fascist is con-
venient for us, liberal and radical anti-fascists alike, because he 
is not like us, because he shares none of our DNA, and because 
the imperative that he suggests to us is simple, reassuring, and 
familiar. It is merely the imperative, broadcast to us by our 
teachers from the earliest days of our infancy, that we ensure a 
rigorous regime of self-hygiene! And this is a fundamental fact 
about contemporary capitalist societies. Just as the impulses to-
wards obscene violence, ecstatic domination, spectacularized 
militarism, and the hysterical persecution of vulnerable, un-
clean others that were the hallmarks of the fascist movements 
of the 1930s are now largely internalized to the private domain 
of the individual liberal consumer, so too has the tendency to 
aestheticize politics, once the distinguishing tendency of fas-
cist artists, become a leitmotiv of the dominant liberal political 
theory. As this process gathers pace, mainstream media hyste-
ria about an impending fascist takeover increases necessarily in 
proportion.
But fascists are not towering granitic blocks with no gaps or 
breaks. They are tiny nuclei of ideas afloat in great cytoplasmic 
seas of unconceptualized frustration and directionlessness. The 
tendency to plump for the former conception instead of the lat-
ter is fundamental to the contemporary aestheticization of poli-
tics, which is also the reason why any essay on anti-fascism and 
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poetry is also compelled to explain why there is now no such 
thing as fascist art.
I cut the words “I think” from the preceding paragraph. My 
life up to now has been a fight for conceptual clarification. I am 
not used to holding space open. I have not yet learned to use 
what doesn’t exist as a surgical (musical) instrument.
I am not alone in this. Klaus Theweleit’s magnificent two-
volume book finishes with an abrupt, mirthful ellipsis, as if this 
might amount to an adequate response to the history of attempts 
by male artists to overleap the distance between reality and 
technical potential. His fundamentally non-artistic response to 
an almost insoluble compositional problem shows how easy it is 
to fail to take beauty seriously.13
One is not born a fascist, one is reborn, palingenetically, at 
the moment when one’s gaps are closed up. This is the infinite 
possibility of systematic thinking, a compositional procedure as 
flexible and as miraculously susceptible to permutation as three 
dots crammed together at the end of a sentence. It is how we res-
pawn again and again into the first screen of our lives, a bowl of 
blood and flesh in a bedroom, exhilarated in the re-emergence 
of this stillbirth, shoveling worlds into a system.
Porpentine’s games are the closest thing I know to a success-
ful anti-fascist art in the specific sense that I am discussing, be-
cause they are among the only works that I can think of that take 
absolutely seriously the task of composing with what doesn’t yet 
exist. This is not negative capability, apophasis, or the jaded 
specter of nineteenth-century Romantic irony. It is alien to the 
clichés of “atmosphere” or “tone,” which are anyway hateful non-
words that do for aesthetics roughly what “diseased migrant car-
avan” does for politics. All of the above-mentioned tendencies 
are perfectly compatible with art made by fascists and would 
13 Theweleit is not to blame for this inadequacy. My point is only that his 
book tries to undermine block-like concepts in what is ultimately a highly 
conceptual way. The ellipsis stands for the openness that self-assertive 
advocates of conceptual gaplessness (revolutionary men who brook no dis-
sent) are congenitally afraid of. But it does not compose a space for it. The 
end…
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continue to be prominent features of fascist culture if it were not 
for the fact that the great majority of the candidate-artists are 
now in fact smiling, hygienic political liberals with the portfolio 
webpages to prove it. What makes Porpentine a great artist is 
not her fragments or uncertainties, mysteries, or doubts, but her 
singular ability to find ways of holding open with the steadiness 
of surgical forceps all of the distances that have grown up within 
and between us and that threaten to collapse again the moment 
we open our mouths. By making those distances into composi-
tional materials, she opens a way out of the culture of fascism 
and anti-fascism in which we loop around, as if in a kind of 









How are you? Thank you for sending me your pamphlet a cou-
ple of months ago. I see that you’ve made another one since with 
some of John Barker’s writing — I’d like to have that one too, if 
there are any of those stamps still going. But I wanted to respond 
first to your poem and its “p.s.,” and to say some things about 
what felt important in it to me, and also to try to get down some 
of my feelings about Sean Bonney’s recent poetry, which appears 
in the vicinity of yours, as one of its many points of reference.
I want to say first though how grateful I am for the poem and 
for what it works through and exposes. I know from reading 
your writing (not just in the pamphlet) how hostile you are to 
1 This letter was written in response to an untitled and unpaginated pam-
phlet distributed by Lotte L.S. in early 2020. In what follows, unattributed 
quotations in the letter itself or in footnotes are taken from the pamphlet. 
As a first step, it may also help to set out the contents of the edition notice: 
“Written in Great Yarmouth June 2019 & Athens December 2019. Printed 
January 2020. Anti-copyright. Free to distribute, copy, borrow, steal. Im-
ages show anti-NATO riots in Iceland in 1949, protests against George H.W. 
Bush’s visit to Iceland in 1983, and nootka lupine in 2019. Any donations to 
Andrými social centre in Reykjavík.”
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the idea that any of us should have to expose any of ourselves to 
a poetry world that is in its own aspirational way just the GCHQ2 
in miniature, and I feel the same way, and always have, that it is 
a necessity (and also just better for our life, for life) to keep our 
heads down. That isn’t quite the kind of exposure that I mean. 
One of the things that I think makes your book so unusual is 
its direct assertion of some actual principles for poetry, from 
the “Anti-copyright” down to the provisional rules for the first 
person plural (more on that at the end) which after so much 
argument and counterargument you finally set out in the post-
script. And your book shows that those principles are not just 
dogmatic inheritances, but that we need to find ways — to work 
for ways — to expose them in our lives, and to expose our lives 
to them. So that’s closer to what I’m trying to talk about, and 
this kind of exposure is much more interesting to me than the 
kind of pseudo-drama of self-revelation that might induce the 
poetry GCHQ to award one of its £3,000 prizes.
I expect that this will seem more like an essay disguised as a let-
ter than vice versa. I’m struggling to keep things separate at the 
moment, as in, this is an (inadequate) attempt to say something 
about your poetry, the way it addresses collectivity, its treatment 
of loss, memory, fidelity to shared experience, etc. But also I 
can’t keep those things apart in my own head from my own un-
stable relation to Sean’s death and the filter of poetry readings, 
confusion, numbness, blogposts, diatribes, Crass lyrics, Hal-
loween parties, and mental breakdowns through which I’m only 
sometimes able to catch sight of it, an Accattone in the squat 
cinema of my mind, showing in incalculable fits and starts. And 
I first met you at the Poetry and Emergency conference in No-
vember 2018, which was also — will now always be — the last 
time that I saw him, dead drunk and being put into a taxi talk-
ing about how he wanted to go to his hotel room to read John 
2 GCHQ stands for Government Communications Headquarters. It is the 
UK equivalent of the NSA and an important part of the global “Five Eyes” 
digital spying network. 
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Wieners, like John Wieners was someone who would take care 
of him, and this is just one stretch of time; but it feels longer in 
one case than the other.
And essays are usually meant to hold all of that stuff at arm’s 
length, which is why this isn’t (why I don’t want this to be) an 
essay, but letters are meant to be answerable, and I’m not sure 
that this one is. There are too few questions in it, and probably 
too many presumptions — you can point them out if you have 
the time for it. I would like to know whether you feel now like 
you’re on the other side of the poem — whether the pledge at the 
end of your “p.s.” continues to feel sustainable. Does it? When 
I first read the pamphlet it felt to me like a very stable object: 
its joints and the points of intersection of its materials seemed 
not only “well judged,” but also as if the whole thing might have 
just fallen into place, like a jigsaw that had done you the favor 
of self-assembling, and despite how ludicrous and ungenerous 
that kind of admiration is I carried on feeling it even while I 
was puzzling my way through the remark towards the end of 
the postscript, that “[f]or a while” you had “stopped thinking 
about the poem before going to sleep, stopped reciting it on late 
night bike rides home, stopped staring at it on a lit screen.” The-
ories are hard to let go of, they survive the greatest amount of 
contravening evidence — this is one of the tedious lessons that 
the December general election is now famous for having re-re-
taught us — and it was only when I went back to the essays you 
published last year to find pieces of familiar language from the 
poem and the postscript staring out at me, in new and different 
configurations, that I understood how much re-working was at 
the root of the apparent stability of the book that you assembled 
and published. So there go those stretches of time again. I’d be 
really interested to know how they seem to you right now.
For a long time I have considered the meaning of the point 
of no return.3
3 Quoted in Lotte L.S., “‘Not to speak about / only to speak nearby,’” Poetry 
Foundation Blog, May 13, 2019, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/har-
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So. It’s easy to read the poem as a single elegy, with Rojava as its 
main elsewhere and Haukur as its main subject. That particular, 
excruciating fact of distance in it: how can we relate to a revo-
lutionary armed struggle, when what we live in is an ongoing, 
occurring circus of reactionary consent? How can we represent 
the decisions of those who have died in it, when we are where 
we are?
I had been thinking about that question throughout January. 
A quotation from Fassbinder that had been doing the rounds on 
the internet got stuck in my head:
People haven’t learned how to love. The prerequisite for lov-
ing, without dominating the other, is your body learning, 
from the moment it leaves the womb, that it can die. When 
you accept that a part of life is death, you have no more fear 
of it and you don’t fear any other “conclusions.” But as long 
as you live in terror of death, you react likewise to the end of 
a relationship, and as a result, you pervert the love that does 
exist.4
There’s a sense of cliché in all of this. Death as a part of life: a 
bohemian’s exercise in titillating the sub-editors. But I had be-
gun to feel fear of death (not only of my own) perverting my 
thinking about politics too, and I wanted to challenge that habit, 
to think openly about some of the possibilities that I had shut 
myself up against. I felt that I had become too preoccupied with 
the point of no return to the exclusion of everything that we can 
presume to lie beyond it, and also that, in equating that point 
with death, I had forgotten that part of what lies beyond it is 
riet/2019/05/not-to-speak-about-only-to-speak-nearby. Now expanded in 
A town, three cities, a fig, a riot, two blue hyacinths, three beginnings, five 
letters, a “death”, two solitudes, façades, four loose dogs, a doppelgänger, a 
likeness, three airport floors, thirty-six weeks…, Tripwire Pamphlet Series 
#10, https://tripwirejournal.com/tripwire-pamphlet-series/. 
4 Norbert Sparrow and Rainer Werner Fassbinder, ‘“I Let the Audience Feel 
and Think’: An Interview with Rainer Werner Fassbinder,” Cinéaste 8, no. 
2 (1977): 21. 
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a number of different forms of survival, some of which might 
prove less cramped and less fearful than the imperative to sur-
vive per se. On top of that I was feeling happier than I had, and 
wanted to take some pleasure in fucking things up again. We 
pervert the love that does not exist, also.
Yesterday, cycling towards Bloomsbury from Hackney, from 
the street market where much of my current life plays out to 
a place where many of my earliest political experiences took 
place, I tried to figure some of this out. I thought about the film 
about Anna Campbell’s life that the BBC broadcast a year or so 
ago. Perhaps you remember it? There’s a moment in that docu-
mentary where Jamie Janson talks about why he went to fight 
in Rojava. He says (as I remember) something striking about 
why he needed to leave his life and go there — that he had come 
to feel that compared to his own political activity the Kurdish 
struggle represented the “real” revolution, and that was why he 
needed to be a part of it. There is something consciously, dev-
astatingly naïve in the simplicity of that idea, and at the same 
time we all know exactly what he means. A “real revolution” 
is not-this, it isn’t NGO work or opinion ed. hand-wringing or 
academic radicalism. It’s the situation in which our desire for a 
transformed social life is externalized, is no longer just a smear 
of impulses playing out inside our own heads, like a bloody 
mess, an abstract painting, a gibberish of nineteenth-century 
words, idea salads for salaried intellectuals that real people just 
aren’t going to have the time for, is ACTUAL REAL LIFE, “real” to 
the point that people are willing to give up their lives for it. “In 
the English-speaking world, where none of us know anything 
except how to kill,” that kind of idealism is systematically killed 
off (is “tragic,” “poignant,” etc.), which is why among other rea-
sons it sucks so much to touch back down in its principles of 
objectivity in Luton.5
I found myself thinking about how your poem deals with that 
commitment to the point of no return in its aftermath. Revolu-




tionary politics MUST be made real and conclusive even at the 
most extreme cost of one’s own life; the pledging or staking of 
life is essential to the reality of the transformation that it brings 
about and acts unerringly as the proof of it. At the same time, 
death in armed struggle is brutal, unheroic, inconclusive, and 
uneventful. It leaves us to live with the unanswerable; it is in-
flicted from the sky by pieces of advanced capitalist machinery 
whose remoteness from the scene of murder is itself a mockery 
of the desire of the victims for immediate proximity — to real 
revolution, to other human beings, to the actuality of their own 
ideals, etc. Is this a paradox? In Bloomsbury I had dinner with 
an old Trotskyist friend who said his proudest achievement in 
life was that he once got ambushed and beaten unconscious in 
Leeds by members of Combat 18. Was he answering my ques-
tion? I doubt that Sean Bonney knew why it was that he thought 
his line about cutting the throats of Tories in the street was the 
most peaceful thing he’d ever written; but where would the po-
etry have been in the idea that it was the most violent?
I’m saying that uncertainty, inconclusiveness, etc., is a mo-
ment of total irrefutable commitment, and not its opposite. I 
know that that’s an obvious thing to assert, but it provides me 
with some initial terms with which to think about the last poem 
that Sean posted on his blog, about three weeks before his death:
Confession 2
while people are starving, wealth
is a crime. I am not willing to argue.
if you are hungry, no laws apply.
glass breaks easily. weapons
can be made from anything.
crime should not go unpunished.
the meaning of royalty
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it too can be killed6
It’s a scene in which absolutely everything has been stripped 
away. Nothing is left, no grand theories, no beautiful vision, 
no historical process. All the spatters and circumvolutions of 
the earlier collages are gone, the purples and lurid pinks come 
back in greyscale, “no way to know how or where or when — or 
if — he died, exactly,” and what remains is hatred of the rich, the 
last thing it is possible to clutch onto once every other reality 
has crumbled or been rejected, and the refusal of explanation: 
“I am not willing to argue.” And you could read this as a quin-
tessential “last poem,” a self-portrait of the artist holding onto 
his one remaining certainty after everything else has gone up 
in smoke: Sean Bonney presents the essence of his system, the 
moral ground-zero across which all of the stray dogs and politi-
cal assassins and ridiculous nymphs and nasty waifs and burn-
ing comets of his imagination pass like plastic bags in the wind. 
I don’t think that’s what it is though. Sean’s poetry was always 
unwilling to argue. It was always full of declarations about what 
constituted a waste of his, and our, time. His historical poetry 
replaced 99% of the present with an enormous yawning ellipsis. 
It could never have been such a mad fucking kick if it didn’t. He 
showed us that poetry should be willing to come out and say 
straight up and as bluntly as any one-minute punk song that 
their reality is DEAD and that if you want to ask who they are 
then you’ve already missed the point. Of course they fucking 
owe us a living. And if we can’t say it in those terms then we 
shouldn’t bother writing poetry, and everything we can pay to 
learn in an MFA class is just mimicry of the official technique for 
smashing a teenaged protestor’s head against a pavement, as you 
know. “Intelligibility is as much to be feared as desired.”
I want to describe a relation in Sean’s poetry that I find hard 
to get down. I know that I’ve written to you about this already, 





but in my own life in the last year or so I’ve felt myself being 
pulled further and further away from my earlier conceptual 
and political certainties. As I have come to know more about 
my immediate social environment, about the state and the real 
lives of the people I live around, and as more of my friends have 
died, become sick, or have broken down, the idea of simple po-
litical solutions to suffering have filled me with more and more 
nausea. I have wanted more and more intensely to write from 
within this state, from within the suffering that I experience vi-
cariously, and not to conjure for my own benefit some fantastic 
alluring exit from it. I’ve wanted to write about the immediacy 
of being stuck, dying, sick, or mentally imploded, and I began to 
hate any art that feeds those experiences into some machine that 
we can call Marxism, or revolutionary politics. I have tried to 
live in this immediacy and to speak and fight for it, to love it as 
the material of working-class art, in which we can say, here is the 
speech of the streets and the vernacular, and of the pain and the 
pleasure of the parties and prison visits and the heat and zero-
hour contracts: and here you are. And can you respond to it? 
And can you recognize its power? And in some ways this move-
ment in my thinking has felt like progress to me; and sometimes 
it has felt like recession, and fear and disappointment and cow-
ardice filter into it and are taken up on its currents and poison 
it like a kind of middle-class lead contamination, and I feel how 
easily it can be denatured into reaction, insularity, and mean-
spiritedness, another version of the pig-headedness that can 
only understand someone’s decision to fight for world revolu-
tion in a place they have never been in terms of the events of 
that person’s early childhood, or its consequences for the warm 
nurturing space of a now-bereft nuclear family.
The last lines of his poetry that Sean published are a dic-
tionary definition: “the meaning of royalty.” They continue a 
tradition in his writing, of establishing step-by-step an alterna-
tive system of meanings, a dual-power structure in the English 
language itself: “the alphabet was a system of blackmail / com-
placent, would skate on our regulated senses”; “screams of con-
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tempt and pain, lodged in […] the centre of our names.”7 Open 
almost any of his books at random and you find statements like 
this. They are so essential to his poetry. None of our words can 
mean what they mean by them; to the extent that they do, our 
avant-garde writing may as well be an internal memorandum 
on a computer in the Home Office. We all write from a place 
that relegates us all: anyone who thinks that the British state is 
in Whitehall and is not also a slick of mucus at the back of their 
own throat has a very limited understanding of what art and 
politics is.8
And the poetry returns all the time to this baseline. Lots of 
people have said and will say that his writing was full of astonish-
ing metaphors. But that’s a kind of failure of response. As a poet, 
Sean treated metaphors as definitions. His use of the word “is” 
is confrontational: if he tells you that “fire is physical time,” he 
means that it is not “the flames, light and heat, and often smoke, 
that are produced when something burns.”9 Negativity runs 
through the writing like indistinct figures through a tunnel, and 
the sound of their footsteps echoes throughout even the most 
inventive of its passages and constitutes his type of rhythm and 
blues. In my mind the movement is always towards a new kind 
of writing degree zero, the concrete literality of a language no 
one has ever spoken and that no one ever will, way out beyond 
the exercises of literary criticism that when you really get down 
to it are just another version of CPS barristers trying to explain 
drill music to a judge. “I am not willing to argue” also means 
“I will do nothing but define”; and there is no more anarchistic 
commitment in Sean’s writing than that. “We must consciously 
create our own world, not according to mindless customs and 
7 Sean Bonney, “Happiness: Poems after Rimbaud,” in Happiness: Poems af-
ter Rimbaud (London: Unkant, 2011), 13; Ghosts (London: Materials, 2017), 
n.p.
8 “What do protests, purpling flowers, starlings, police and endless daylight 
have in common? I write from a place that relegates us all.”
9 “fire is physical time. is absolute unrest” (“Happiness: Poems after Rim-




destructive prejudices, but according to the canons of reason, 
reflection and discourse that uniquely belong to our own spe-
cies.” Again: if you meet a Tory in the street, cut his throat. Two 
ways of saying the same thing, to be asserted simultaneously, 
in the manner of Sean’s syllabi from the period just before the 
financial crisis. “HEX ENDUCTION HOUR (The Fall) and/or FUCK 
DE BOERE (Peter Brotzmann) to be listened to only while read-
ing ROSA LUXEMBURG /// The Accumulation of Capital.”
So here is the dynamic that that way of thinking helps me to 
overcome: we feel we have to disobey everything else in order to 
see at all,10 and the stale formulae of radical politics produce in 
us a kind of overwhelming revulsion, and we return to the world 
in search of new experience, and over time the immediacies that 
we learn to articulate become formulae of a new variety, and our 
repudiation of the alleged identity of “unwillingness to argue” 
and mental deprivation segues into a new conservatism on a 
reduced scale, into stubborn possessive smallness, refusal to ac-
cept loss, tired anti-intellectualism, hatred of sudden upheaval, 
and obsessive fear of dying, which is to say into the entire range 
of curtain-twitching pathology that can be attributed to the av-
erage English voter as their birthright and common inheritance. 
This is the path of hatred for empty ideas that is so necessary 
to poetry and that nevertheless terminates over and over again 
in… some new empty ideas. And what I want to explain is how 
Sean’s poetry contains another route that closely resembles this 
one but isn’t it, and which I want to be able to define for myself 
more consistently (I think of Anne Boyer on what resembles the 
grave but isn’t).
Or perhaps that’s too strong. Sometimes we don’t start out 
by wanting to disobey everything but by just feeling exhausted, 
done. The times when I have felt the most sickened by my own 
formulae are the times when I have felt most acutely that they 
do nothing for those who are closest to me. Our ABCs, our smart 
10 “To see and experience the ways in which we are impossible without one 
another is to be convinced that we must disobey everything else in order 
to see at all.”
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turns of phrase, all the dumb shit that we have said to ourselves, 
our belief in rhetoric or symbols or beautiful argument, eve-
rything that is vivid or life-giving in our minds becomes ugly 
in the face of its inability to change even the most basic things 
about our own lives and the lives of the people we care about. 
We return into ourselves: “everything forced to the surface. I 
don’t feel I’m myself anymore. I’ve fallen to pieces, I can hardly 
breathe. My body has become something else, has fled into its 
smallest dimensions, has scattered into zero. And yet, as soon as 
it got to that, it took a deep breath, it could suddenly do it, it had 
passed across, it could see its indeterminable function within 
the whole.” And learning to compose like that from the “small-
est dimensions” of ourselves is something that Sean worked on 
constantly for the last ten years. This moment from Brecht about 
“passing across” was a total obsession for him: the trial of his 
poetry is always to find in the last thing we have left a power 
of expression that is greater than the sum total of everything 
that has been taken away. “The very simplest words / must be 
enough. When I say what things are like / everyone’s heart must 
be torn to shreds.” “Thatcher faked her death.” “Put your shoes 
on, get started / someone will finish.” It’s for that reason that 
the tributes to Sean written after his death that have hurt me 
the most are always the most syntactically atomized. Take what 
Verity Spott wrote: “My friend. Our friend. Our comrade. Our 
ridiculous man. Our ghosts. Our poetries. Our eternal fires, 
winds and reveries. Sean Bonney. Love.” Tim Thornton: “how 
I wonder what we are.” It’s all there, the complex expression of 
simple class hatred, the moment of action in the scene of desti-
tution (“weapons / can be made from anything”), the ability to 
make exhaustion into a power of negativity (never work/never 
argue), the discovery of a totally alternative universe in a po-
etry that does nothing more than — that can do nothing more 
than — define its own words, and the cynicism and bliss and in-
extinguishable hilarity of all this, and the delight in brokenness: 
“glass breaks easily.” Most things break easily. Language breaks 
easily. Most poetry is wretched not because language is hard to 
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break but because people are afraid to break it. so break it. don’t 
argue. just fucking break it. stop killing yourself.
I’ll try to summarize.
I’ve tended to think that what I have taught myself to reject is 
false arguments about political life, in favor of a sober recogni-
tion of what is in front of me. I have found this way of thinking 
liberating, and it has also led me inexorably towards depression 
and a kind of political paralysis.
I now realize that I had in mind at the same time another kind 
of development that needs to be independently defined. This is 
rejection of argument on their terms, in favor not of the world as 
it is, but of self-definition. The former thinking involves a kind 
of retreat into the self and its circle of intimate attachments. The 
latter involves an affirmation of the self by means of its reclama-
tion from a world that immiserates it. It says, I will not waste my 
time on this. We will have our own definition of royalty, as well 
as of what it means to kill it. It says fuck the pigs at this moment 
and throughout all eternity.
And this is the relation that I have needed Sean’s poetry to 
clarify for me. I want to state it plainly because I am not certain 
that I can prevent myself from forgetting it: the poetry of our 
self-definition seems always to be receding into the poetry of 
our disillusionment. The “idealism vs. realism” conflict (some-
where else you call it “the world as I experience it” vs. “how I’d 
like it to look, feel, run”)11 is a travesty of the greater conflict in 
our lives, and yet it constantly reasserts itself over it. Its capacity 
for reassertion is the most important thing about it. It is so hard 
to get free of it. It is so much easier to imagine a “real world” 
and some realm of empty ideas that falsifies it than it is to say 
convincingly that I am not willing to argue, because the first way 
of thinking is just an inert conceptual model whereas the sec-
ond is an attitude and a trial and in its own small way a point 
11 Lotte L.S., “Strange Country: On Ai, Frank Stanford, and Page Expecta-
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of no return; and the attitude (Kirill Medvedev might call it the 
“noise”)12 is always dying out, daily, leaving the model behind it, 
like the sketch of a body on a pavement. Here is the death-mask 
for our own living hatred of empty ideas. And I fucking love 
this last poem by Sean because every time I read it I see in its 
absolute fatigue and disillusionment a way out, into the smallest 
dimensions of itself and across into the realization that this is 
how I have always wanted my life to sound.
●
To never truly be convinced by the act of naming (and 
thereby writing) is to forever do a double take on my own 
intentions. Names individualise the context in which we 
think and act together, and yet to write of an undisclosed 
“we” — whether “for,” “with,” “about,” or “to” — is to repre-
sent, one way or another. Why claim words that belong to 
us all? It is an anarchist tradition to disbelieve copyright or 
ownership, to refuse to talk on behalf of the group, to re-
ject an identified and uniformed set of desires or ideals. To 
recognise that our thoughts and desires are the products of 
numerous people, but not some cognate “movement” or ho-
mogenous group — not a “group” at all.
I am more interested in celebrating Sean’s ability to liberate us 
from everything that is pointless and constipated in our culture 
than in mourning his disappearance from it. In my mind, po-
etry is a kind of street party that runs through all the wars and 
pandemics and Tory Party conferences and unfulfilled desires 
and suicides and breakdowns and out the other side; and no one 
gets into it unless they admit to themselves they can say any-
thing they fucking like; and the only thing you ever learn here is 
that that’s the only thing there is to do. I started to write poems 
12 Kirill Medvedev, “My Fascism (A Few Truths),” in It’s No Good, ed. Keith 
Gessen, trans. Keith Gessen with Mark Krotov, Cory Merrill, and Bela 
Shayevich (New York: Ugly Duckling Presse/N+1, 2012), 145.
196
wound building
only when I first realized this (late), and Sean just reminded me 
that I’ll realize it again before I write my last one too. It’s a law of 
nature, just like wealth is a crime.
But I said earlier that I’d say something about the rules you 
set out for talking about who “we” are (about who your “group 
that is not a group” is). The question of naming runs through 
the whole of the poem, but the passage that I quoted above from 
the “p.s.” has the sense of a conclusion: “It is an anarchist tradi-
tion to disbelieve copyright or ownership, to refuse to talk on 
behalf of the group, to reject an identified and uniformed set of 
desires or ideals. To recognise that our thoughts and desires are 
the products of numerous people, but not some cognate ‘move-
ment’ or homogenous group — not a ‘group’ at all.” I feel like 
you kind of end up — maybe there’s a better word for it than 
this — falling back on this assertion? Why should we expect an-
archist “traditions” to solve any of our problems? — since they 
haven’t done such a good job up until now — and yet that’s also 
why the claim seems true to me. I’ve been searching in my head 
for weeks for a phrase to describe the overtone in it, the noise 
that it makes, and it’s only now that I realize stupidly and with 
a feeling almost of embarrassment that one of the reasons why 
the passage stood out to me in the first place is that that sound, 
of a mind falling back on its principles and refusing to budge, is 
the same sound that you get in “Confession 2.” I’m not willing to 
argue. And then I think of a structure of thought that I associate 
with the poetry of Lisa Jeschke: better to be blurry and forget-
table than crisp and immediately perceptible. Better to fall back 
on an argument than make it. Better to be a living person strug-
gling to hold on to a scrap of meaning than a corpse drowned 
in a sea of it. Better the anarchist tradition of refusing to talk on 
behalf of the group — and better its crudest rule of thumb about 
how to conduct yourself in a street protest — than even the most 
cleverly sophisticated intellectual tradition of cravenly selling it 
out. Like Sean would have said, it’s obvious. If we want to write 
useful poems, we have to keep on reminding ourselves of how it 
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feels to refuse to step out of the road. Of course one of the ways 
to do that is actually to refuse to do it.
Poetry is the street party that runs through the middle of an 
unconscionable reality / argument is the court order that pro-
scribes it. I have found in my own life that the less willing we 
are to debate, the more we’re able to say, and I’ve spent so much 
time arguing about this here that I’ve hardly said anything about 
what your poem contains and invokes: things that people have 
said to us. Little slivers of conversation coming free from their 
times and places, floating instances, plastic chairs, community 
notice boards, bedrooms, the non-developmental spaces in our 
lives, lights moving across the walls, orange hesitating to pink 
in the hospital receptions and reception centers, one feeling 
wrapped around another, and the way that these realities seem 
to move away from us as we step towards them, as the mirages 
of our anti-capitalism; and “what could happen if we just left 
[them] alone?”13 The obvious implication is that we feel some 
compulsion to do something to them (to argue about them? to 
fuck them up and mis-describe them?) because these are the 
kinds of persons we are, and these are the lives that we lead: 
“happens in floating instances,” and other semi-anagrams for 
the word happiness.14 I will never feel truly certain about my 
ability to talk about things that can only be seen when they are 
left slightly out of focus, “poems after Rimbaud,” flowers, pro-
tests, starlings, daylight, the nineteenth century, Regents Street 
or Jupiter, an unwanted phone call and the glass window be-
tween the lifts and the corridor of the secure ward, drunken 
speech and the need to trash sentiment whose title could be “the 
13 “voices rising up from the back / of the room / singing / ‘no, I don’t want 
you to turn his death / into a theatre performance / funded by the state’ / 
not everything must become ‘art,’ / become ‘cause,’ become trans-
formed — what could happen if you just left it alone?”
14 “Happens in floating instances / that yellow / and dampen / a hindsight 
that differs / depending on who is looking / a group which never actually 




absence /”15 or sunlight through an eyelid or our class enemies 
or the “UK general election of 2019” in the meridian of its con-
jugations of displaced feeling. And can I hold on to it? And can 
I prevent myself from destroying it? For me, the important dif-
ference is not between this state that I am now gesturing toward 
with a list of nouns and “clarity.” That would just be the ideal 
vs. reality protocol again. It’s the difference between that feeling 
and the feeling of sprinting onto a runway to stop a plane taking 
off. We need both. There will always be spaces in which we are 
left behind. There are always ways to pass back out of them in a 
blur. We love the people who have shown us it is possible.
Brussels 1872 / London 2020: here are some of my instinctual 
aversions. I don’t want to talk about memories. I don’t want to 
talk about “my” past. I don’t want to talk about the places where 
we drank or community centers or listservs or how much care it 
took on the part of the people I have written about to persuade 
me that I could do what I am now doing. I pass through peri-
ods of thinking our political rulers are hateful distorted fascists 
who deserve to be assassinated and periods of thinking they are 
quite normal, unremarkable people whose lives are so tedious I 
can’t even bring myself to name them, and the sensation of this 
uncertainty is more valuable to me than any conceivable state 
of elucidation. I spend my day trying to write a few sentenc-
es about this, and I wake up in the middle of the night from a 
nightmare in which the idea of a decade is something solid and 
impermeable and looming until the 5 a.m. air comes in through 
the window and dispels it. And like you I want to say “fuck you” 
to the deadening influence of remembrance, and to plant that 
“fuck you” like a flower in a landscape where the light is incapa-
ble of failing, and like you I both can and cannot do it. 
oh well.  
15 “old NASA training camps / the absence / of landmarks” […]
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Fig. 1. Sean Bonney, Baudelaire Collage, September 2006.  
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